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Between 2011 and 2015, the Wayne County Treasurer completed
the property tax foreclosure process for one in four properties in
Detroit, Michigan. No other American city has experienced this
elevated rate of property tax foreclosures since the Great Depression.
Studies reveal that the City of Detroit systematically and illegally
inflated the assessed value of most of its residential properties, which
led to inflated property tax bills unaffordable to many homeowners.
Extraordinary tax foreclosure rates and extensive dispossession
resulted. Consequently, Detroit has become a “predatory city”—a
new and important sociolegal concept that this Article develops.
Predatory cities are urban areas where public officials
systematically take property from residents and transfer it to public
coffers, intentionally or unintentionally violating domestic laws or
basic human rights. Detroit is not alone. Ferguson, Missouri, New
Orleans, Louisiana, and Washington, D.C. are among the other US
cities where state actors have used illegal methods to augment public
coffers. Although this practice affects many urban areas, US legal
scholarship has almost completely overlooked the phenomenon of
predatory cities.
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This Article is the first attempt to understand the intersecting
economic, social, and political factors that have caused these
struggling cities to become predatory. Through an ethnographic study
of illegal property tax assessments in Detroit, I find that predatory
systems, rather than a few predatory people, initiated and perpetuated
the illicit practices. More specifically, several factors made the City
and its residents extremely vulnerable, and thus susceptible, to
predation. Against this backdrop of vulnerability, certain legal and
governance failures created structural opportunities for predation to
advance at scale. Using the Detroit case, this Article identifies,
defines, and examines the phenomenon of predatory cities, which
scholars and policy makers must begin to better understand and
address.
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INTRODUCTION
When Amazon publicly announced that it was searching for a second
headquarters, 238 cities placed bids to lure the powerhouse online retailer and
capture its promise of jobs and economic prosperity.1 Many financially desperate
cities view investments from companies like Amazon as the only cure to their
deeply entrenched economic ills.2 But private sector investment is elusive.3 With
few other options, cities have increasingly sought to raise much-needed revenue
from their own residents by increasing parking and traffic citations, passing jail
expenditures onto incarcerated populations, and shifting other expenses that once
came from the public purse onto private citizens.4 Some cities, however, have
taken these extractive practices too far. They have become predatory. Predatory
cities are urban areas where public officials systematically take property from
residents and transfer it to public coffers, intentionally or unintentionally
violating domestic laws or basic human rights. This Article explores the
question: Why do some financially desperate cities become predatory?
After experiencing decades of economic decline—which worsened in the
years just before it declared the largest municipal bankruptcy in US history—
Detroit has devolved into a predatory city.5 Between 2009 and 2015, the City of
Detroit, located within Wayne County, Michigan, assessed 53 to 84 percent of
homes in violation of the Michigan Constitution, which states that no property

1. See Elizabeth Weise, Amazon Second Headquarters: Some Expect Another Round of
Finalists
Before
Winning
Bid,
USA
TODAY
(Apr.
30,
2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2018/04/30/could-we-waiting-not-winner-but-round-twoamazons-mulls-game-changing-decision-its-second-headquarte/554045002 [https://perma.cc/XB8FR4HC].
2. Paul Foley, Local Economic Policy and Job Creation: A Review of Evaluation Studies, 29
URB. STUD. 557 (1992) (reviewing studies on Enterprise Zones, the Regional Enterprise Grant, and
other economic development initiatives); Rodrick Miller, The Tortoise and the Hare: Economic
Competitiveness
in
the
Amazon
Era,
FDI
ALLIANCE
(Dec.
2017),
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/a90217_bef9f493000c452f95da4f4db96376c2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K65P-BBRM] (article written by the former President and CEO of the Detroit
Economic Growth Corporation (2014–2017) and current CEO of Invest Puerto Rico).
3. Less than three months after Amazon promised its new headquarters would be in New York
and Northern Virginia, it pulled out of its New York location despite the city’s promise of massive tax
breaks. See Update on Plans for New York City Headquarters, AMAZON BLOG: DAY ONE (Feb. 14,
2019), https://blog.aboutamazon.com/company-news/update-on-plans-for-new-york-city-headquarters
[https://perma.cc/U2HE-MJ4N].
4. See, e.g., Matthew Shaer, How Cities Make Money by Fining the Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/08/magazine/cities-fine-poor-jail.html
[https://perma.cc/8FA3-563H]; Tanzina Vega, Costly Prison Fees Are Putting Inmates Deep in Debt,
CNN MONEY (Sept. 18, 2015), https://money.cnn.com/2015/09/18/news/economy/prison-feesinmates-debt/index.html [https://perma.cc/5LFD-JEPK].
5. See James Spiotto, Detroit’s Bankruptcy is the Nation’s Largest, N.Y. TIMES (July 18,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/07/18/us/detroit-bankruptcy-is-the-largest-innation.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/69DJ-QAUP].
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shall be assessed at more than 50 percent of its market value.6 This led to illegally
inflated property taxes that many homeowners could not afford to pay.7
Consequently, the Wayne County Treasurer confiscated homes at historic rates
for non-payment of property taxes. To make matters worse, many affected
residents were not even supposed to be paying property taxes in the first place
because they live below the federal poverty threshold and hence qualified for the
Poverty Tax Exemption (PTE).8
Mr. Jones’s story perfectly illustrates the problem. He was born in Detroit
and has never called any other city home.9 He remembers the army tanks that
ominously rolled down his tree-lined street during the 1967 uprising. He told me
about the good old days when working at a car factory placed your family
comfortably in the middle class. He also recalled when the factories left, sending
his beloved City in a downward economic spiral. Nevertheless, through the good
times and the bad, “I stuck it out here,” Mr. Jones said in a melancholy tone.10
In 2012, after a lifetime as a blue-collar worker, Mr. Jones finally saved
enough money to purchase his first home. He paid $2,500, which was the
approximate price others paid for similar threadbare homes in his neighborhood.
Although Mr. Jones’s home had been stripped, leaving only a shell with no
windows, no furnace, no water, and no electrical lines, the City taxed his home
as if it was worth $49,824—a clear violation of the Michigan Constitution’s
mandate prohibiting property tax assessments from exceeding 50 percent of a
property’s market value. Mr. Jones’s only source of income was his pension, and
he qualified for the PTE because his earnings fell below the federal poverty
line.11 But Mr. Jones was unaware of this entitlement and never applied. In the
end, Mr. Jones was unable to pay his illegally inflated property tax bill, so the
Wayne County Treasurer foreclosed upon his home and sold it at auction for
$2,900. Mr. Jones lamented: “It’s hard to describe the feeling when you lose your
home, but it’s an embarrassment that I don’t think a person should go through
more than once, if they survive it the first time.”12
6. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
7. See Bernadette Atuahene & Timothy R. Hodge, Stategraft, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 263, 266
(2018). When Wayne County was brought to task for this unconstitutional behavior, however, the case
never received a ruling on the merits and was instead dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. See infra note
316 and accompanying text.
8. Forty percent of Detroit residents live below the federal poverty line. See Community Facts,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml
[https://perma.cc/T8PM-DZTW]; Alexa Eisenberg et al., ‘It’s Like They Make It Difficult for You on
Purpose’: Barriers to Property Tax Relief and Foreclosure Prevention in Detroit, Michigan, HOUSING
STUD. (Sept. 2019).
9. See Bernadette Atuahene, Opinion: Don’t Let Detroit’s Revival Rest on an Injustice, N.Y.
TIMES (July 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/22/opinion/sunday/dont-let-detroits-revivalrest-on-an-injustice.html [https://perma.cc/3TSB-P77S].
10. Interview with Mr. Jones (Mar. 15, 2017) (on file with author); see also Atuahene, supra
note 9.
11. Interview with Mr. Jones, supra note 10.
12. Id.
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Detroit, however, is not the only city engaging in this particular type of
predatory behavior. A recent Pulitzer Prize nominated Chicago Tribune series
found that homes in minority neighborhoods on the south and west sides of
Chicago were paying effective tax rates twice as high as those in wealthier,
predominately white neighborhoods on the north side.13 In addition, the
preliminary results of an ongoing study by Christopher Berry show that most
local property tax assessors not only in Chicago and Detroit, but also in New
York City, Philadelphia, St. Louis, Phoenix, Miami, Los Angeles, Las Vegas,
Boston, and Seattle are systemically inflating the property tax assessments of
poor and minority homeowners in violation of existing laws.14
In addition to property tax overcharges, judges, police, and other public
officials also supplement public budgets by illegally extracting funds from
residents. This includes New Orleans judges who jail defendants when they do
not have the ability to pay court fees; Ferguson police who engage in
unconstitutional policing and issue discriminatory fines; and Washington, D.C.
police who abuse civil forfeiture laws. Fiscal austerity endured by economically
embattled cities sometimes pushes officials to cut corners and violate laws in
order to augment shrinking budgets and replenish public coffers. This is a trend
that scholars and policy makers can no longer afford to ignore.
In Detroit, Washington, D.C., Ferguson, New Orleans, as well as many
other cities where public officials are illicitly taking money from residents to
bolster public coffers, the burning question is: Why? In Part I, I use ethnographic
methods to examine the case of unconstitutional property tax assessments in
Detroit to determine how the City became predatory. I find that the illegality
commenced and persisted because of predatory systems, not a few predatory
people. More specifically, I find that systemic racism, economic and political
troubles, corporate malfeasance, poor state-level funding, and overstretched civil
society organizations rendered Detroit and its residents vulnerable. Against this
backdrop of vulnerability, legal and governance failures—such as legal
contradictions, concealment, impaired internal accountability, legal limitations,
and financial advantage—created structural pressures, precipitating the
predation.
In Part II, I look beyond Detroit to construct the theory of predatory cities.
I describe how the concept builds upon, but is distinct from, existing theoretical
concepts. I then demonstrate that the problem of state actors enlarging state
coffers through illegal actions is not unique to Detroit. In addition, I show that
this problem expands beyond property tax administration and encompasses

13. See
generally
THE TAX DIVIDE,
CHI. TRIB.
(Apr.
25,
2018),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/investigations/ct-tax-divide-investigation-20180425storygallery.html [https://perma.cc/7NXU-PTVD] (a collection of articles forming an investigation into
Cook County’s unique tax system and its unequal burden upon residents).
14. Christopher Berry, An Evaluation of Property Tax Regressivity in the States, U. CHI. HARRIS
PUB. POL’Y (Apr. 18, 2018) (unpublished) (on file with author).
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many other domains, including abuses of municipal code enforcement, civil
forfeiture, and court fines and fees. In sum, this Article establishes predatory
cities as a significant and far-reaching phenomenon worthy of further study by
legal scholars and social scientists.
I.
THE CASE STUDY: UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENTS IN
DETROIT

0

Number of Tax Foreclosures
5,000
10,000 15,000 20,000

25,000

The magnitude of Detroit’s property tax foreclosure crisis is immense.
Between 2011 and 2015, the Wayne County Treasurer completed the foreclosure
process for about 100,000 Detroit properties.15 Given that there are about
385,000 properties in the city, approximately one in four properties completed
the property tax foreclosure process during this five-year period.16 When
considering only residential properties with a structure, approximately 30
percent completed the tax foreclosure process during this period (See Figure 1).17
Americans have not witnessed such massive numbers of property tax
foreclosures since the Great Depression. In recent years, foreclosure levels have
dropped slightly—Wayne County auctioned about 50,000 Detroit properties
between 2015 and 2018—but they are still exceptional.18
Figure 1: Foreclosures of Residential Properties with Structures in Detroit19

2011

2012

2013

Residential with Structure

2014

2015
Other

Property tax foreclosures stem from delinquent property tax bills.
Authorities calculate property tax bills by multiplying the assessed value of a

15. See Atuahene & Hodge, supra note 7, at 266–67.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. E-mail from Jerry Paffendorf (Nov. 28, 2018, 11:59 AM) (on file with author) (data obtained
through FOIA requests from Wayne County).
19. “Other” includes residential properties without structures on them, such as vacant lots.
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property (minus any exemptions) by the property tax rate.20 Consequently, if
assessed values are inflated, the property tax bills will also be overstated. On
several occasions, Mike Duggan—Detroit’s mayor—admitted that the City of
Detroit is overassessing its residents.21 Tim Hodge and I conducted a study that
found Detroit is not only overassessing its residents, but it is doing so in violation
of the Michigan Constitution.22 The Michigan Constitution, supporting
legislation, and case law all state the assessed value of a property divided by its
market value cannot exceed 0.5.23 Between 2009 and 2015, however, the City of
Detroit assessed 53 to 84 percent of its residential properties in violation of the
Michigan Constitution.24
Moreover, our study found that while Detroit’s Assessment Division is
assessing most higher-valued properties at or even below this constitutionally
permitted limit of 0.5, it assesses lower-valued properties significantly in excess
of the limit.25 For instance, in 2009, the Division, on average, assessed the lowest
valued properties at levels eighteen times larger than the constitutionally
permitted assessment to market value ratio of 0.5 (9.02), middle-value properties
at two times more than the permitted limit (1.00), and the highest valued
properties below the permitted limit (0.38).26
We determined these estimates using an assessment ratio study (also known
as ratio study or sales ratio study), which is the primary mechanism that taxing
authorities, taxpayers, and appeal boards use to determine if assessments meet a
jurisdiction’s legal requirements.27 Michigan law requires that analysts include
only arm’s length transactions—involving a willing buyer and a willing seller—
in their calculations.28 But there is an exception when non-arm’s length
20. For more on the property tax assessment process, see Bernadette Atuahene & Christopher
Berry, Taxed Out: Illegal Property Tax Assessments and the Epidemic of Tax Foreclosures in Detroit,
9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 847, 856–69 (2019).
21. City of Detroit, New Property Assessment Reductions, YOUTUBE (Jan. 28, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OB4WiRUJzzg [https://perma.cc/GUX8-P9KE] (Mayor Mike
Duggan addressing the City of Detroit: “As I said when I was campaigning, I felt like the assessments
in this city were higher than the actual sales price that people could sell their house for.”).
22. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
23. Id.; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.27a(1) (West 2019); Great Lakes Div. of Nat’l Steep
Corp. v. City of Ecorse, 576 N.W.2d 667, 672 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
24. Atuahene & Hodge, supra note 7, at 286 (“[F]or properties sold between 2008 and 2014,
the majority of assessments violated the Michigan Constitution: 2009 (65%); 2010 (84%); 2011 (53%);
2012 (73%); 2013 (78%); 2014 (83%); 2015 (65%).”).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. INT’L ASS’N OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, STANDARD ON RATIO STUDIES 7, 10 (2013),
https://iaao.org/media/standards/Standard_On_Ratio_Studies.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S7ZD-QXRY]
(“assessors, appeals boards, taxpayers, and taxing authorities can use ratio studies to evaluate the fairness
of funding distributions, the merits of class action claims, or the degree of discrimination.”).
28. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.27(6) (West 2019) (requiring the purchase price used in
assessments to be “an arms-length transaction and not at a forced sale”); Cty. of Washtenaw v. State Tax
Comm’n, 373 N.W.2d 697, 705 (Mich. 1985); see also INT’L ASS’N OF ASSESSING OFFICERS,
GLOSSARY FOR PROPERTY APPRAISAL AND ASSESSMENT 9 (2d ed. 2013)
https://www.iaao.org/media/Pubs/IAAO_GLOSSARY.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YZQ-CMMG]. The
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transactions “have become a common method of acquisition in the jurisdiction
for the class of property being valued.”29 Even though non-arm’s length
transactions are, in fact, the common method of acquisition for Detroit’s
residential properties, we nevertheless included only arm’s length transactions
in our calculations so that our estimates provide the most conservative measure
of unconstitutionality.30 Analysts who include non-arm’s length transactions in
their analysis will find that the measure of unconstitutionality is even worse.31
In another study, Christopher Berry and I examined all residential
properties in Detroit sold between 2009 and 2013. We found that—controlling
for purchase price, location, and time-of-sale—10 percent of these homes would
not have gone through tax foreclosure but for illegally inflated tax assessments.32
Additionally, since the Detroit Assessment Division overassessed lower-priced
homes at a greater frequency and magnitude than higher priced homes, we
estimated that 25 percent of tax foreclosures among homes in the bottom price
quintile (less than $9,000 in sale price) were due to unconstitutional property tax
assessments.33 The empirical evidence confirms that Detroit’s unrivaled property
tax foreclosure rates are illegitimate.
These illegitimate property tax foreclosures have dire consequences for
individuals, families, and communities. Alexander Tsai has comprehensively
reviewed the empirical literature and found that most studies conclude
foreclosure adversely impacts the physical and mental health of individuals and
communities.34 Specifically, studies consistently find that foreclosure prompts
increased stress, shame, alcohol abuse, depression, suicide, psychological
distress, and anxiety.35 In addition, high foreclosure rates destroy communities,

IAAO describes “market value” as the price “which a property should bring in a competitive and open
market under all conditions requisite for a fair sale, the buyer and seller each acting prudently and
knowledgeably, and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.” Id. at 101.
29. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.27(1) (West 2019).
30. See Atuahene & Hodge, supra note 7, at 275, 284 & Table 2 (showing that, of 123,400
property sales in Detroit from 2008 to 2014, only five percent were conducted at arm’s length).
31. This is because the market values for non-arm’s length sales—which includes properties
sold through auction—are typically lower than for arm’s length sales.
32. Atuahene & Berry, supra note 20, at 886.
33. Id.
34. Alexander C. Tsai, Home Foreclosure, Health, and Mental Health: A Systematic Review of
Individual, Aggregate, and Contextual Associations, PLOS ONE (Apr. 7, 2015),
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0123182&type=printable
[https://perma.cc/JCA7-KU3K].
35. See Kathleen A. Cagney et al., The Onset of Depression During the Great Recession:
Foreclosure and Older Adult Mental Health, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 498, 498 (2014); Meredith
Horowski, Housing Instability and Health: Findings from the Michigan Recession and Recovery Study,
Policy
Brief
#29,
NAT’L
POVERTY
CTR.
(Mar.
2012),
http://www.npc.umich.edu/publications/policy_briefs/brief29/NPC%20Policy%20Brief%20%2029.pdf [https://perma.cc/EP7Q-85QS]; Jason N. Houle & Michael T. Light, The Home Foreclosure
Crisis and Rising Suicide Rates, 2005 to 2010, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1073, 1073 (2014); Karen
McCormack, Comfort and Burden: The Changing Meaning of Home for Owners At-Risk of
Foreclosure, 35 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 421, 426 (2012); Tsai, supra note 34, at 12–13.
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especially when the foreclosure displaces long-standing residents. The evidence
suggests that foreclosed homes routinely remain unoccupied and neglected and
enter, once again, into tax foreclosure.36 These vacant homes are more
susceptible to blight and arson, which adversely affect the safety and economic
value of occupied homes nearby.37 Increased foreclosure rates are also associated
with heightened crime rates and feelings of insecurity.38 Without question,
unconstitutional property tax assessments and the resulting tax foreclosures are
a scourge.
A. Methodology
I use mixed methods to empirically explore the advancement of
unconstitutional property tax assessments in Detroit. In prior quantitative work,
my co-authors and I employed assessment ratio studies as well as regression
analysis to establish that the City of Detroit has been systematically assessing its
residents in violation of Michigan law.39 But to expose why state actors have
perpetrated this routinized illegality, I adopt qualitative methods, which reveal
nuances and subtleties that quantitative methodologies often miss. Consequently,
after obtaining Institutional Review Board clearance from IIT, Chicago-Kent
College of Law, I conducted an ethnography that relies principally on participant
observation and semi-structured interviews.
1. Participant Observation
There are three primary ways to conduct an observational study: (1) full
participant observation (when subjects know that observations are being made
and who is making them), (2) partial participant observation (when some
subjects know that observations are being made but some do not), and (3)
onlooker observation (when no one knows that observations are being made).40
This study employs full participant observation, as I moved to Detroit and lived
there full time from January 2017 to December 2019 in order to actively partake
36. See Margaret Dewar, The Effects on Cities of “Best Practice” in Tax Foreclosure: Evidence
from Detroit and Flint, CLOSUP Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2, (2009) [hereinafter Dewar, The
Effects on Cities of “Best Practice”], http://closup.umich.edu/files/closup-wp-2-tax-foreclosure.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YRA8-HNLV].
37. See id. at 5; Violet Ikonomova, As Tax Foreclosures Give Wayne County a Short-Term
Financial Boost, Is There Incentive for an Overhaul?, DETROIT METRO TIMES (June 14, 2017),
https://www.metrotimes.com/detroit/as-the-system-gives-wayne-county-a-short-term-financial-boostis-there-incentive-for-an-overhaul/Content?oid=4179545 [https://perma.cc/2FRH-ECRD]; Loveland
Tech., The Detroit Fire Report: An In-Depth Look at a Year of Fires in the City of Detroit,
https://detroitfires.squarespace.com/#cover [https://perma.cc/594G-BPFY].
38. Cagney et al., supra note 35, at 498; Houle & Light, supra note 35, at 1075.
39. Bernadette Atuahene, “Our Taxes Are Too Damn High”: Institutional Racism, Property
Tax Assessments, and the Fair Housing Act, 112 N.W. U. L. REV. 1501, 1544 (2018) [hereinafter
Atuahene, Our Taxes Are Too Damn High]; Atuahene & Berry, supra note 20, at 862; Atuahene &
Hodge, supra note 7, at 266.
40. See Mark C. Lashley, Observational Research Methods, in THE SAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMMUNICATION RESEARCH METHODS (Mike Allen ed., 2017).
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in ongoing activities and systematically record observations related to the
property tax foreclosure crisis.
To begin the immersion, I moved into a downtown Detroit high-rise
building. It took six months to get situated, learn the city, and make contacts. I
spent the remaining eighteen months living on the city’s eastside in the 48214
zip code, where 85.4% of the zip code’s population is African American, 37.5%
live below the poverty level, 20.7% have not graduated from high school, and
only 19.3% have attained a bachelor’s degree or higher.41 Most importantly,
between 2002 and 2013, 19% of the properties in this zip code (2,903 out of
15,160) completed the tax foreclosure process.42 I became fully integrated into
the area by becoming an active member of a church whose explicit mission is to
minister in the 48214 zip code, frequenting local establishments, and attending
local block club and community meetings. Once integrated, I obtained a solid
understanding of the tax foreclosure crisis from the perspective of those I lived
beside.
In addition to being embedded on the eastside, I was also a convener of the
Coalition to End Unconstitutional Tax Foreclosures (the “Coalition”), which has
three foundational goals: (1) stop unconstitutional property tax assessments; (2)
compensate Detroit residents who have already lost their homes through illegally
inflated property tax bills they could not afford to pay; and (3) suspend pending
property tax foreclosures until authorities can confirm that delinquent taxpayers
have not been unconstitutionally assessed. With twelve different grassroots
organizations under its umbrella, the Coalition is a major player in rectifying the
property tax foreclosure crisis.
My integral involvement with the Coalition, as well as my residence on the
city’s eastside, provided extraordinary access to community members, activists,
policy makers, government bureaucrats, foundations, social service
organizations, and other key players. For instance, when the Coalition was
involved in creating and passing an ordinance related to the Poverty Tax
Exemption, I was in constant contact and meetings with many city officials
responsible for property tax administration. I would arrive early and intentionally
use the time before the meeting to ask questions, verify facts, and familiarize
myself with the views of key city officials. Also, I commonly followed key actors
to their offices after the meeting in order to continue the conversation.

41. COMMUNITY FACTS, supra note 8 (search for zip code 48214 under “Community Facts”).
Comparatively, the Census reported that, nationwide, 30.3 percent of individuals have attained a
bachelor’s degree or higher, 87.0 percent have graduated from high school, and 15.1 percent of the U.S.
population is determined to be below the poverty level. Id.
42. For a list of all parcels recorded as completing the tax foreclosure process between 2002 and
2013, see Archival Tax Foreclosures in Detroit, 2002—2013, DATA DRIVEN DETROIT,
https://hub.arcgis.com/datasets/D3::archival-tax-foreclosures-in-detroit-2002-2013
[https://perma.cc/C4AK-SNNH] (127 properties completed the tax foreclosure process twice and ten
properties completed it three times).
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Although participant observation is the primary methodology I employ in
this study, it is not without its drawbacks. The observer bias and observer effect
are two aspects of participant observation with which researchers must grapple
when designing their studies. The most discussed type of observer bias is what
anthropologists call the problem of “going native,” which is when observers’
ability to identify and record is compromised by their deep affinity for the group
under study.43 In contrast, the observer effect occurs when researchers are not
concealed and thus impact the individuals they observe.44
The fact that I was a convenor of the Coalition is a prime example of the
observer effect and bias. I was truly a participant-observer and embraced the
inherent tensions of this dual role. While in the activist role, my actions deeply
impacted how certain city residents and officials viewed and responded to the
very phenomenon under study. But it also enabled me to build deep rapport with
city officials and residents, which allowed me to unveil many truths inaccessible
to strangers. It is important to note that—even if I did not take on an activist
role—my ethnographic observations could not be neutral.45 Uninvolved
outsiders who do not impact the phenomenon under study may not be tainted by
their subjects or their involvement, but they are tainted by their personal
experiences. The only way to deal with this ever-present bias is for researchers
to be honest about how their positionality affects their data collection. Pretending
to be neutral is unproductive.
2. Semi-structured Interviews
In order to understand the property tax foreclosure crisis from the
perspective of those most acutely affected, I conducted formal, semi-structured
interviews with Detroit residents who experienced tax foreclosure. Most of the
interviewees were people who had received help from United Community
Housing Coalition (UCHC), a longstanding Detroit nonprofit that has been
leading local efforts to prevent property tax foreclosure. In 2017, a UCHC
volunteer called clients who had lost homes to foreclosure between 2014 and
2016 to ask if they would be willing to participate in this study. About one
hundred clients expressed interest, so the research team called each one to
schedule a phone interview.
I then personally conducted all the interviews, which typically lasted from
thirty to ninety minutes. I stopped interviewing when I reached the point of data

43. See generally Clifford Geertz, “From the Native’s Point of View”: On the Nature of
Anthropological Understanding, 28 BULL. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 26 (1974).
44. See, e.g., Morris S. Schwartz & Charlotte Green Schwartz, Problems in Participant
Observation, 60 AM. J. SOC. 343, 346 (1955).
45. See Lashley, supra note 40. But see Karen O’Reilly, Going “Native”, in KEY CONCEPTS IN
ETHNOGRAPHY (2009) (“[I]t is increasingly recognized that complete physical and emotional distance
is neither possible nor even desirable.”).
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saturation.46 In total, I conducted fifty-nine semi-structured interviews. Each
respondent received a $20 Subway© gift certificate as a research incentive and
in gratitude for their time. I also conducted interviews with the leadership of
community organizations actively fighting for residents affected by property tax
foreclosure. I conducted all interviews of residents and activists with the promise
of confidentiality, and thus I use pseudonyms in this Article to protect their
identities.
To ensure that I examined the property tax foreclosure crisis from every
possible angle, I also interviewed relevant policy makers and bureaucrats. Given
their role as public servants, most of these interviews proceeded without the
promise of confidentiality. Respondents include several Detroit City Council
members, the Wayne County Treasurer, Detroit’s Chief Assessor, the Chairman
of Detroit’s Board of Review, the head of Detroit’s Department of Housing and
Redevelopment, and many others public servants involved with property tax
administration in Detroit. Although I interacted with Detroit’s Mayor, Mike
Duggan, through the participant observation, he was the only key governmental
actor to refuse a formal interview.47
In sum, participant observation in combination with semi-structured
interviews created space for a comprehensive understanding of how
unconstitutional property tax assessments proliferated, leading Detroit to
become a predatory city. As with all ethnographic work, the goal is not to suggest
that the reasons I identify in the Detroit case are generalizable to all predatory
cities. Instead, my results generate empirically informed hypotheses about why
other cities become predatory. Using both qualitative and quantitative methods,
other scholars can test whether these hypotheses are durable across various cases.
B. The Genesis of a Predatory City
Given the damage wrought, the most pressing question is: Why did
unconstitutional property tax assessments proliferate in Detroit? In this Section,
I use the Detroit case to begin exploring why predatory cities exist in advanced
liberal democracies with well-developed legal infrastructure and an avowed
commitment to the rule of law.

46. Data saturation is when the same themes, facts, and emotional responses are repeated
continually, and new information is sparse. See Patricia L. Fusch & Lawrence R. Ness, Are We There
Yet? Data Saturation in Qualitative Research, 20 QUALITATIVE REP. 1408, 1409 (2015).
47. When our research team requested an interview—making clear we were not party to the
ongoing litigation (see infra note 303)—Mayor Duggan personally sent the following reply on June 4,
2017: “As you know, this matter is the subject of pending litigation. Whether you are a party to that
litigation yourself doesn’t change the fact that I cannot comment on the subject matter of pending
litigation. I respectfully ask that you direct requests for discussions on this matter to the city law
department.” E-mail from Mike Duggan, Mayor of Detroit, to Bernadette Atuahene, Professor of Law,
IIT, Chicago-Kent Coll. of Law (June 4, 2017, 16:31 CDT) (on file with author).
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1. The Creation of Vulnerability
Through an interplay of factors, public and private institutions actively
constructed vulnerability in Detroit, and this set the background conditions
necessary for unconstitutional property tax assessments to flourish. Martha
Fineman has written extensively on vulnerability and defines it as “the universal
and constant susceptibility to change, both positive and negative, in our physical
and social well-being that exists over the life course.”48 Although classical
liberalism dismisses vulnerability and venerates the ability to ‘pull yourself up
by your bootstraps,’ independence and self-sufficiency are myths. As many
feminist scholars have noted, to become an autonomous individual, people
depend upon family, community, and various forms of state assistance.49 Since
interdependence is the true status quo, a vulnerability analysis acknowledges the
role of both state and non-state actors in co-producing volatility.
In Detroit, public and private entities constructed the vulnerability of
African Americans through discriminatory zoning, racially restrictive covenants,
urban renewal, mortgage and insurance redlining, and predatory mortgage
lending. When public officials allowed unconstitutional property tax
assessments to proliferate, they worsened existing vulnerabilities. Although
many civil society organizations serve and protect vulnerable populations, they
were overstretched and thus unable to arrest unconstitutional property tax
assessments and the resulting property tax foreclosure crisis. In addition, due to
years of economic decline, corrupt politicians, failing schools, reduced state
funding, and a historic municipal bankruptcy, the City of Detroit itself was
vulnerable: a violated violator worthy of sympathy.
a. Systemic Racism Creates Vulnerability
This wave of unconstitutional property tax assessments and tax
foreclosures is not the first time that state agents have abused African Americans
in Detroit and other metropolitan areas. Racial zoning, prevalent at the turn of
the twentieth century, is a prime example.50 In 1910, Baltimore was the first city
48. Email from Martha Albertson Fineman, to Bernadette Atuahene, Professor of Law, IIT,
Chicago-Kent Coll. of Law (Oct. 29, 2018, 13:44 CDT) (on file with author); see also Martha Albertson
Fineman, “Elderly” as Vulnerable: Rethinking the Nature of Individual and Societal Responsibility, 20
ELDER L.J. 71 (2012); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60
EMORY L.J. 251 (2010); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the
Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008) [hereinafter Fineman, Anchoring Equality].
49. See Susan Dodds, Dependence, Care, and Vulnerability, in VULNERABILITY: NEW ESSAYS
IN ETHICS AND FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 181, 183–84 (Catriona Mackenzie et al. eds., 2014); Fineman,
Anchoring Equality, supra note 48, at 19. See generally JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A
RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF, AUTONOMY, AND LAW 138 (2011).
50. See Christopher Silver, The Racial Origins of Zoning in American Cities, in URBAN
PLANNING AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY: IN THE SHADOWS (June Manning Thomas &
Marsha Ritzdorf eds., 1997) (describing the establishment of racial zoning ordinances as a substitute for
more direct forms of segregation and detailing the spread of such ordinances across major US cities
throughout the early twentieth century).
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to adopt a citywide ordinance, preventing certain racial groups from residing in
its boundaries.51 Detroit was not far behind.52 Although the Supreme Court
outlawed racial zoning in 1917, the practice nevertheless continued for several
years after.53
Eventually, local governments moved away from explicit racial zoning and
resorted instead to exclusionary zoning—a subtler means of excluding racial
minorities.54 Exclusionary zoning occurs when local governments preclude
certain types of land uses, such as low-income apartments, from their
jurisdictions by imposing lot size or density requirements. This limits the supply
of housing and thus increases its price, barring low-income individuals and
families from residing in these suburban communities. Exclusionary zoning
allows the market to do the dirty work by legally keeping certain people out.55
In Wayne County, curtailed access to suburban housing has locked African
Americans into racially segregated cities like Detroit, Inkster, and Highland
Park.
Similar to racial and exclusionary zoning, racially restrictive covenants also
prevented African Americans from taking residence in suburban communities
and accessing the attendant educational, social, and economic resources found
therein.56 A covenant is a private agreement between landowners that imposes
duties on subsequent owners who were not party to the initial agreement.57
Racially restrictive covenants ordinarily prevented African Americans (and in
the West also Asians) from occupying homes.58
Real estate boards and neighborhood associations in Northern cities created
and enforced racially restrictive covenants to subordinate African-Americans,
politely using contract law like Southern cities impolitely used lynchings and
cross burnings.59 As the Great Migration progressed and scores of African
Americans fled racial violence in the South to find refuge in Northern cities,60

51.
52.

Id.
THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN
POSTWAR DETROIT 3 (2014).
53. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917). Many cities ignored Buchanan, including
Atlanta, Indianapolis, New Orleans, Richmond, Kansas City, St. Louis, and Austin. See Silver, supra
note 50.
54. See Paul E. King, Exclusionary Zoning and Open Housing: A Brief Judicial History, 68
GEO. REV. 459, 469 (1978).
55. See Vill. of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (ruling exclusionary zoning
is legal).
56. See generally RICHARD R. W. BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD:
RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS (2013).
57. 68 A.L.R.2D 1022 COMMENT NOTE.—AFFIRMATIVE COVENANTS AS RUNNING WITH THE
LAND § 1 (1959).
58. See BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 56, at 53.
59. See Michael Jones-Correa, The Origins and Diffusion of Racial Restrictive Covenants, 115
POL. SCI. Q. 541, 559 (2000).
60. See generally ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS: THE EPIC STORY OF
AMERICA’S GREAT MIGRATION (2011).
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racially restrictive covenants kept them cloistered in segregated communities
with limited economic resources and dilapidated housing.61 In Detroit, the
NAACP reported:
The federal government encouraged the use of racially restrictive
covenants and, in one case, refused to make loans to a developer for a
housing development project unless he built a six-foot high wall to
separate his property from property owned by African Americans.62
In the 1940s, “80% of Detroit property outside the inner city was subject to
racial covenants, which white residents established neighborhood associations to
enforce.”63 So by the end of the 1940s, the majority of Detroit’s AfricanAmerican residents lived in a sixty-square block of the city’s Lower East Side.64
Because there were few neighborhoods in which African Americans could
reside, limited supply and great demand pushed up rental prices in these
segregated areas. Consequently, although the housing stock was inferior,
landlords charged African Americans 20 to 40 percent more in rent than they
charged white renters.65
While state and private actors used zoning laws and covenants to keep
African Americans separate from whites, urban renewal uprooted African
Americans from the inner-city communities in which they were sequestered.66
Urban renewal was when state agencies designated an area as blighted, used
eminent domain to acquire properties in the appointed zone, uprooted the
existing population, and transferred these properties to developers, subsidizing
the purchase price in exchange for the promise of redevelopment.67 James
Baldwin famously called it “Negro removal” because urban renewal
disproportionately affected African-American communities weakened by
segregation, emaciated tax bases, limited political influence, and a lack of quality
public services.68 By 1970, urban renewal displaced over 5,500 African61. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF
HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017).
62. NAACP, HISTORY OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST AFRICAN AMERICANS IN
DETROIT, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., https://www.naacpldf.org/files/ourwork/Detroit%20Housing%20Discrimination.pdf [https://perma.cc/PPP8-2MMD].
63. Id.
64. SUGRUE, supra note 52, at 23–24.
65. NAACP, supra note 62.
66. See generally MINDY THOMPSON FULLILOVE, ROOT SHOCK: HOW TEARING UP CITY
NEIGHBORHOODS HURTS AMERICA, AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2016).
67. Id.; see also Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 335 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (“Plaintiffs
contend that the City of Hamtramck and its mayor, its co-ordinator of urban renewal and its City
Planning Commission have intentionally planned and implemented urban renewal and other
government projects for the purpose of removing a substantial portion of Black citizens from the City.”);
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 61, at 122 (“In 1962, with federal urban renewal funds, the city [of Detroit]
began to demolish African American neighborhoods. The first project cleared land for expansion of a
Chrysler automobile manufacturing plant. Then, federal dollars were used to raze more homes to make
room for the Chrysler Expressway (I-75) leading to the plant.”).
68. Interview with James Baldwin by Kenneth Clark (June 24, 1963)
http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_C03ED1927DCF46B5A8C82275DF4239F9
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American families from their homes in Detroit.69 The Highway Act of 1956
exacerbated the displacement by disproportionately leveling African-American
communities to build freeways.70 For instance, authorities destroyed Black
Bottom—an iconic Detroit neighborhood that was home to the City’s first
African-American mayor, Coleman Young, Jr., and boxer Joe Louis—to make
room for Route 10 and I-75.71
When displaced African-American families tried to resettle in white
communities, whites often resisted, using an array of violent and nonviolent
tactics.72 If they failed to keep African Americans out, whites fled and took their
physical and social capital with them.73 With these impediments to moving into
adjacent suburbs firmly in place, most poor and working-class African
Americans only had the option of relocating from one segregated, distressed
neighborhood to another. Crime and despair thrived in these newly configured,
hyper-vulnerable communities, in part, because urban renewal disrupted and
diminished the social capital necessary to abate it.74
Urban renewal cleared the way for redlining and vice versa. Redlining is
when financial institutions (such as banks and insurance companies) cordon off
an area based on race and refuse to provide the capital and services necessary for
these communities to thrive.75 Redlining marked African-American
[https://perma.cc/HS2Q-KHN6]; see also Harry W. Reynolds, Jr., Population Displacement in Urban
Renewal, 22 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 113, 115–16 (1963) (“The computations of the Housing and Home
Finance Agency on this point suggest that 42,403 displaced families out of 61,200 in urban renewal sites
were non-white.”); Greg Miller, Maps Show How Tearing Down City Slums Displaced Thousands,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Dec. 15, 2017), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/12/urban-renewalprojects-maps-united-states [https://perma.cc/6PDU-2QPM] (“In cities like Philadelphia, Detroit, and
Atlanta, more than two-thirds of those displaced were people of color.”).
69. See Renewing Inequality: Urban Renewal, Family Displacements, and Race 1955–1966,
http://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/renewal [https://perma.cc/Q9KM-VMXT] (an interactive map
provided by the University of Richmond Digital Scholarship Lab).
70. 23 C.F.R. §§ 1–1399 (2018); see MARK H. ROSE, INTERSTATE: EXPRESS HIGHWAY
POLITICS, 1939–89, at 107 (1990); Federal Transit Authority: Transit Cooperative Research Program,
Consequences of the Development of the Interstate Highway System for Transit, 21 RES. RESULTS DIG.
1, 6 (1997), http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/tcrp/tcrp_rrd_21.pdf [https://perma.cc/UHA9-BTXG].
71. Johnny Miller, Roads to Nowhere: How Infrastructure Built on American Inequality,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/feb/21/roads-nowhereinfrastructure-american-inequality [https://perma.cc/7TTK-9Y5V].
72. NAACP, supra note 62 (In the 1950s, “there were over 200 recorded acts of white neighbors
harassing or committing violence against African American ‘pioneers’ attempting to integrate white
neighborhoods, including: mass protests, throwing brinks through windows and paint on the house,
burning effigies and crosses, breaking windows and physically attacking homeowners”).
73. See Reynolds Farley, Detroit Fifty Years After the Kerner Report: What Has Changed, What
Has Not, and Why?, 4 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 206, 208 (2018); Amy J. Schulz et al., Racial
and Spatial Relations as Fundamental Determinants of Health in Detroit, 80 MILBANK Q. 677, 684
(2002).
74. See FULLILOVE, supra note 66, at 53–70.
75. See JOHN P. KRETZMANN & JOHN L. MCKNIGHT, BUILDING COMMUNITIES FROM THE
INSIDE OUT: A PATH TOWARD FINDING AND MOBILIZING A COMMUNITY’S ASSETS 59–62 (1993)
(describing how urban renewal decimated neighborhoods, especially those which had previously housed
tight-knit migrant communities, and how that decimation had “ominous implications” for the strength

2020]

PREDATORY CITIES

123

communities as deviant and so financial institutions refrained from investing,
aggravating the existing physical degradation and social distress.76 By the 1940s,
redlining adversely affected much of Detroit.77 Maps labelled 28 percent of the
city as “hazardous,” 51 percent as “definitely declining,” and only 20 percent as
“still desirable” or “best.”78 The effects of redlining are felt even today.79
In response to segregation, police brutality, poverty, and racial inequalities
in housing, education, and labor, African Americans in Detroit staged an uprising
in the summer of 1967.80 To understand the eruption of racial violence in Detroit
and other US cities, President Johnson commissioned the Kerner Report, which
concluded that “[o]ur nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one
white—separate and unequal.”81 After the uprising, white flight increased from
a trickle to a gushing flood, transforming Detroit into a majority AfricanAmerican city.82 Detroit’s population is now about 80 percent African-American
due to the combination of state sanctioned racial and exclusionary zoning,
racially restrictive covenants, and redlining.83
In a recent study, I found that unconstitutional property tax assessments and
property tax foreclosures occur at a significantly higher rate in Wayne County’s

of those communities); Peter Dreier, Redlining Cities: How Banks Color Community Development, 34
CHALLENGE 15 (1991).
76. See generally Gregory D. Squires et al., Urban Decline or Disinvestment: Uneven
Development, Redlining and the Role of the Insurance Industry, 27 SOC. PROBS. 79 (1979).
77. See Farley, supra note 73, at 208–11.
78. ROBERT K. NELSON ET AL., MAPPING INEQUALITY: REDLINING IN NEW DEAL AMERICA,
https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/redlining/#loc=10/42.3475/-83.1365&opacity=0.8&city=detroit-mi
[https://perma.cc/9ED6-NYWK] (providing historical maps showing which districts in certain cities
were redlined); see FED. HOUSING ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANUAL: UNDERWRITING AND
VALUATION PROCEDURE UNDER TITLE II OF THE NATIONAL HOUSING ACT ¶ 1360 (1918),
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/Federal-Housing-Administration-UnderwritingManual.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NG6-4F8Q] (The Fair Housing Act appraisal manuals advised banks to
favor communities that had adopted racially restrictive covenants and instructed them not to lend in
areas with “inharmonious racial groups”).
79. See, e.g., DANIEL AARONSON ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHI., THE EFFECTS OF THE
1930S
HOLC
“REDLINING”
MAPS
1
(2019),
available
at
https://www.chicagofed.org/~/media/publications/working-papers/2017/wp2017-12-pdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UXD2-QDUK]; Tracy Jan, Redlining Was Banned 50 Years Ago. It’s Still Hurting
Minorities
Today,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
28,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/03/28/redlining-was-banned-50-years-ago-itsstill-hurting-minorities-today/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.69d093f1836a
[https://perma.cc/W5CCRN5N].
80. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL DISORDERS: SUMMARY
OF REPORT, http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/kerner.pdf [https://perma.cc/DV54-GGHZ]
[hereinafter SUMMARY OF CIVIL DISORDERS REPORT]. See generally THE KERNER REPORT: THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (2016).
81. See SUMMARY OF CIVIL DISORDERS REPORT, supra note 80, at 1.
82. See Kevin Boyle, The Ruins of Detroit: Exploring the Urban Crisis in the Motor City, 27
MICH. HIST. REV. 109, 114 (2001) (Through white flight, “[w]hite Detroiters thus reinforced African
Americans’ ghettoization, trapping them in the center of the city as it was being rapidly stripped of jobs.
By doing so, they forced black Detroiters to bear the burden of deindustrialization”).
83. COMMUNITY FACTS, supra note 8 (search zip code 48214 under “Community Facts”).
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predominately African-American cities than in its predominately white ones.84
It is important to understand that the racialized nature of the property tax
foreclosure crisis is part of this longer history of state actors using racially biased
laws and policies to construct vulnerability in Detroit and other AfricanAmerican communities.
b. Corporate Malfeasance Creates Vulnerability
The literature provides ample examples of regulatory and governmental
agencies passively enabling, ignoring, or actively permitting corporate
criminality.85 In the Detroit case, corporate malfeasance did not directly cause
illegally inflated property tax assessments. Instead, it set the background
conditions necessary for the illegality. Predatory lending that targeted minority
communities for subprime loans was one significant factor that precipitated the
Great Recession and caused a steep decline in home values—a pivotal factor in
the emergence of unconstitutional property tax assessments.86 The evidence
suggests that predatory practices, involving fraud and deceit, became the rule
rather than the exception for minority communities.87 This was possible because
African-American and Hispanic communities have historically turned to
predatory lenders for much needed capital, especially since redlining and other
policies reduced access to conventional loans.88
The detrimental economic impacts of subprime lending have devastated
African-American communities in Detroit, New York, Chicago, Atlanta,
Houston, and Washington D.C.89 Detroit stands out among these, however.90
Jacob Rugh and Douglass Massey show that, between 2004 and 2006, about 40

84. Atuahene, Our Taxes Are Too Damn High, supra note 39, at 1455.
85. See, e.g., STATE-CORPORATE CRIME: WRONGDOING AT THE INTERSECTION OF BUSINESS
AND GOVERNMENT (Ronald C. Kramer & Raymond Michalowski eds., 2006); David O. Friedrichs &
Dawn L. Rothe, State-Corporate Crime and Major Financial Institutions: Interrogating an Absence,
3 STATE CRIME J. 146 (2014); David Whyte, Regimes of Permission and State-Corporate Crime, 3
STATE CRIME J. 237 (2014).
86. See Lauren M. Ross & Gregory D. Squires, The Personal Costs of Subprime Lending and
the Foreclosure Crisis: A Matter of Trust, Insecurity, and Institutional Deception, 92 SOC. SCI. Q. 140,
142–43 (2011); Jacob S. Rugh et al., Race, Space, and Cumulative Disadvantage: A Case Study of the
Subprime Lending Collapse, 62 SOC. PROBS. 186, 186 (2015); Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey,
Racial Segregation and the American Foreclosure Crisis, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 629, 629–33 (2010); Neil
Fligstein & Alexander Roehrkasse, The Causes of Fraud in Financial Crises: Evidence from the
Mortgage-Backed Securities Industry 25, 33 (Inst. for Research on Lab. & Emp., Working Paper No.
122–15, 2015), https://www.irle.berkeley.edu/files/2015/The-Causes-of-Fraud-in-Financial-Crises.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QUX8-RNDJ].
87. Rugh & Massey, supra note 86, at 633.
88. Id. at 630.
89. See Ross & Squires, supra note 86, at 140; Rugh et al., supra note 86, at 186, 198.
90. See Philip Ashton, CRA’s “Blind Spots”: Community Reinvestment and Concentrated
Subprime Lending in Detroit, 32 J. URB. AFF. 579, 587 (2010) (“Detroit emerged as the largest of 30
metro areas distinguished by having the highest prevalence of subprime lending alongside high minority
denial rates.”); Rugh & Massey, supra note 86, at 633.
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percent of all bank loans issued in the metro Detroit area were subprime.91
Detroit also had one of the highest mortgage foreclosure rates,92 which is
unsurprising because data show that “the greater the degree of Hispanic and
especially black segregation a metropolitan area exhibits, the higher the number
and rate of foreclosures it experiences.”93
Subprime lending and the ensuing mortgage foreclosure crisis ravaged
Detroit’s housing market. Between 2008 and 2010, the average Detroit home fell
in value from roughly $80,000 to $25,000.94 Unconstitutional tax assessments
proliferated largely because Detroit’s Assessment Division was unable to adjust
tax assessments to reflect the staggering price declines. Additionally, banks do
not typically provide financing to homes worth less than $50,000.95 Since 2009,
the average value of a Detroit home falls below this threshold amount.96
Consequently, as shown in Figure 2, most banks stopped originating mortgages
in Detroit’s embattled housing market. 97 The situation got so bad that, in 2012,
banks originated a mere 203 loans in the entire City of Detroit—down from
6,599 loans prior to the housing bubble’s burst.98

91. Rugh & Massey, supra note 86, at 646, n.2; see also Class Action Complaint at ¶ 81, Adkins
v. Morgan Stanley, 307 F.R.D. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 12 CIV 7667), 2012 WL 4856708, at 25
[hereinafter Adkins Class Action Complaint].
91. Adkins Class Action Complaint, supra note 91, at ¶ 121 (ACLU lawsuit involving against
Morgan Stanley sought to certify a class of 6,000 African American homeowners who had obtained
predatory loans from that bank alone).
92. Detroit’s 2007 mortgage foreclosure rate of five percent was the highest in the nation.
MICHIGAN STATE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, SAVE THE DREAM: MICHIGAN
FORECLOSURE
DATA,
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mshda/Data_230191_7.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G6YK-GL2E].
93. See Rugh & Massey, supra note 86, at 631.
94. Atuahene & Berry, supra note 20, at 853 & Fig. 2.
95. Id. at 854.
96. Id. Moreover, according to our analysis of sales data from the City of Detroit’s Open Data
Portal, 71 percent of home sales since 2009 were for a purchase price less than $50,000. Detroit’s Open
Data Portal provides access to public data and information about city governments and service delivery:
CITY OF DETROIT OPEN DATA PORTAL, https://data.detroitmi.gov [https://perma.cc/KTA4-ZLJ9].
97. See ERIKA C. POETHIG ET AL., URB. INST., THE DETROIT HOUSING MARKET: CHALLENGES
AND
INNOVATIONS
FOR
A
PATH
FORWARD
24
fig.19
(2017),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/88656/detroit_path_forward_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/239B-PSWH].
97. Id.
98. Id.
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Figure 2: Mortgage Originations in Detroit from 2001-201699
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Mortgage Originations

The lack of access to mortgages forced people to purchase homes in Detroit
using a land contract, a form of seller financing requiring buyers pay monthly
installments similar to rent. In a traditional home sale, the buyer receives legal
title prior to paying off the mortgage. But with a land contract, the buyer often
receives title only after the contract is paid in full.100 More detrimentally, if the
buyer misses a payment, sellers retain the right to cancel the contract and keep
all prior payments, as if they were rental payments and not equity.101 Unlike a
traditional rental contract, however, buyers provide a down payment, assume
responsibility for all repairs, and are exempted from legal doctrines—such as the
warranty of habitability—that protect consumers from housing unfit for
habitation.102
In recent years, these disadvantageous land contracts have outnumbered
mortgages in Detroit.103 Unlike mortgages, land contracts are poorly regulated,
leaving underinformed first-time homebuyers vulnerable to further corporate
malfeasance. Since Michigan law does not require land contract sellers to

99. Id.
100. 26 M.L.P. 2d Real Property: Contracts for Sale of Real Property § 451 (defining a land
contract).
101. BERYL SATTER, FAMILY PROPERTIES: RACE, REAL ESTATE, AND THE EXPLOITATION OF
BLACK URBAN AMERICA 281 (2009) (explaining that renters were bound “in contracts that gave them
no equity in the properties until most or all of the price had been paid, [so] the plaintiffs could not sell
their properties without suffering a grave financial loss”).
102. See generally 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 449 (2018) (describing the implied
warranty of habitability).
103. See Joel Kurth, Loose Regulations Make Land Contracts a Tool to Exploit Low-Income
Homeowners,
CRAIN’S
DETROIT
BUS.
(May
20,
2017),
http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20170521/NEWS/170529985/loose-regulations-make-landcontracts-a-tool-to-exploit-low-income [https://perma.cc/B87V-ZUV7] (writing in 2017, noting that
“[l]ast year, land contracts outnumbered mortgages in Detroit, 834 to 710, according to Wayne County
records”).

2020]

PREDATORY CITIES

127

disclose liens or debts on the property or to have homes appraised, it is common
for buyers to supply a down payment, finish their installment payments, receive
the deed, and only then discover that their new property has delinquent property
taxes.104 Consequently, predatory land contracts as well as predatory lending
have exacerbated the property tax foreclosure crisis.
c.

Political and Economic Turmoil Creates Vulnerability

The antidote to vulnerability is resilience.105 Resilience comes from
institutional, personal, and social resources that mitigate vulnerability, although
these resources can never erase it altogether.106 But when institutions, such as
city government, are acutely vulnerable too, a community’s opportunity for
resilience is accordingly reduced.107 While institutional racism and poverty left
most Detroit residents vulnerable, the City’s own vulnerability arose from a bevy
of socioeconomic ills, including a decades-long economic decline, corrupt
leadership, and the largest municipal bankruptcy in US history. In its
vulnerability, the City of Detroit intensified the vulnerability of its residents.
In the mid-twentieth century, the auto industry generated almost a third of
all jobs in Detroit.108 With its fate closely tied to America’s auto industry, Detroit
was once one of the nation’s most prosperous cities.109 But, when the auto
industry began to decline, so did Detroit.110 From the 1950s to now, the City’s
population has fallen 65 percent from close to two million people to just over
700,000.111 As Detroit’s economy and population declined, its political troubles
ascended.
Between 1974 and 1994, under the leadership of Detroit’s first AfricanAmerican mayor, Coleman Young Jr., Detroit was politically stable although its
economy was in decline.112 It was not until the election of Kwame Kilpatrick
104. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 565.357 (West 2019); Kurth, supra note 103.
105. See, e.g., Diana Hernández et al., Public Housing on the Periphery: Vulnerable Residents
and Depleted Resilience Reserves Post-Hurricane Sandy, 95 J. URB. HEALTH 703 (2018) (discussing
how vulnerable populations cope through resilience).
106. See id. at 704, 714.
107. See Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 48, at 12–13 (“[R]iddled with their own
vulnerabilities, society’s institutions cannot eradicate, and often operate to exacerbate, our individual
vulnerability.”).
108. See SUGRUE, supra note 52, at 95.
109. See Charles K. Hyde, “Detroit the Dynamic”: The Industrial History of Detroit from Cigars
to Cars, 27 MICH. HIST. REV. 57, 57 (2001).
110. See SUGRUE, supra note 52, at 3.
111. See Ben Austen, The Post-Post-Apocalyptic Detroit, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/13/magazine/the-post-post-apocalyptic-detroit.html
[https://perma.cc/A8MY-9288]; Christine MacDonald, Detroit Population Rank Is Lowest Since 1850,
DETROIT NEWS (May 20, 2016), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroitcity/2016/05/19/detroit-population-rank-lowest-since/84574198 [https://perma.cc/7M53-XMVN].
112. See Boyle, supra note 82, at 119 (“By the time [Young] took office, angry white voters had
repeatedly defeated millage votes, leaving the public schools all but bankrupt, while white flight had
fundamentally undermined the city’s tax base. Thus, Young was left to govern a city that had never
recovered from 1967.”).
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(2002-2008) that the economic and political tumult sincerely began.113 After a
court convicted him of perjury and obstruction of justice in 2008, Kilpatrick
resigned. In 2013, a federal court convicted him of twenty-four federal offenses
and sentenced him to twenty-eight years in prison.114 While his resignation and
subsequent imprisonment was unsettling enough, the end of Kilpatrick’s regime
also coincided with the Great Recession, which sent Detroit’s home prices
tumbling. So, political scandal and instability engulfed the City at the time that
Detroit’s long economic decline was most severe, and the City needed—but
lacked—strong leadership to navigate the turbulent economic waters.115
From 2008 to 2013, Detroit was drowning in debt and on the verge of
economic collapse.116 Responding to the crisis, Michigan’s governor, Rick
Snyder, wrested control of Detroit’s financial operations from its elected officials
in 2013 and gave them to Kevyn Orr—his appointed Emergency Manager—for
an 18-month term.117 Without the approval of Detroit’s democratically elected
city government,118 Orr filed the largest municipal bankruptcy in our nation’s
history, restructuring over $18 billion in debt and long-term liabilities.119 During
this period, Orr imposed austerity measures, cutting city pensions and reducing
spending for vital police, court, transportation, and water services.120 Strapped

113. See also Nathan Bomey & John Gallagher, How Detroit Went Broke: The Answers May
Surprise You – and Don’t Blame Coleman Young, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Sept. 15, 2013),
https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2013/09/15/how-detroit-went-broke-theanswers-may-surprise-you-and/77152028 [https://perma.cc/P5Y8-LBTU] (“Wall Street types who
applauded Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick’s financial acumen following his 2005 deal to restructure city
pension debt should consider this: The numbers prove that his plan devastated the city’s finances and
was a key factor that drove Detroit to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy in July.”).
114. See Steven Yaccino, Kwame M. Kilpatrick, Former Detroit Mayor, Sentenced to 28 Years
in Corruption Case, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/11/us/formerdetroit-mayor-kwame-kilpatrick-sentencing.html [https://perma.cc/R5X8-5TSX].
115. After Kilpatrick’s departure, Detroit was overseen by a quick succession of leaders: Kenneth
Cockerel, Jr. took office in September 2008 and left eight months later, to be replaced by David Bing.
Mike Duggan took office in 2014, and found his governing powers interrupted by Kevyn Orr, the
Emergency Manager. Tina Granzo, People of Detroit: Mayors of Detroit,
http://historydetroit.com/people/mayors.php [https://perma.cc/N6FS-5JAY].
116. See generally Bomey & Gallagher, supra note 113.
117. See Mich. Local Financial Stability and Choice Act of 2012, Public Act 436, § 9(2) (2012)
(giving the Governor power to appoint an Emergency Manager to address a financial emergency).
118. See SUGRUE, supra note 52, at xix. City Council resisted the implementation of an
emergency manager, advocating instead to give the City’s program manager more power over necessary
financial reforms. See Darren A. Nichols & Chad Livengood, Emergency Manager Approved to Fix
Detroit
Crisis,
DETROIT
NEWS
(Mar.
14,
2013),
http://webarchive.loc.gov/all/20130314203159/http://www.detroitnews.com/article/20130314/METR
O01/303140456 [https://perma.cc/MW27-M6PC].
119. On December 3, 2013, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes ruled that Detroit was legally
entitled to pursue bankruptcy. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 191, 230–31 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013);
see also Public Act 436, § 18(1) (authorizing Emergency Managers to file bankruptcy).
120. See CITY OF DETROIT OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGER KEVYN D. ORR, EMERGENCY
MANAGER REPORT 40–44 (2013), https://detroitmi.gov/sites/detroitmi.localhost/files/201805/Emergency%20Manager%20Report%20_%20September%2030%2C%202013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VHV3-UJ94] (disapproving $190,000 in water operations and maintenance, $820,000
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for cash, the City could not adequately conduct basic city services such as trash
removal, street light repair, and determination of property tax assessments.121
Without basic city services, about half of Detroit’s property owners decided not
to pay their property taxes.122 The downward economic spiral worsened.
d. Overstretched Civil Society Organizations Create Vulnerability
Another chief reason that unconstitutional property tax assessment
proliferated in Detroit is that civil society organizations serving Detroit’s
vulnerable populations were stretched exceedingly thin. United Community
Housing Coalition (UCHC) was the organization most intensely focused on
ameliorating the property tax foreclosure crisis.123 It provides counseling for
homeowners at risk of tax foreclosure, assists owners to re-purchase their homes
through the tax foreclosure auction, and offers a zero-interest loan to pay
delinquent taxes and prevent homes from going to the auction.124 While other
organizations assisted in battling the property tax foreclosure crisis, the help was
modest. But alone UCHC did not have the capacity necessary to deal with the
monumental tax foreclosure problem. Its hands were full providing a variety of
other housing-related services, including landlord tenant counseling, housing
placement, tenant organizing, and mortgage prevention counseling. The property
tax foreclosure crisis was a systemic breakdown requiring a systemic solution
that UCHC and other Detroit nonprofits did not have the capacity to deliver.

in transportation, $5.4 million in “risk management fund,” and $1.5 million from the “general fund,”
including police, law, and the 36th District Court.); Susan Tompor, Even 5 Years Later, Retirees Feel
the Effects of Detroit’s Bankruptcy, DETROIT FREE PRESS (July 18, 2018),
https://www.freep.com/story/money/personal-finance/susan-tompor/2018/07/18/detroit-bankruptcyretirees-pension/759446002 [https://perma.cc/7CBS-4T4W].
121. See Matt Helms et al., 9 Ways Detroit is Changing After Bankruptcy, DETROIT FREE PRESS
(Nov. 9, 2014), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/detroit-bankruptcy/2014/11/09/detroit-cityservices-bankruptcy/18716557 [https://perma.cc/47YU-5JJ8] (“Average police response times clocked
in at almost an hour. Tens of thousands of broken streetlights meant entire streets go dark at nightfall.
And though Detroit has more than 200 municipal parks, the city could only afford to keep about a quarter
of them open.”).
122. Christine MacDonald & Mike Wilkinson, Half of Detroit Property Owners Don’t Pay
Taxes, DETROIT NEWS (Feb. 21, 2013), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroitcity/2018/06/13/detroit-property-owners-tax-delinquency/700005002 [https://perma.cc/7EHA-M3JL]
(“The News reviewed more than 200,000 pages of tax documents and found that 47 percent of the city’s
taxable parcels are delinquent on their 2011 bills. Some $246.5 million in taxes and fees went
uncollected.”).
123. See ALEXA EISENBERG ET AL., UNIV. MICH. POVERTY SOLS., PREVENTING OWNEROCCUPIED PROPERTY TAX FORECLOSURES IN DETROIT: IMPROVING ACCESS TO THE POVERTY TAX
EXEMPTION
3
(2018),
https://poverty.umich.edu/files/2018/12/PovertySolutionsPoveryTaxExemption-PolicyReport-r2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CDL-YVP2] (“UCHC established the
Tax Foreclosure Prevention Project (TFPP) in 2003, which provides free counseling services to residents
experiencing tax foreclosure.”).
124. UNITED CMTY. HOUS. COAL., TAX FORECLOSURE PREVENTION PROJECT,
http://www.uchcdetroit.org/services/tax-foreclosure [https://perma.cc/Z9PV-9LAM].
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Many civil society organizations, such as We the People of Detroit, focused
instead on battling the City’s water shutoff crisis.125 With water prices rising 120
percent between 2007 and 2017, water became unaffordable for Detroit’s
impoverished population.126 When people could not afford to pay, the delinquent
water bill would attach as a lien to the home, causing further property tax
foreclosures and displacement.127 In addition to this draconian collection policy,
city officials began shutting off water when delinquent water bills amounted to
$150 or more, depriving poor residents of running water in their homes.128 Most
detrimentally, water shutoffs placed families at risk. In addition to the dangers
of living with no running water, social services can remove children from a home
that is without water for more than seventy-two hours.129 This dire situation
prompted an investigation by the United Nations special rapporteurs on the right
to water, sanitation, and affordable housing who produced a report declaring,
“disconnection of [water] services due to an inability to pay for the service is a
retrogressive measure and constitutes a violation of the human rights to water
and sanitation.”130
Civil society organizations were also preoccupied with reforming Detroit’s
failing public schools. In the 2017-2018 school year, only 6.3% of Detroit Public
Schools’ third through eighth graders tested at the level of “proficient.”131
125. See WE THE PEOPLE OF DETROIT, COMMUNITY RESEARCH COLLECTIVE (2016),
http://wethepeopleofdetroit.com/communityresearch/water [https://perma.cc/2QHK-TNHH] (using
data to illustrate the impact of water shutoffs on public health).
126. Eleanor Greene, Detroit Fights for Fair Water Access, GREEN AM. (Oct. 24, 2017),
https://medium.com/@GreenAmerica/detroit-fights-for-fair-water-access-d644ab46d97f
[https://perma.cc/HL3P-F2M7]; see also Price of Water: 2010–2015, CIRCLE OF BLUE (Apr. 1, 2015),
https://www.circleofblue.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/WaterPricing2015graphs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FA3H-KH92].
127. SUPARNA BHASKARAN, HAAS INSTITUTE FOR A FAIR AND INCLUSIVE SOCIETY, PUBLIC
HEALTH & WEALTH IN POST-BANKRUPTCY DETROIT 12 (2017), https://communitywealth.org/sites/clone.communitywealth.org/files/downloads/haasinstitute_publichealthwellbeingdetroit%20%281%29.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NWR9-UGEM].
128. Laura Gottesdiener, UN Officials ‘Shocked’ by Detroit’s Mass Water Shutoffs, ALJAZEERA AM. (Oct. 20, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/10/20/detroit-waterun.html [https://perma.cc/9HJ6-8ZQ9] (highlighting that the City did not cut off water for commercial
and industrial users even though their delinquent bills accounted for the lion’s share of the debt owed to
the water department); Greene, supra note 126.
129. See DIANE DEPANFILIS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, OFF. OF CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT, CHILD NEGLECT: A GUIDE FOR PREVENTION, ASSESSMENT, AND INTERVENTION
13 (2006), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/neglect.pdf [https://perma.cc/WK4K-X66Z]
(listing lack of running or clean water as a type of behavior that indicates “inadequate supervision”);
Greene, supra note 126; Rose Hackman, What Happens When Detroit Shuts Off the Water of 100,000
People, ATLANTIC (July 17, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/07/whathappens-when-detroit-shuts-off-the-water-of-100000-people/374548 [https://perma.cc/ZK2C-HB37].
130. U.N. H.R. Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe Drinking
Water
&
Sanitation,
at
10,
U.N.
Doc.
A/HRC/30/39
(Aug.
5,
2015)
https://www.refworld.org/docid/55f7e7e04.html [https://perma.cc/U3WQ-JF6Q].
131. Detroit Public Schools Grades 3–8 Assessments, MICH. SCH. DATA,
https://www.mischooldata.org/DistrictSchoolProfiles2/EntitySummary/SchoolDataFile.aspx
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Several foundations, such as The Skillman Foundation and United Way, as well
as grassroots groups, like 482Forward, have worked tirelessly alongside parents
to get Detroit’s failing schools back on track.132
In addition, civil society organizations were wrapped up in efforts to end
predatory lending and the resulting mortgage foreclosure crisis in Detroit.
Community development organizations—under the umbrella of Community
Development Advocates of Detroit (CDAD)—dealt with the destruction left in
the wake of the mortgage foreclosure crisis by focusing on securing vacant
properties, reducing blight, facilitating reuse, and promoting urban
agriculture.133 As Detroit has been emerging from financial ruin and attracting
new residents,134 several groups—rallied together by Detroit People’s
Platform—created a community benefits ordinance that ensures poor residents
also benefit from the City’s revitalization.135
I have provided just a sample of the issues that engrossed Detroit’s civil
society organizations and diverted their attention from battling unconstitutional
property tax assessments. As one long-standing Detroit activist lamented:
If you are working on the ground, you are fucking overwhelmed! There
is so much happening. So many fights going on. On the ground, we are
always faced with immediate need. We are focused on triage. Rarely do
we get opportunity to focus on the cause of the disease. Honestly, I was
embarrassed that I did not know about unconstitutional property tax
assessments. But the bleeding is so heavy, there is no opportunity to
assess structural wrongs.136
Her embarrassment, however, is misplaced. Even if activists were not embattled
with other ongoing justice fights, understanding how the Assessment Division

[https://perma.cc/LYH7-FBD4] (select “Wayne RSEA” under ISD; select “Detroit Public Schools
Community District” under District; select “2017–18” for School Year; and then select “Grades 3–8
Assessments” under Data Files).
132. See Coalition for the Future of Detroit School Children, Skillman FOUND.
https://www.skillman.org/initiatives/coalition-for-the-future-of-detroit-school-children
[https://perma.cc/DPH4-N3NK]; Education, United Way Se. MICH., https://unitedwaysem.org/focusareas/education
[https://perma.cc/U73E-HVTQ];
482Forward,
https://www.482forward.org
[https://perma.cc/82ZK-TJXS].
133. See Community Development Advocates of Detroit, https://cdad-online.org
[https://perma.cc/3C4A-JECD].
134. See Austen, supra note 111; Monica Davey, Detroit Needs Residents, But Sends Some
Packing, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/us/detroit-needsresidents-but-sends-some-packing.html [https://perma.cc/DQ3M-SHM3].
135. See DETROIT, MICH., CITY CODE §§ 12-8-1 to -5 (2019) (previously codified as DETROIT,
MICH., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 14-12-1 to -5 (2017)); see also What is the Community Benefits
Ordinance?, CITY OF DETROIT, https://detroitmi.gov/departments/planning-and-developmentdepartment/citywide-initiatives/community-benefits-ordinance
[https://perma.cc/JXV5-7Y48];
Community
Benefit
Agreements,
DETROIT
PEOPLE’S
PLATFORM,
http://detroitpeoplesplatform.org/resources/community-benefit-agreements
[https://perma.cc/C2MTEJFX ].
136. Comment Made to Bernadette Atuahene, Professor of Law, IIT, Chicago-Kent Coll. of Law
at a Community Event (Sept. 27, 2018) (on file with author).
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calculates property taxes and determining whether it was following the relevant
laws is a formidable task. Ultimately, the lack of watchdog organizations with
the time and ability to monitor the Assessment Division left Detroit vulnerable.
Hence, unconstitutional property tax assessments proliferated.
e.

Reduced Federal and State Funding Creates Vulnerability

Underfunding public entities creates vulnerability that can open the door to
predatory cities. Federal funding to states and cities has been decreasing,
although the services localities must provide have been increasing. In 1974, the
federal government created the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG)
Program to fund states and local governments.137 However, the program has been
eroded through time, suffering both from Reagan administration budget cuts and
inadequate inflation adjustments.138 Consequently, analysts found that in “real
2016 dollars, funding has decreased 80 percent since its peak in 1979 from $15.0
billion to $3.0 billion . . . .”139 When Trump became President in 2017, his
administration proposed cutting the CDBG program entirely.140 Michigan has
sustained significant financial damage from the reduction in federal funding. In
2003, Wayne County received $6.6 million and Detroit $46.5.141 Fifteen years,
one bankruptcy, and a Great Recession later, Wayne County received only $5.5
million and Detroit $34.5 million.142
In addition to reductions in federal funding, states have also drastically cut
funding for their cities. The key to understanding state level disinvestment in
Michigan is understanding its revenue sharing practices.143 In exchange for the
137.
138.

Richard S. Williamson, Community Development Block Grants, 14 URB. LAW. 283 (1982).
Robert Benenson, Reagan and the Cities, Revenue Sharing and Two Other Survivors,
EDITORIAL
RES.
REP.
1982,
at
529–48
(1982),
https://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre1982072300 [https://perma.cc/ARB2-JZD4].
139. BRETT THEODOS ET AL., URB. INST., TAKING STOCK OF THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
BLOCK GRANT 2 (2017), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/89551/cdbg_brief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CU4Q-JHSV]; see also Pam Fessler, Shrinking Community Grants Put Cities in a
Crunch, WBUR NEWS (Mar. 2, 2012), https://www.wbur.org/npr/147751971/shrinking-communitygrants-put-cities-in-a-crunch%20 [https://perma.cc/9FBZ-5NVJ ] (reporting that HUD grants shrank by
25 percent from 2011 to 2012.).
140. Lissette Flores, Trump Budget Eliminates Housing and Community Development Block
Grants, Ctr. Bud. & Pol’y Priorities (June 8, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/trump-budgeteliminates-housing-and-community-development-block-grants [https://perma.cc/BA3G-Y5NF].
141. About Grantees: HUD Awards and Allocations: Wayne County, MI, HUD EXCHANGE,
https://www.hudexchange.info/grantees (under “Find a Grantee Page,” select “by State” and select “
Michigan”; change “All Grantees” to include both “Wayne County, MI” and “Detroit, MI”; then select
“by Program” and select “CDBG: Community Development Block Grant Program”; click search, and
under the results pages of “Wayne County, MI” and “Detroit, MI”, select “CDBG” on the left hand side
and then select “View More Awards” to view 2004 amounts).
142. Id.
143. For more information about revenue sharing in Michigan, see MICH. MUN. LEAGUE,
Revenue Sharing Factsheet (2014), http://www.mml.org/advocacy/2014-revenue-sharingfactsheet.html [https://perma.cc/DHZ9-VHMP]; Anthony Minghine, The Great Revenue Sharing Heist,
MICH. MUN. LEAGUE (2014), http://www.mml.org/advocacy/great-revenue-sharing-heist.html
[https://perma.cc/R5L6-LWXH].
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promise of revenue sharing, localities in Michigan forfeited their right to levy
sales taxes and instead gave the state exclusive jurisdiction to do this.144
Localities became entitled to two types of revenue sharing payments to fund
essential services.
The first is mandated by Article IX Section 10 of the Michigan
Constitution.145 Local governmental units receive 15 percent of the gross amount
the state collects from its 4 percent sales tax.146 The Michigan Constitution
guarantees these funds and requires voter approval for any changes.147 The State
has come under fire for circumventing this guarantee by re-labeling some
constitutional funds as “non-constitutional” to reduce the revenue that it must
share with cities.148
The second type of revenue sharing payment is statutorily created.149
Unlike the constitutionally mandated funding stream, the state legislature can
and has altered the statutorily decreed payments.150 Under Governor Rick
Snyder, the State replaced statutory revenue sharing with the Economic Vitality
Incentive Program (EVIP), which requires local governments to satisfy certain
requirements—pertaining to accountability, transparency, consolidation, and
employee compensation—prior to receiving funds.151 In its first year, EVIP
reduced revenue sharing payments by approximately one-third in order to cover

144. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 141.601–99 (West 2019). For a list of cities who
have imposed local income taxes, see What Cities Impose an Income Tax?, MICH. DEP’T
TREASURY,
https://www.michigan.gov/taxes/0,4676,7-238-75545_43715-153955--,00.html
[https://perma.cc/XB2E-LNMJ].
145. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 10, as amended.
146. Id.
147. Id. art. IX, § 25.
148. See Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Complaint at 5, Taxpayers for Mich. Constitutional Gov’t
v. Dep’t of Tech., Mgmt. & Budget, No. 334663, 2019 WL 3432064 (Mich. Ct. App. July 30, 2019)
(No. 334663) (arguing that the State failed to pay local governments the correct amount due under
Michigan Constitution’s Headlee Amendment, depriving them of billions of dollars in funding).
149. Mich. General Omnibus Appropriation Bill, Public Act 207 of 2018, art. VIII (2018); MICH.
Senate
Fiscal
Agency,
Revenue
Sharing
Overview,
http://www.senate.michigan.gov/sfa/Departments/Overview/OVrev_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Y92VA5D].
150. For more information on actual revenue sharing expenditures, see Michigan Senate Fiscal
Agency, http://www.senate.michigan.gov/sfa/Departments/DPrev_web.html [https://perma.cc/EWA7YUS4].
151. See Mich. Public Act 63 of 2011 (2011); see also Constitutional Revenue Sharing, MICH.
DEP’T TREASURY, https://www.michigan.gov/treasury/0,4679,7-121-1751_2197_58826_62375--,00.html [https://perma.cc/WYY3-9QKC]; Presentation, Evah Cole, Mich. Dep’t Treasury, Economic
Vitality
Incentive
Program
(EVIP)
Training
(Aug.
16,
2011),
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/EVIP_Training_MML081611_365895_7.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6A7R-38X9]. See generally THE CTR. FOR LOCAL, STATE, AND URBAN POLICY,
Michigan Public Policy Survey: EVIP Dashboards (2012), http://closup.umich.edu/files/mpps-evipdashboards.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZWK-6X88] (explaining EVIP and Michigan’s statutory revenue
sharing program).
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a state budget deficit.152 For Detroit, this meant a $70 million funding
reduction.153 Revenue sharing payments have never returned to their pre-EVIP
levels.154
This permanent funding reduction is problematic because, while the state
had budget deficits, many local governments were also financially devastated by
the Great Recession and desperately needed the funds. Due to caps on property
tax growth, cities are slowly recovering from the steep decrease in housing prices
and the corresponding decline in property tax revenues. In contrast, state
revenues—generated from a variety of taxes (i.e. income, sales, use, business)—
have recovered more quickly. Nevertheless, state revenue sharing has decreased
over the years, leaving local governments to fend for themselves.155 One report
finds that “[f]rom 2003-2013, sales tax revenues went from $6.6 billion to $7.72
billion. Over that same period, statutory revenue sharing declined from over
$900 million annually to around $250 million.”156
The decreased revenue sharing payments have been detrimental for several
struggling Michigan cities. The Michigan Municipal League, a collaborative
group of municipal leaders and local officials, estimates that between 2003 and
2013 reductions in revenue sharing deprived Detroit of $732 million, Flint of
$54.9 million, Pontiac of $40 million, and Lansing of $40 million.157 The decline
in revenue sharing payments forced many local governments to adopt severe
austerity measures, slashing services and cutting corners to stay afloat. While
declines in revenue sharing payments hit both wealthy and poor cities hard,
affluence is like a mouth guard, preventing richer cities from becoming toothless.
In addition to decreasing revenue sharing payments, in 2003, Michigan’s
Secretary of State unilaterally imposed certain fines and fees for commonplace
automobile infractions, including driving without a license, driving without
insurance, reckless driving, and driving under the influence of alcohol.158 The

152. See Jonathan Oosting, How Michigan’s Revenue Sharing ‘Raid’ Cost Communities Billions
for
Local
Services,
MLIVE
(Mar.
30,
2014),
https://www.mlive.com/lansingnews/2014/03/michigan_revenue_sharing_strug.html [https://perma.cc/5S89-L2N2].
153. Id.
154. See MICH. SENATE FISCAL AGENCY, REVENUE SHARING PAYMENTS: CITIES, VILLAGES,
TOWNSHIPS (CVTS), AND COUNTIES: FY 2000–01 THROUGH ESTIMATED FY 2018–19 (July 20, 2018),
http://www.senate.michigan.gov/sfa/Departments/DataCharts/DCrev_RevSharePayType.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E8QQ-JRAR] (showing the total statutorily-authorized payments per fiscal year from
2000 to 2017).
155. But see Minghine, supra note 143 (discussing revenue sharing losses).
156. Id. (emphasis in original).
157. Id; see also Oosting, supra note 152.
158. See Chad Livengood, Unpaid Fines Strand Drivers, Crimp Region’s Workforce, CRAIN’S
DETROIT BUS. (Aug. 6, 2017), https://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20170806/news/635666/unpaidfines-strand-drivers-crimp-regions-workforce [https://perma.cc/JZV4-FB22] (“Drivers were levied new
fees ranging from $150 for driving with an expired license and $200 for driving without insurance to
$500 for drunken driving and $1,000 for causing injury or death.”); see also Mich. SEC. STATE, Dep’t
of State Court Manual DLAD-239: Offense Code Index for Traffic Violations,
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/OffenseCode_73877_7.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G354-5H5J]
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state called these “Driver Responsibility Fees.”159 For instance, operating a
vehicle while intoxicated now carried a two-year fine of $1000 per year, while
driving with a suspended license resulted in a two-year fine of $500 per year.160
With the new fines, the state raised between $99 million and $115 million a
year.161 “In Detroit alone, around 70,000 people owed more than $100
million.”162 Most detrimentally, the state did not conduct ability to pay hearings
prior to suspending a driver’s license. So when poverty prevented drivers from
timely paying these fines, this resulted in license suspension (with a hefty
reinstatement fee), inability to renew, and additional fines.163 These measures
further immiserated indigent populations by removing their ability to get to work
and earn money to pay their debts.164 The state covered its budget deficit at the
expense of the state’s poorest residents. In 2018, after significant public outcry,
the state repealed Driver Responsibility Fees.165 But, significant damage was
already done.

(showing that offenses related to bodily alcohol content or use of a vehicle under the influence of
controlled substances or alcohol were updated in September of 2003).
159. Sarah Cwiek, Five Things to Know About the End of Michigan’s Driver Responsibility Fees,
MICH. RADIO NPR (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.michiganradio.org/post/five-things-know-about-endmichigans-driver-responsibility-fees [https://perma.cc/88SG-SSFF].
160. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.732a(2)(a), (b) (West 2019).
161. See ELLIOT WILD, SENATE FISCAL AGENCY, DRIVER RESPONSIBILITY FEES: A FIVE-YEAR
CHECKUP
2
(2008),
http://www.senate.michigan.gov/sfa/Publications/Notes/2008Notes/NotesJulAug08ew.pdf
[https://perma.cc/93QM-VUYZ] (“Total collected revenue in 2006 reached nearly $109.0 million,
followed by approximately $120.9 in 2007.”); Kathleen Gray, Drivers Have Glimmer of Hope to Get
Rid
of
Responsibility
Fees,
DETROIT
FREE
PRESS
(Oct.
10,
2017),
https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/2017/10/10/driver-responsibility-fees-amnesty/748282001
[https://perma.cc/URA8-2NDH].
162. See Cwiek, supra note 159.
163. The outrage against these laws eventually sparked lawsuits. See Fowler v. Johnson, No. 1711441, 2017 WL 6379676 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 14, 2017), rev’d sub nom. Fowler v. Benson, 924 F.3d 247
(6th Cir. 2019) (granting plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the Michigan
Secretary of State from suspending the licenses of those unable to pay their fee debts but later modified
and stayed pending appeal); Dawson v. Sec’y of State, 739 N.W.2d 339 (Mich. App. 2007) (holding
that classification schemes imposed by the driver responsibility fees did not violate constitutional equal
protection rights).
164. See Mich. Sec’y of State Jocelyn Benson, If I Had Driver Responsibility Fees Do I Still
Have to Pay Reinstatement Fees to Get My License Back? (Sept. 12, 2019),
https://www.michigan.gov/sos/0,4670,7-127-5647_12539_71028-486327--,00.html
[https://perma.cc/5FBA-2KTG] (Those wishing to reinstate their licenses must pay a base fee of $125,
with a possibility of additional fees.); see also Mich. Sec’y of State Jocelyn Benson, Driver License
Reinstatement Fee (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.michigan.gov/sos/0,4670,7-127-1627_8665_907429558--,00.html [https://perma.cc/C5ZA-CAA8] (listing additional fees such as a $45 fee for failure to
appear in court).
165. See Press Release, Gov. Rick Snyder Signs Legislation to Accelerate Elimination of Driver
Responsibility Fees, Address Outstanding Fees and Allow for License Reinstatement (Mar. 1, 2018),
https://www.michigan.gov/formergovernors/0,4584,7-212-90815_57657-462030--,00.html
[https://perma.cc/36AN-8VVQ]; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.732a(11) (2019)
(“Beginning September 30, 2018 . . . [a]ny outstanding driver responsibility fee assessed under this
section shall not be collected.”).
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Structural issues—such as reduced federal CDBG funding, decreased state
revenue sharing payments and increased state fees and fines—created
vulnerability that contributed to Detroit’s economic chaos. When Governor
Snyder imposed an Emergency Manager on Detroit, he was not a gallant knight
coming to save the day. Instead, he was more akin to a disheveled janitor
cleaning up a mess he and other state and federal level leaders helped to create.
Most importantly, that economic mess created the background conditions
necessary for unconstitutional property tax assessments to thrive.
2. Legal and Governance Failures
Against this backdrop of vulnerability, legal and governance failures—
including legal contradictions, concealment, impaired internal accountability,
legal limitations, and financial advantage—created structural opportunities for
predation to advance.
a. Legal Contradiction
Law is an imprecise tool. A law that solves one problem can also prevent
state officials from achieving other goals crucial to the proper functioning of
their agencies or governments. Scholars who have contributed to the state crime
literature aptly call this a “legal contradiction.”166 State crime scholars note that,
although constrained by the law, “not everyone caught in this dilemma will opt
for violating the law, but some will.”167
The legal contradiction at the heart of Detroit’s property tax foreclosure
crisis arose from two amendments to Article IX of the Michigan Constitution
(1963), which limit local governments’ taxing powers.168 Article IX initially
established that a property’s assessed value cannot exceed 50 percent of its
market value.169 Since property taxes in Michigan were higher than the national
average, in November 1978, voters ratified Proposal E, otherwise known as the
Headlee Amendment.170 This requires voter approval for new property taxes and
166. See William J. Chambliss, State-Organized Crime—The American Society of Criminology,
1988 Presidential Address, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 183, 201 (1989) (examining legal contradiction through
the study of state-organized crime)[hereinafter Chambliss, State-Organized Crime]; see also WILLIAM
J. CHAMBLISS & MARJORIE S. ZATZ, MAKING LAW: THE STATE, THE LAW, AND STRUCTURAL
CONTRADICTIONS (1993); Jeffrey Ian Ross & Dawn L. Rothe, Ironies of Controlling State Crime, 36
INT’L J. L., CRIME & JUST. 196 (2008).
167. Chambliss, State-Organized Crime, supra note 166, at 202.
168. See MICH. DEP’T TREASURY, OFFICE REVENUE & TAX ANALYSIS, SCHOOL FINANCE
REFORM IN MICHIGAN; PROPOSAL A: RETROSPECTIVE 1 (2002) [hereinafter PROPOSAL A:
RETROSPECTIVE], https://www.michigan.gov/documents/propa_3172_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/C72TN6PC] (“Before Proposal A, Michigan’s property tax burden was more than 33 percent above the
national average . . . .”).
169. MICH. CONST. ART. IX, § 3; see also Atuahene & Hodge, supra note 7, at 275–79
(discussing the history of the aforementioned amendments to the Michigan Constitution).
170. The Amendment added Section 6 and Sections 25–34 to Article IX. MICH. CONST. art. IX,
§§ 6,
25–34;
see
Michigan
Legislature,
Headlee
Amendment,
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(a1gl20mcheamde4injezciha))/mileg.aspx?page=LoadVirtualDoc&B
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increases in property tax rates (“millage rates”) that go beyond the Amendment’s
guidelines.171 In a city like Detroit—which has the highest tax rate in the state of
Michigan and the third highest tax rate of any city in the US—voters are unlikely
to authorize further tax increases.172
Next, in March 1994, voters further extended Article IX by approving the
Michigan Education Finance Amendment, widely known as Proposal A.173 This
limits increases in a property’s taxable value to no more than inflation or 5
percent, whichever is less.174 Consequently, when the real estate market is
booming and property values rapidly outpace inflation, the cap deprives local
governments of significant revenues because they can only legally collect less
than 50 percent of a property’s market value. Only upon a property’s transfer can
local authorities reset the taxable value to 50 percent of the property’s market
value.175 The Michigan Department of Treasury estimates that, between 1994
and 2003, Proposal A cut $63 billion in local property taxes.176 Because property
taxes are a significant source of revenue for Michigan localities,177 Proposal A
has left even fiscally conservative local governments facing uncertain budgets.
The two Amendments’ combined effect was to protect taxpayers against
spiraling property tax bills. In so doing, legislators anticipated that the primary
repercussion would be loss of local government revenues,178 which could hinder
their ability to carry out core functions. It was likely, however, that local
governments’ attenuated educational expenditures (also mandated by Proposal

ookmarkID=6536 [https://perma.cc/7RP8-TN9H]; see also Kevin C. Kennedy, The First Twenty Years
of the Headlee Amendment, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1031, 1031–32 (1999).
171. A millage rate is defined as the number of tax dollars the taxpayer must pay for each $1,000
of taxable value. MICH. LEGISLATURE, MICHIGAN TAXPAYER’S GUIDE 3–4 (2018),
https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Publications/TaxpayerGuide-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EH94YMS8].
172. See LINCOLN INST. LAND POL’Y & MINN. CTR. FISCAL EXCELLENCE, 50-STATE
PROPERTY
TAX
COMPARISON
STUDY
FOR
TAXES
PAID
IN
2017
(2018),
https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/50-state-property-tax-comparison-for-2017exec-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/7X4L-C9KJ] (showing that Detroit’s effective tax rates is 3.63%,
which is more than double the national average of 1.49%).
173. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.27a(2) (West 2019).
174. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.27a(2)(a); PROPOSAL A:
RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 168, at 1.
175. MICH. LEGISLATURE, supra note 171, at 1 (“A transfer of ownership occurs when a title or
present interest in the property is transferred through conveyance by deed, land contract, trust,
distribution under a will, certain leases, or other mechanisms.”).
176. PROPOSAL A: RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 168, at 8.
177. For 2015 and 2016 respectively, property taxes as a percentage of total revenue for other
major Michigan cities as determined from city budget report: Grand Rapids (44.2%, 43.2%); Warren
(66.9%, 67.0%); Sterling Heights (38.7%, 36.0%); Lansing (31.8%, 31.5%); Ann Arbor (24.3%,
22.1%); Dearborn (64.3%, 63.2%); Livonia (37.2%, 37.3%); Kalamazoo (53.1%, 54.1%). Figures were
determined based on reported city budget numbers; available on file with the author.
178. See HOUSE LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS SECTION OF MICH., DUAL SCHOOL FINANCE PLANS,
SECOND ANALYSIS 7 (1994) (“Preliminary reports from tax specialists estimated that [Proposal A]
provide an aggregate net tax cut . . . Various early analyses . . . put the net annual tax cut from the ballot
proposal between $110 million and $176 million.”).
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A) would lessen the financial blow.179 But the financial hit many localities took
was more substantial than anticipated because one central assumption underlying
the Amendments—that property values continually increase—proved untrue.
As a result of the Great Recession, property values decreased nationally.180
In Detroit, the drop was especially precipitous (see Figure 3).181 Detroit’s
Assessment Division faced a serious quandary. Because of Proposal A, property
tax assessments on unsold parcels could not increase beyond the inflation rate,
which over the last decade has never exceeded 1.1%.182 So, if the 2009 dip in
market prices lasted only three to five years, this would nevertheless have a
sustained effect on the city’s ability to raise revenues. That is, dropping the
assessed values would lock these low values in even after the real estate market
recovered.
Figure 3: Median Sale Price of Single-Family Homes in Detroit183
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Alvin Horhn, Detroit’s highest-ranking official in the Assessment Division,
stated, “Proposal A does not allow jurisdictions to recapture value once the
market recovers because no one ever imagined a sustained housing crash would

179. See also Patrick L. Anderson, Headlee Amendment Protections Under Proposal A,
MACKINAC CTR. PUB. POL’Y (May 1, 1993), https://www.mackinac.org/5790 [https://perma.cc/5CC5E3EF] (“‘A’ has the intended effect of increasing state aid to local schools while reducing local property
taxes.”).
180. See, e.g., United States Market Overview, ZILLOW, https://www.zillow.com/home-values
[https://perma.cc/H4ZT-JYNV] (showing that the median single-family home valuation for the United
States in the aggregate dipped from approximately $174,000 in 2009 to approximately $150,000 in 2012
before beginning to increase).
181. See Atuahene & Berry, supra note 20 and accompanying text.
182. MICH. DEP’T TREASURY, BULL. 16 OF 2017: INFLATION RATE MULTIPLIER (2017),
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/Bulletin_16_of_2017__Inflation_Rate_Multiplier_for_2018_604882_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/DP7F-ZA7H] (showing that
Headlee inflation rate calculations from 1995–2018 vary between 0.997 and 1.044).
183. See Detroit Home Prices & Values, ZILLOW, http://www.zillow.com/detroit-mi/homevalues [https://perma.cc/W9GQ-EAYF]; see also Atuahene & Berry, supra note 20, at 853 fig.2.
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occur. No one conceived of this.”184 Herein lies the problem legislators did not
anticipate when enacting the Amendments to Section IX of Michigan’s
constitution: local officials cannot simultaneously respond to temporary market
downturns and ensure adequate operational revenues.
Given this legal contradiction, assessors throughout Michigan have an
incentive to ride out down markets by not sufficiently decreasing market values,
which is possible because assessors have substantial leeway in ascribing value
to each taxpayer’s property. As Horhn rightly stated, “Determining market
values is an art and a science, so two appraisers can look at the same property
and come to different results.”185 Failure to properly adjust values will cause
systemic non-compliance with the constitutional mandate that prohibits
assessments from exceeding 50 percent of a property’s market value. But in
theory, once the market recovers, values will comply with the law and all would
once again be well. But, as shown in Figure 3, property values in Detroit never
fully recovered. As a result, the illegality was not temporary. It persisted.
The onus was on individual taxpayers to protest incorrect tax assessments
and rectify the illegality.186 Those who did not, paid “the price,” literally. A study
that Hodge and I completed found that unconstitutional property tax assessments
are more prevalent and acute amongst lower-valued homes.187 In Detroit, owners
of lower-valued homes rarely appeal their property taxes,188 so those who
actually paid “the price” were those who could least afford to do so. In Detroit
and other Michigan cities, assessment officials failed to adequately respond to
the steep drop in housing values, and hence broke the law rather than jeopardize

184. Interview with Alvin Horhn, City of Detroit Deputy Chief Financial Officer (Oct. 15, 2018)
(on file with author); see also Lindsay VanHulle, Strapped Cities Taking Aim at Proposal A, BRIDGE
(Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.bridgemi.com/business-bridge/strapped-cities-taking-aim-proposal
[https://perma.cc/P87S-JAKQ] (“While local government leaders understood in the mid-1990s that an
economic downturn could have devastating consequences for revenue, [chief operating officer of the
Michigan Municipal League] Minghine said, a healthy economy might have led them to underestimate
the effect: ‘You never experienced those declines like that, so you never saw the math play out the way
it did.’”).
185. Interview with Alvin Horhn, supra note 184 (“Experience and knowledge of the local
market, that is the art part. The science part is we must follow the state Assessor’s Manual and General
Property Tax Act.”).
186. See Atuahene & Berry, supra note 20, at 865 (explaining that, at a town hall in January 2017,
when “Mayor Duggan was asked what his administration planned to do to compensate Detroit residents
for assessments that were, for years, in violation of the Michigan Constitution, he said that while it is
unfortunate that this occurred, all Detroit residents had an opportunity to appeal their assessments and
rectify the situation, so the city is not liable for any damages resulting for the unconstitutional
assessments”).
187. Atuahene & Hodge, supra note 7, at 288 (“[T]he lowest-valued properties in 2009 were, on
average, assessed at levels almost eighteen times larger than the constitutionally permitted 0.5 limit
(8.87); middle-valued properties were assessed three times more than the constitutionally permitted limit
(1.54); and the highest-valued properties were assessed below the constitutionally permitted limit
(0.4).”).
188. Id. at 268–69 & n.20, 292.
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revenues.189 While violating the law is imprudent, it is important to understand
the prevailing legal contradiction and its role in facilitating the lawbreaking.
b. Concealment
Due to the Headlee Amendment, Michigan authorities cannot add new
property taxes or increase the rate on existing property taxes without voter
approval. This makes state attempts to alter property tax rates tremendously
visible.190 Property tax assessment calculations, on the other hand, are
camouflaged by complexity. They are also the only part of the tax equation
where local governments have substantial ability to affect revenues. Assessment
calculations therefore present the greatest opportunity for mischief because it is
too complicated for taxpayers to determine whether officials have violated the
law by assessing a property above 50 percent of its market value. This
information is, in a sense, concealed so citizens are often unaware that something
untoward is happening. In fact, taxpayers must skillfully leap over at least six
specific hurdles to identify and rectify flawed calculations. Poverty and time
constraints, however, make for short legs.
First, the taxpayer must understand how the state calculates their property
tax bill. Michigan law demands that authorities assess all properties annually,191
and this requires three distinct calculations: Assessed Value (AV), State
Equalized Value (SEV), and Taxable Value (TV).192 Local assessors use a mass
appraisal system to determine a property’s market value, and they set AV at no
higher than 50 percent of this determined value. The SEV is the AV equalized
across Michigan’s various cities and counties by bringing the total valuation for
each property category within all assessing units in the county and state as close
to the 50 percent constitutional limit as possible.193 Proposal A created the TV,
which is the SEV with growth capped at 5 percent or the inflation rate, whichever
is less.194 To determine annual property tax bills, the assessor multiplies TV by
the authorized millage rate.195
As this concise summary of AV, SEV, and TV demonstrates, property tax
calculations are enormously difficult. These calculations are beyond the
comprehension of many homeowners, like Mrs. Baines who, along with her
husband and seven children, are life-long Detroiters. Mrs. Baines is often
unemployed due to a chronic illness, and her husband’s employment in the

189. See Atuahene, Our Taxes Are Too Damn High, supra note 39, at 1510–13, n.49 & tbl.3A
(showing that Wayne County’s predominately African-American cities faced unconstitutional property
tax assessment and property tax foreclosures at a significantly higher rate than its predominately white
cities).
190. See MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 25.
191. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.10(1) (West 2019).
192. See MICH. LEGISLATURE, supra note 171, at 1.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See id. at 3–4.

2020]

PREDATORY CITIES

141

construction industry is seasonal. Nevertheless, after years of saving, the Baines
family was finally able to purchase their first home in 2012 on a land contract.
That same year, the Detroit assessor claimed their new home was worth $46,000
and began taxing them at that rate. But, they had purchased it for only $20,000—
the approximate price of other homes in their area.
When the Baines could no longer afford to pay the illegally inflated
property taxes, the Wayne County Treasurer foreclosed on their home in 2015
and sold it to an investor at the tax auction for $500. The investor eventually
evicted the family and the house is now standing empty. To add insult to injury,
since their household income falls below the federal poverty line, the Baines
qualified for the Poverty Tax Exemption and were not even supposed to be
paying the illegally inflated property taxes that triggered their eviction.
When I asked Mrs. Baines whether she understood the various calculations
that appeared on her property tax bill, she said:
I had no clue about any of that. The tax bill is, to be honest, confusing.
You just look for the number, you are hit with it, and you know you
cannot afford it, so you know you are about to lose the house. All these
feelings consume you with those large numbers. I was thinking about
ways I can raise money . . . You just kind of just pay what they say and
do not look at how it is put together. People do not pay attention. It was
not something we were taught to do. You want to be a home owner, so
you jump into it without having the information. You are not worried
about how the taxes are added up. It is just not common knowledge
among poor folks. You just do not pay attention to the little things.196
Second, taxpayers must determine the value of their homes. The industry
standard for estimating the market value of residential properties is the market
approach, which uses recent sales of comparable properties sold voluntarily.197
For the most accurate estimates, homeowners can hire a professional appraiser
to conduct a formal appraisal, which on average costs anywhere from about $254
to $376 in Michigan.198 Homeowners can also rely on real estate agents who use
recent sales recorded in the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) to determine the
market value of a home. In addition, homeowners can estimate the market value
of their home themselves by using personal knowledge or internet services that
aggregate home sales prices such as Zillow© and Trulia©.
For homeowners with low information, minimal education, limited time, or
scant resources, calculating the value of their home can be a near impossible task.

196. Confidential Interview with Mrs. Baines (Dec. 23, 2017) (on file with author).
197. INT’L ASS’N OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, supra note 27, § 4.3, at 9.
198. The range is for a single-family home or condominium. Michigan Real Estate Appraisal
Costs
&
Prices,
PROMATCHER,
https://appraisers.promatcher.com/cost/michigan.aspx
[https://perma.cc/C4AU-4L3R]; see also How Much Does It Cost To Hire A Property Appraiser?,
HOMEADVISOR,
https://www.homeadvisor.com/cost/inspectors-and-appraisers/hire-a-propertyappraiser [https://perma.cc/3RVU-5EC3] (The national average cost is $332. The average cost for
Detroit is $285).
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When I asked Mrs. Baines if she knew how to calculate the value of her home
she said, “Absolutely not. I did not know how you find the value of your home.
I did not know how much my house was worth. If you are trying to get a
mortgage, they will tell you, but I bought my home on land contract and this is
the type of hidden stuff they keep from you.”199
Third, the taxpayer must know that an appeals process exists. A clear
majority of the people I interviewed who were subject to unconstitutional
property tax assessments and then evicted from their homes when they could not
afford to pay the resulting illegally inflated tax bills did not even know there was
an appeals process. One respondent told me that when he looked at his property
tax bill, he did not see anything about an appeals process. He said, “I don’t think
that was on there. And, if they did, it was pretty fine print where you wouldn’t
be able to see that. You know the only thing you’re basically looking at are the
numbers.”200 Mrs. Baines agreed:
I did not even know about the appeal process when I lost my house.
Nobody told me. Community has no clue about the appeal process. The
Treasurer should have sent out this info. to people who were about to go
through the foreclosure process. The organizations helping with the
foreclosure did not tell me either. I went to specific places (like United
Community Housing Coalition) for help and it was never said to me.”201
Every city in Michigan must mail an assessment notice to taxpayers
annually.202 This notice contains the legal description, property address, property
classification, and informs taxpayers what their AV, SEV, and TV are for the
current and prior year.203 Although the assessment notice mailed to all taxpayers
contains language indicating they can protest (first to the Assessors Review and
then to the March Board of Review and Michigan Tax Tribunal),204 nowhere is
the taxpayer informed that the assessed value listed is constitutionally prohibited
from exceeding 50 percent of their property’s market value. That is, the
assessment notice informs taxpayers of their right to protest without providing
them with the information necessary to properly construct the protest.
Nevertheless, in a hallway conversation, a former City Council member,
George Cushingberry Jr., told me the problem was that “black folks” in Detroit
did not file property tax assessment appeals because “our people do not read and
we have got to start reading.”205 These types of condescending explanations
criticize people for not reading the fine print instead of blaming the local
government for putting this essential information in fine print. Cushingberry’s
199. Confidential Interview with Mrs. Baines, supra note 196.
200. Interview with Mr. Jones, supra note 10.
201. Confidential Interview with Mrs. Baines, supra note 196.
202. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.24(c) (West 2019).
203. Id.
204. Assessment Notice form L-4400 (2018). A sample form is available online at
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/1019f_504168_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/BGF2-G3DD].
205. Conversation with George Cushingberry Jr., Detroit City Councilman (July 8, 2017).
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re-election materials were certainly in a readable font. But as Mrs. Baines
observes, “Even if you read about it, you do not know what to do. You do not
know how to file an appeal.”206
Fourth, even if taxpayers know there is a process for appealing incorrect
property tax assessments, they must have the time required to file the appeal,
which involves several steps. Between February 1 and February 15, taxpayers
must first file an appeal by mail or in person with Detroit’s Board of Assessors,207
which must, at minimum, contain the property address or parcel number, reason
for the appeal, and some form of evidence or justification.208 If residential
property owners fail to file an appeal with the Board of Assessors, they forfeit
their right to approach subsequent appeal bodies.209
Review by the Board of Assessors is not required by state law, but rather it
is an extra step in the appeals process mandated by city ordinance in Detroit
alone.210 The Assessor’s Review infrequently produces changes to the
assessment roll,211 making it nothing more than an unnecessary obstacle. One
lawyer—who has made significant sums specializing in property tax appeals for
Detroit residents since 2007—noted that “a significant part of the [appeal]
process is to discourage people from pursuing their rights. Throwing up obstacles
up to discourage them.”212 My ethnographic observations confirm this.
There are several reasons why even people who knew about the
assessment appeals process did not file an appeal within the designated fifteenday period. Employment demands, child and elder care responsibilities, mobility
challenges, and procrastination were among the main barriers respondents
recounted. Mr. Harris’s story is instructive. He is an African-American father
with two grown children. He has been employed as a nurse’s assistant at Henry
Ford hospital for over twenty years. Mr. Harris inherited his father’s home in
2004. When he told me that “the property taxes were outrageous and exceeded
206.
207.

Confidential Interview with Mrs. Baines, supra note 199.
DETROIT, MICH., CITY CODE § 44-4-3(b) (2019) (previously codified as DETROIT, MICH.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 18-9-3(b) (2017)). In recent years, the City of Detroit has lengthened the
assessor’s review period from January 25 to February 18. See Joe Guillen, Detroit Extends Time to
Appeal
Property
Valuation,
DETROIT
FREE
PRESS
(Feb.
13,
2017),
http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2017/02/13/detroit-extends-time-appealproperty-valuation/97850946 [https://perma.cc/B3BQ-XR35].
208. C.f. interview with Alvin Horhn, supra note 184 (“About 65–70 percent of appeals are by
mail. The Assessor’s Review is very informal, there are no forms. The appeal process gets increasingly
formal as it goes along.”) (on file with author).
209. See
Property
Assessment
Appeal
Information,
CITY
OF
DETROIT,
https://www.detroitmi.gov/departments/office-chief-financial-officer/ocfo-divisions/officeassessor/property-assessment-appeal-information [https://perma.cc/FF57-EE88]. In contrast, the
process for commercial properties is far less cumbersome because taxpayers have the right to go
straight to the Michigan Tax Tribunal, bypassing both the Assessor’s Review and the March
Board of Review. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 205.735a(4)(b) (West 2019).
210. See DETROIT, MICH., CITY CODE § 44-4-3(b).
211. Interview with Alvin Horhn, City of Detroit Deputy Chief Financial Officer (Nov. 9, 2018)
(on file with author).
212. Confidential Interview with Mr. Tyler (Feb. 10, 2017) (on file with author).
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the value of the home,”213 I asked him whether he knew about the appeals process
and he said:
Yeah, I was aware. But, trying to work every day. I work 12 hours a
day, so it’s kind of hard to go downtown and sit down there all day and
still not get anything done or even see anybody. That process is so
backed up and overwhelming. That’s why a lot of people don’t follow
through with it because it’s just too time-consuming. The city knows
those properties aren’t worth that much. They should take it upon
themselves and come around and yearly assess those properties. The
owner shouldn’t have to go through that because we don’t have the time.
We have to work to try to keep the home . . . I didn’t have the time to
take off to go downtown and pay to park and go through all that and
spend a whole day down there and still end up with nothing at the end
of the day. So, I just chose not to use the [appeals] process.214
Fifth, if the taxpayer does not initially get a favorable decision from the
Assessor’s Review, she must know there are further opportunities to appeal. The
next step in the appeals process is the March Board of Review, which consists
of nine Detroit residents appointed by City Council.215 Homeowners can file
an appeal in person or by mail by filling out a standardized form used
statewide. Willie Donwell, the Chairman of the Board of Review, says he will
accept sales comparisons, cost of repair records, and photographs showing
structural damage to prove the City’s market valuation is incorrect.216
If homeowners are not satisfied with the March Board of Review’s
decision, then they can appeal to the Michigan Tax Tribunal by July 30 of the
tax year under protest.217 While there are no fees to file an appeal at the
Assessor’s Review and the March Board of Review, the Tax Tribunal requires a
filing fee that ranges from $125 to $300, depending on the property’s value.218

213. Confidential Interview with Mr. Harris (Apr. 8, 2017) (on file with author).
214. Id.
215. The March Board of Review issues all decisions by the first Monday in April and submits
its assessment rolls to the county by the first Wednesday in April. See DETROIT, MICH., CITY CODE
§ 44-4-5 (previously codified as DETROIT, MICH., CODE OF ORDINANCES
§ 18-9-5 (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.28(1) (West 2019); see also DETROIT, MICH., CITY
CODE § 44-4-7(b) (previously codified as DETROIT, MICH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 18-9-7(b)
(2017)).
216. Interview with Willie Donwell, Member, Detroit Board of Review (Jan 25, 2017) (on file
with author). But see Christine MacDonald, Detroit’s Property Tax System Plagued by Mistakes, Waste,
DETROIT NEWS (Feb. 22, 2013) [hereinafter MacDonald, Property Tax System],
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2018/06/13/detroits-property-tax-systemplagued-mistakes-waste/700547002 [https://perma.cc/QUX9-BHZJ] (indicating that sales comparisons
may not be sufficient).
217. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 205.735a(6) (West 2019); Mich. Tax Trib. R.
792.10271 (Jan. 15, 2015).
218. For properties with an SEV or TV less than $100,000, the filing fee is $125. If the property
is valued at $100,000.01 to $500,000, the filing fee is $200, and values above that require a $300 filing
fee. What are the Tribunal’s Fees for Filing a Petition or a Motion in Small Claims?, LARA TAX TRIB.,
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If homeowners are not satisfied with the Tax Tribunal’s decision and can prove
that it committed “fraud, error of law or the adoption of wrong principles,” then
they can further appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals and then the Michigan
Supreme Court.219
Sixth, even if taxpayers know there is more than one opportunity to appeal,
they must have the time and money to pursue the appeal further. I met Mr. Louis
when I was observing the March Board of Review hearings. He bought three
properties at the Wayne County tax foreclosure auction and came before the
Board to reduce the Assessed Values on all three. Although the Board reduced
the AV on all three properties, Mr. Louis believed that further reductions were
necessary so that the AV correctly reflected the properties’ true market value.
He knew he could appeal to the Michigan Tax Tribunal, but he did not have the
time. He said,
I did not go to Tribunal because of family health things with my folks.
I wish I could have gone to the Tribunal, but I just could not. What bugs
me is that during the citywide reassessment they dropped [the AV] by
half. So, I had to pay winter and summer taxes with that high amount,
and then they brought it down. But nothing changed in that time.220
Although the Board of Review did not reduce the AV, the City of Detroit
did a complete reassessment of all residential properties in January 2017 and
reduced the AV. Mr. Louis believes that the AV now reflects 50 percent of the
market value of his properties, as required by law.221 That is, the citywide
reassessment did what the Board of Review failed to do, demonstrating that the
appeals process had serious flaws.
During the period when Detroit’s economic crisis peaked, the City lost over
90 percent of its Tax Tribunal cases.222 Even worse, because of manpower issues
associated with the 2013 bankruptcy, city lawyers did not even respond to
complaints filed with the Tribunal, and so taxpayers routinely won default
judgments.223 In 2015, the City of Detroit tried to right the ship and hired a
contractor to respond to Tribunal filings. Nevertheless, according to Mr. Tyler—
a lawyer specializing in property tax appeals in Detroit—the city’s win rate did
not improve very much because “the evidence presented was garbage.”224 He
claims “that year, we averaged 42% reductions. Our success rate at the Tribunal
went from 95% to 90%.”225 Those taxpayers who appealed all the way to the Tax
https://www.michigan.gov/taxtrib/0,4677,7-187-67491-131666--,00.html
[https://perma.cc/67C67SP8].
219. See MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 28.
220. Confidential Interview with Mr. Louis (Mar. 19, 2017) (on file with author).
221. Id.
222. Interview with Alvin Horhn, supra note 211.
223. Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a) (“When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative
relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend . . . the clerk must enter the party’s default.”).
224. Confidential interview with Mr. Tyler, supra note 212.
225. Id.; see also Christine MacDonald, Detroit Tax Appeals Reveal Stark Imbalance, DETROIT
NEWS (June 14, 2018) [hereinafter MacDonald, Tax Appeals Reveal Imbalance],
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Tribunal received assessed value reductions based on market value estimates
rather than conjecture. But, like Mr. Louis, Mrs. Baines, and Mr. Harris, most
taxpayers, unfortunately, never made it this far.
For these six reasons, a seemingly impenetrable wall of procedure stymied
the detection and correction of unconstitutional property tax assessments in
Detroit. Without advocates—such as lawyers, real estate agents, or appraisers—
most taxpayers could not navigate the complex process.226 Although certain
entrepreneurial advocates have developed businesses that specialize in
submitting property tax assessment appeals at scale,227 the two business models
dominant in this industry make it economically infeasible for owners of lowvalue homes to hire these innovative firms.228
The first is the contingency model where the enterprise charges no upfront
fees. 229 Instead, it takes a fixed percentage of the first year’s savings resulting
from a successful appeal. If the appeal is unsuccessful, the customer does not
have to pay a dime. The key to this business model is to serve clients who both
are likely to win an appeal and to save significant sums consequently. This means
owners of lower-valued homes are not ideal clients because—although they may
win an appeal—the resulting sum saved (and thus payment to the enterprise) is
lower because they pay lower property taxes.230
The second business model—most commonly used for residential
properties in Detroit—is based on a flat fee for services.231 Mr. Tyler and his
firm have been doing business in Detroit since 2007 using this business model.
His firm filed appeals for about 2,200 homes between 2013 and 2015 and saved
these clients about $2.3 million in year one alone.232 To secure its services and
the resulting savings, Mr. Tyler’s company typically charges a $600 base fee
plus out-of-pocket expenses, which most often entail appraisal and filing fees.233
He estimates the average appeal costs $875, but the cost can be as low as $660

https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2018/06/14/detroit-tax-appeals-revealstark-imbalance/703650002 [https://perma.cc/349W-58RS] (in an analysis of more than 4,000 appeal
decisions by the Michigan Tax Tribunal, finding that the tribunal “reduced Detroit property values at a
far higher rate than neighboring communities and nearly 50 percent more than the county average”).
226. MacDonald, Property Tax System, supra note 216 (Harold Hoyt, a businessman who filed
630 tax appeal for his clients, said: “regular citizens rarely have luck without a professional
representative. ‘They don’t stand a chance,’ Hoyt said. ‘It’s a rigged game’”).
227. Id. (“Complaints are so rampant a cottage industry has emerged to challenge Detroit
assessments.”).
228. William M. Doerner & Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, The Role of Representative Agents in the
Property Tax Appeals Process, 68 NAT’L. TAX J. 59, 60 (2015) (discussing the compensation model for
tax appeal representatives and the incentives for them to “target affluent neighborhoods in making their
solicitations”).
229. Id.
230. Id.; see also id. at n.19 (showing that the probability of winning a tax appeal is higher in a
low-income neighborhood, although the returns on that success are also lower).
231. See id. at n.5.
232. Confidential Interview with Mr. Tyler, supra, note 212.
233. Id.
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and as high as $1200. Unlike clients who use similar property tax appeal services
in Chicago, his clients have no guarantee that they will recoup their costs. For
owners of lower-valued homes subject to illegally inflated tax assessments, it is
not clear they would recoup their costs even when the appeal is successful
because their tax savings are lower.
When Detroit reappraised all residential properties in January 2017 and
finally began assessing properties based on their market values, business dried
up for Mr. Tyler and firms like his. As Mr. Tyler recounted,
We are not pushing this business anymore. The numbers are getting
much more in line with reality. Assessments are coming down and are
closer to reality. The market has recovered. There is less to fight about.
Less of a disparity. So, what we can accomplish for clients is less
significant.234
Although firms like Mr. Tyler’s provided a very valuable service to Detroiters
after the Great Recession, he believes taxpayers “should not have had to go
through the expense to obtain simple fairness.”235 Fairness came with a price tag
and many who could not afford the cost did not have the aptitude to fight the
illegally inflated property tax assessments widespread in Detroit. So, they either
paid the resulting overpriced property taxes or lost their homes when they could
not.
Although the complicated appeals process concealed the problem of
unconstitutional property tax assessments, the impact of the tax foreclosure crisis
was no secret to Detroit residents, activists, academics, and policy makers.
Activists described the property tax foreclosure crisis and the attendant
displacement as a hurricane with no water.236 Local news outlets did several
stories about the historic levels of property tax foreclosure in Detroit.237
Homeowners were also keenly aware that something was awry. As one
respondent recounted, “At first I thought it was just me, but when I seen yellow
baggies (foreclosure notices) on my entire block, I knew something wasn’t right.
I knew something was up.”238 Also, in response to residents’ long-standing
grievances, reducing property tax assessments and abating the foreclosure crisis
has been one of Mayor Duggan’s key political promises.239

234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See, e.g., Dianne Feeley, A Hurricane Without Water: Detroit’s Foreclosure Disaster,
BLACK AGENDA REP. (June 3, 2015), https://blackagendareport.com/detroit_foreclosure-disaster
[https://perma.cc/D8K5-DDJS].
237. See, e.g., MacDonald & Wilkinson, supra note 122; Joel Kurth, Mass Evictions Loom After
Homes Sold Off, DETROIT NEWS (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroitcity/2015/10/07/mass-evictions-loom-homes-sold/73558768 [https://perma.cc/P3C2-UVNA].
238. Confidential Interview with Mr. Smith (Mar. 19, 2017) (on file with author).
239. See Rod Meloni, Detroit Property Taxes and Righting the Ship, CLICK ON DETROIT (Jan.
27, 2014), https://www.clickondetroit.com/money/rod-meloni-detroit-property-taxes-and-righting-theship [https://perma.cc/M6J5-YTNM].
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Given the heightened visibility of the tax foreclosures, the question
becomes: How did the problem of systemic unconstitutional tax assessments
remain hidden for so long? Although scholars from University of Michigan and
Michigan State had written eloquently about Detroit’s inordinately high property
tax rates and inequitable property tax assessments,240 it was not until the
publication of our study, Stategraft, that the discourse of unconstitutional tax
assessments began.241 Hodge and I were the first to make the link between well
documented tax assessment inequity and Michigan’s constitution, legislation,
and case law. One homeowner’s comment well reflected what was common
knowledge among Detroit residents about their high property taxes: “I knew it
was wrong, I did not know it was in the Constitution, Michigan’s Constitution,
but I knew it wasn’t right.”242
Despite this evidence, the tax foreclosures continued unabated, largely
because local officials strategically placed the blame—and the onus to change
the situation—on citizens. In all my interviews with City officials, they regularly
blamed the excessive tax foreclosure rate on failures of personal responsibility.
For example, David Szymanski, Detroit’s former Treasurer explained to me that
the tax foreclosure crisis was full throttle because “when people had a choice
between buying purses and paying their taxes, unfortunately they chose to buy
the purse.”243 Victoria Kovari, the General Manager of the Department of
Neighborhoods, believes that the tax foreclosure crisis is a result of “people
buying homes that they could not afford.”244 Overlooking the problem of
unconstitutional property tax assessments and the resulting illegally inflated
property taxes, Raymond Wojtowicz—Wayne County’s Treasurer for 39
years—rebuked delinquent property owners and advised them to “just pay your

240. Joshua M. Akers, Making Markets: Think Tank Legislation and Private Property in Detroit,
34 URB. GEOGRAPHY 1070, 1070–93 (2013); Margaret Dewar et al., Disinvesting in the City: The Role
of Tax Foreclosure in Detroit, 51 URB. AFF. REV. 587, 606–07 (2015) [hereinafter Dewar et al.,
Disinvesting in the City]; Timothy R. Hodge et al., Assessment Inequity in a Declining Housing Market:
The Case of Detroit, 45 REAL EST. ECON. 237 (2017); Timothy R. Hodge et al., Tax Base Erosion and
Inequity from Michigan’s Assessment Growth Limit: The Case of Detroit, 43 PUB. FIN. REV. 636 (2015);
Gary Sands & Mark Skidmore, Making Ends Meet: Options for Property Tax Reform in Detroit, 36 J.
URB. AFF. 682, 682–83, 691–98 (2014).
241. Atuahene & Hodge, supra note 7.
242. Illegal Foreclosures Detroit, The Human Impact of Illegal Foreclosures: Interview with
Sonja Bonnett, YOUTUBE (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zpfvs-VAMJc
[https://perma.cc/P2PR-S3LS].
243. Interview with David Szymanski, former Treasurer of Detroit (Mar. 14, 2017) (on file with
author). Szymanski had earlier said this at a public meeting in Cobo Center in downtown Detroit on
January 29, 2015 in a room full of Detroiters facing tax foreclosures. See Christine MacDonald,
Homeowners Facing Foreclosure Flock to Cobo Center, DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 29, 2015),
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/wayne-county/2015/01/29/homeowners-facingforeclosure-flock-cobo-center/22527173 [https://perma.cc/G6GT-N7CB].
244. Conversation with Victoria Kovari, General Manager, Dep’t of Neighborhoods (Sept. 25,
2018) (on file with author).

2020]

PREDATORY CITIES

149

taxes on time.”245 City officials routinely mobilized narratives that blamed the
poor while ignoring the systemic illegality at play, keeping the structural
injustices hidden in plain sight.
c.

Impaired Accountability

Impaired accountability is one main reason that systemic unconstitutional
property tax assessments arose and persisted in Detroit. Calculating property tax
assessments and ensuring they are in line with Michigan law is the Detroit
Assessment Division’s job. While unconstitutional tax assessments abounded,
the mechanisms established to hold the Division accountable for accuracy failed.
More specifically, there are four entities with the power to oversee and correct
the work of Assessment Divisions in Michigan that are not abiding by existing
laws and procedures: The Assessment Division itself, Board of Review, Wayne
County Board of Commissioners, and State Tax Commission.
i.

Assessment Division

The internal quality controls within the Assessment Division are the first
accountability mechanism. Assessors must go out to inspect and value
properties, submit those valuations to their managers for review, and managers
then submit all valuations to the three-member Board of Assessors for final
approval.246 Normally, multiple levels of review and approval serve as a
safeguard, ensuring accuracy and bolstering the data’s integrity. But the review
process broke down because the data were riddled with inaccuracies.
Detroit had not conducted a reappraisal of properties in its jurisdiction in at
least fifty years.247 In addition, between 2002 and 2003, the Assessment Division
switched from its original mainframe assessing software to a more modern
operating system called Equalizer.248 The Division totally botched the
conversion and, as a result, many property descriptions were incorrect and
valuations were inaccurate.249 A building’s value is based on its attributes, but
245. Joel Kurth et al., Sorry We Foreclosed on Your Home. But Thanks for Fixing Our Budget,
BRIDGE (June 6, 2017), https://www.bridgemi.com/detroit-journalism-cooperative/sorry-weforeclosed-your-home-thanks-fixing-our-budget [https://perma.cc/T3FV-8SN6]; see also Marti
Benedetti, ‘Time to Pass the Torch,’ Says Retiring Wayne County Treasurer Raymond Wojtowicz After
39
Years
on
Job,
CRAIN’S
DETROIT
BUS.
(Oct.
4,
2015),
https://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20151004/NEWS/310049995/time-to-pass-the-torch-saysretiring-wayne-county-treasurer-raymond [https://perma.cc/6AL7-D2NJ].
246. Interview with Alvin Horhn, supra note 184 (on file with author). As of January 2019, there
is one seat empty. Currently, only Horhn and one assessor, Charles Erickson, are on the board.
247. OFFICE OF THE ASSESSOR, WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE CITY OF DETROIT’S
CITYWIDE PROPERTY REAPPRAISAL [hereinafter DETROIT’S PROPERTY REAPPRAISAL],
https://detroitmi.gov/document/reappraisal-brochure [https://perma.cc/M2DC-K8UN].
248. OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL, CITY OF DETROIT, PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE
FINANCE DEPARTMENT ASSESSMENTS DIVISION JULY 2008–JUNE 2011, at 19 (2012) [hereinafter
PERFORMANCE AUDIT], http://bit.ly/2hu2XJK [https://perma.cc/XYQ8-D3FV].
249. Id. at 9 (“Management acknowledged that they have accuracy issues with property
information because of the conversion, economic conditions, and changing property valuations. The
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the Division lost much of the data about each property’s underlying attributes
because—while the original assessing software could hold something like 100
building attributes—the new Equalizer system could hold drastically fewer.250
Alvin Horhn, Detroit’s highest-ranking assessment official, told me, “The
conversion should have happened over several years with officials going into the
field and verifying the information. But, in 2002, things began going south in
Detroit and we did not have the manpower or funding to do the switch
properly.”251 Without proper data and documentation, the Division’s internal
quality control mechanisms were wholly ineffective. Horhn confessed, “We took
statistical averages of what we could get our hands on. But, with limited
resources and limited access to data, you will come up with garbage. In the best
circumstances, this is not what we should have been doing.”252
A damning report by Detroit’s own Office of the Auditor General laid bare
the disarray within the Assessment Division. It concluded that “[a]ssessing
activities and data management activities are inefficient and are not effective,
and they lack sufficient internal controls.”253 The Auditor General’s office
conducted site visits, which revealed that “for five of the 22 (22.7%) residential
properties audited, the actual condition of the building or property did not match
its condition in Equalizer.”254 The office also examined a sample of the data in
Equalizer. The errors were significant.
Prior to the conversion a property listed three commercial buildings,
however, after the conversion the property listed one store, and two
apartment buildings; A vacant lot which still included the original
building [and] assessed values were not updated appropriately; A
property that was improperly listed as tax exempt, and the apartment
building only had a base rate of $5 per square feet; The error rate for
accuracy of property information on property record cards (the manual
assessing system), as well as information in Equalizer, was greater than
5%, which is not a passing score according to the Michigan State Tax
Commission (STC).255
Correctly done, assessors determine a property’s market value using the
most updated cost estimates found in the Michigan Residential Assessors
Manual.256 Without accurate data, the Equalizer system is in override, which

result is inaccurate or incomplete information and errors in property descriptions and valuations in the
Equalizer.”).
250. Interview with Alvin Horhn, City of Detroit Deputy Chief Financial Officer (Jan. 26, 2017)
(on file with author).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 248, at 2.
254. Id. at 10.
255. Id. at 9.
256. See generally MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.27 (West 2019); STATE TAX COMM’N,
MICHIGAN ASSESSORS MANUAL VOL. III (2018) [hereinafter ASSESSORS MANUAL],
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means assessment officials must input values manually.257 That is, the override
function creates an opportunity for assessors to escape the Assessors Manual’s
stringent calculation requirements and bend the rules. This is exactly what
happened in Detroit. Assessors based building values on incremental, ad hoc
adjustments to previously estimated values. This makeshift system imploded in
2008, during the Great Recession, when Detroit’s housing prices fell
precipitously, leaving no room for incremental adjustments.
Horhn describes how Linda Bade, Detroit’s Chief Assessor at that time,
handled the bungled conversion exacerbated by the Great Recession:
She initiated deep across the board cuts. It was impossible to target cuts
neighborhood by neighborhood because the resources did not exist to
do that. The City was having serious financial troubles and it was just
trying to keep fireman and police on the streets. There was no money
for an army of appraisers. So Bade made cuts across the board. When
she started making cuts in 2007, the total SEV was 14 billion. By the
time she left in June 2013, the total SEV dropped to 6 billion. Since the
cuts were substantial and uniform across the board, some property
owners got cuts they did not deserve, and others did not get enough.
Linda knew it was wrong and burned herself to the ground trying to deal
with it all.258
Horhn’s story indicates that property tax assessments in Detroit were no longer
derived using legally mandated formulas. They were instead based on crude
guesses.
Without adequate staffing, the Assessments Division could not provide
better estimates. But due to budget cuts, the Division did not replace employees
who left during the chaos, worsening the staffing shortage.259 Horhn recounts
how the Division’s staff diminished as Linda Bade came and went.
In 1997, we had 100 staff members. Then, Linda retired. When she came
back in April of 2007, we had 57 people. In 2013, Linda retired again
and at that point we were down to 35 people. When people left, they
were not replaced. We did not have manpower because the City was
focused on public safety. But, 35 people could not get the job done.260
The Auditor General found that 75 percent of employees interviewed said that
lack of adequate staffing was the Division’s most piercing problem.261 According
to Michigan’s State Assessors Board, “an effective assessment system requires
one full-time employee, including clericals per 1,500 to 3,500 parcels.”262 In

https://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/Merged_Volume_III_With_All_Edits_051817_57583
5_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/NBD4-25LR].
257. PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 248, at 9.
258. Interview with Alvin Horhn, supra note 184 (on file with author).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 248, at 43.
262. See id. at 50.
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2011, the Division had a total of fifty-two employees, and each assessor was
responsible for 6,911 parcels, nearly double the recommended ratio.263 Without
adequate staffing, existing employees had to do excessive overtime, routinely
leading to burn out.264
In addition, the staffing shortages meant that the Assessment Division
could not fulfill its legal duty to perform site visits.265 The Auditor General found
that, rather than visiting 30 percent of properties annually in compliance with
state requirements and internal metrics, the Division often failed to visit
properties for 22–30 years.266 Assessors are supposed to use site visits to ensure
property characteristics and values are up to date. Because Detroit has one of the
highest rates of arson, vacancy, mortgage foreclosure, and tax foreclosure, its
property stock changes rapidly,267 making site visits vital for accurate records
and assessments.268 Horhn describes how the Great Recession exacerbated
inaccuracies by hindering the Division’s ability to conduct site visits.
As the market crashed, more people were filing appeals and poverty tax
exemptions, but we had nobody to send out in the field. We could not
get out of the office, so we used the property transfer affidavits and sales
available to us. But, you cannot confirm the value of a house if you are
not out there to review sales. We didn’t have staff to do what we needed
to do. We were in the middle of the storm trying to keep our heads above
water while everything was crashing down all around us.269
Top officials such as Mr. Horhn and Mrs. Bade are not bad people; nor are
they incompetent. Simply said, they were just not given the resources they
needed to do their jobs in accordance with existing laws. It was the Assessment
Division’s lack of human and financial resources which led its officials to
generate an assessment roll that violated Michigan law.270 Although simple

263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 11.
266. See id. at 9.
267. See Jerry Herron, Niki’s Window: Detroit and the Humiliation of History, 47 GA. REV. 362,
372–73 (1993); Joel Kurth & Christine MacDonald, Volume of Abandoned Homes ‘Absolutely
Terrifying’, DETROIT NEWS (June 24, 2015), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/specialreports/2015/05/14/detroit-abandoned-homes-volume-terrifying/27237787
[https://perma.cc/4Q7FZ976]; Loveland Technologies, THE DETROIT FIRE REPORT, http://detroitfires.squarespace.com
[https://perma.cc/594G-BPFY]; Patrick Sisson, The High Cost of Abandoned Property, and How Cities
Can Push Back, CURBED.COM (June 1, 2018), https://www.curbed.com/2018/6/1/17419126/blightland-bank-vacant-property [https://perma.cc/NC4K-46XC].
268. See PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 248, at 11 (“The effect of not conducting the required
annual site visits results in detailed property records (including data in Equalizer), assessments, and the
City’s tax rolls that are not accurate. Assessments can only be as accurate as the property data on which
they are based. Understated assessments results in lost revenues for the City, while overstatements
increase revenues at the expense of property owners.”).
269. Interview with Alvin Horhn, City of Detroit Deputy Chief Financial Officer (Jan. 27, 2017)
(on file with author).
270. Some believe that Linda Bade, who was in charge during the worst years, deserves ample
blame. See MacDonald, Property Tax System, supra note 216 (“Police are investigating the
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Hollywood narratives are attractive, the genesis of a predatory city does not
always involve good guys donning white hats and bad guys sporting black ones.
Sometimes the predation occurs because there is no money to buy a hat.
ii.

Board of Review

When the Assessment Division’s internal quality control mechanisms
failed disastrously, the next bulwark against inaccurate property tax assessments
was the Board of Review.271 By soliciting and hearing property tax assessment
appeals, the Board identifies and corrects mistakes in the assessment roll to
guarantee its accuracy.272 Willie Donwell—the Board’s Chairman since
2004—admitted that he knew about the bungled conversion to Equalizer, the
lost data, and the widespread assessment inaccuracies that resulted.273 He also
acknowledged that, according to the Michigan Tax Act, the Board of Review
has control over all assessments whether appealed or not.274 The Board,
however, did not have the power to mandate a complete reappraisal of every
property in the city, which was required to correct the roll’s deficiencies.275 Mr.
Donwell felt the only real power he had to compensate for the Assessment
Division’s failures was to encourage community members to file an appeal,
which is exactly what he did.276
Interviews with companies that specialize in helping Detroit residents
appeal their property tax assessments revealed that the Board of Review could
have done more. The head of one such business, Mr. Tyler, said that the Board
is “supposed to act as a check on the assessor, but I don’t know how well they
are fulfilling their role. The Board is working in tandem with the assessor instead

disappearance of nearly $310,000 in cash that went missing over five years from the Assessment
Division . . . Even so, two of its leaders [Linda Bade and Frederick Morgan] not only have kept their
jobs, but also are drawing pensions in additions [sic] to their paychecks.”).
271. STATE TAX COMM’N, STATE TAX COMMISSION BOARDS OF REVIEW 3 (2018),
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/BOR_QA_423899_7.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UTQ5DM8L].
272. See DETROIT, MICH., CITY CODE § 44-4-7 (2019) (previously codified as DETROIT, MICH.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 18-9-7 (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 211.28–.30 (West 2019).
273. Donwell did not, however, believe the Equalizer debacle resulted in any illegality. “I
believed they were acting with information from the State Tax Commission, which issues
bulletins. If they are following the rules [in the bulletin], then they are in compliance.” Interview
with Willie C. Donwell, Administrator/Chairman, City of Detroit Board of Review, in Detroit, Mich.
(Oct. 23, 2018) (on file with author).
274. Id. See also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.29(2) (West 2019) (“The board shall do
whatever else is necessary to make the roll comply with this act.”) (emphasis added).
275. See ASSESSORS MANUAL, supra note 256, at 118 (“According to the Michigan Supreme
Court, a Board of Review may NOT make wholesale or across the board adjustments to assessments. A
Board of Review must consider each parcel and act upon it individually.”).
276. Interview with Willie C. Donwell, Administrator/Chairman- City of Detroit Board of
Review, in Detroit, Mich. (Feb. 3, 2017) (on file with author). In reality, the Board also should have
reported the systemic inaccuracies to the State Tax Commission. See STATE TAX COMMISSION
BOARDS OF REVIEW, supra note 271, at 11.
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of working as a check on the assessor.”277 As an example, he recounted a story
about one property that was assessed as if it was worth $40,000 when a certified
appraisal valued it at $10,000. The Board disregarded the appraisal and gave only
a 3 percent reduction. Scoffing at the reduction, Mr. Tyler said,
At this level, it is not a matter of opinion, it is a core discrepancy. The
reduction was not reached by looking closely at the appraisal. There is
no rhyme or reason to it. It is not based on value! They give a percentage
reduction rather than a reduction based on value because they are
overwhelmed by the volume of appeals but recognize that values are
overstated.278
Mr. Tyler’s company took the appeal to the Michigan Tax Tribunal and won.
In March of 2017, I attended several public sessions of the March Board of
Review. Mr. Donwell allowed me to sit in the back and observe. My observations
confirmed many of Mr. Tyler’s concerns about the haphazard assessment
reductions. When I arrived, about twenty-five people were seated in the hallway,
waiting for the Board to call them inside the hearing room. Once it was each
taxpayer’s turn, he or she entered the hearing room where there was a court
recorder, appraisers from the Assessment Division, and a person who read the
parcel number, petitioner(s) name, address, and stated value of the property into
the record. Representatives from the Assessment Division placed information
about the appellant’s property on a screen and Mr. Donwell called the petitioners
to a microphone to explain why they thought that their property assessments
were too high. Mr. Donwell was in complete control of the proceedings. There
were two or three other board members present at all times, but they only spoke
when it was time to say, “I move that we accept” and “I second that.”
During the time I spent observing the hearings, Mr. Donwell rescheduled
over 90 percent of the people who came without an advocate because they did
not bring any documentation to prove the assessor’s valuation of their property
was incorrect. They were ill-informed about the process and only came prepared
to tell their story. When people did bring sufficient “proof” and the Board voted
to reduce the assessed value, it was not clear how Mr. Donwell came up with the
new valuation. After the session, when I asked Mr. Donwell to explain how he
came up with the reduced values, he claimed he was using a formula. But when
I asked to see the formula, a calculator fiasco that involved typing a string of
nonsensical numbers ensued, proving there was, in fact, no formula. In truth, it
was a rough estimation. No board members asked questions about how Mr.
Donwell determined the final number; their presence and final approval were
rubber stamps.
Since Mr. Donwell’s outsized control over the Board of Review is manifest,
it was especially problematic when an investigation conducted by Detroit’s

277.
278.

Confidential Interview with Mr. Tyler, supra note 212.
Id.

2020]

PREDATORY CITIES

155

Board of Ethics found that Mr. Donwell improperly sought to personally benefit
from the widespread tax foreclosures.279 He created a company—called
Hometown Detroit—that tried to purchase 2,000 to 4,000 foreclosure eligible
homes in Northwest Detroit, some of which could have been foreclosed upon
after appearing before the Board. The plan was to restore the homes and then sell
them to low-income families on land contracts.280 But, Detroit’s ethics ordinance
does not allow public servants to engage or accept “private employment or
rendering services when such employment or service is in conflict or
incompatible with the proper discharge of official duties. . . .”281
Consequently, on June 7, 2018, the Ethics Board sanctioned Mr. Donwell
with a public admonishment—the least severe punishment in its arsenal.282 Since
his scheme never advanced beyond a proposal, City Council allowed Mr.
Donwell to remain in his position as the Board of Review’s chairman.283 Mr.
Donwell has publicly apologized to Detroit residents for any impropriety that
occurred and continues to work with community groups to reform and improve
administration of the Poverty Tax Exemption and appeals processes.284
In sum, the Board of Review could not and did not hold the Assessment
Division accountable for its systematic miscalculations. In fact, the Board was
part of the problem. Mr. Donwell confessed that his belief at the height of the
economic crisis was that, “the Board of Review’s job is to make sure balances
are correct. There is a number the city gives us, and we have to back into that
number. The ABCs are to ensure the right amount of money is coming in. We
are charged with making sure assessments are fair. What is the difference
between what is right and what needed to be done?”285 He shrugged.

279. Res. Admonishing Willie Donwell, Chairperson of the Detroit Board of Review Property
Assessment, CITY OF DETROIT, BD. OF ETHICS ADMIN., (2018) [hereinafter BD. OF ETHICS ADMIN.],
https://detroitmi.gov/document/resolution-admonition-w-donwell [].https://perma.cc/ZU4U-ERNY].
280. Joe Guillen, Detroit Property Tax Official’s Side Job in Real Estate Causes Stir, DETROIT
FREE PRESS (Apr. 16, 2017), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2017/04/16/2jobs-detroit-property-tax-official-raise-some-questions/100460728 [https://perma.cc/PQS3-NVGV];
Joe Guillen, Detroit Tax Official Reprimanded for Second Job in Real Estate, DETROIT FREE PRESS
(July 10, 2018) https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2018/07/10/tax-officialwillie-donwell-ethics-rules/769427002 [https://perma.cc/J6T9-EG4Q].
281. DETROIT, MICH., CITY CODE § 2-106.1(2)(d) (2019)).
282. Violations of ethics ordinances can result in public admonishment by the Board of Ethics, a
recommendation for disciplinary review, a recommendation to City Council for “removal or forfeiture
proceedings,” an administrative sanction, and even fines or imprisonment. See DETROIT, MICH., CITY
CODE § 2-106.11.
283. Despite finding that Donwell had violated multiple ordinances, the Board of Ethics
Administration only required Donwell to receive Ethics training within three months of its resolution.
See BD. OF ETHICS ADMIN., supra note 279.
284. Willie C. Donwell, Administrator/Chairman,- City of Detroit Board of Review, Press
Conference and Community Forum for Coalition to End Unconstitutional Tax Foreclosures (July 8,
2017).
285. Interview with Willie C. Donwell, supra note 216.
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Wayne County Board of Commissioners

Once the Board of Review failed to protect Detroit taxpayers against
illegally inflated property tax assessments, the next entity with oversight capacity
and the tools to hold Detroit’s Assessment Division accountable was the Wayne
County Board of Commissioners.286 Although only the local assessor can assign
an assessed value to each property,287 the Michigan Tax Act mandates that each
county perform equalization to achieve uniformity among the local units in the
county.288 To equalize, a county uses its own sales or appraisal studies to verify
that the cumulative assessed value of each property category does not exceed 50
percent of the category’s cumulative market value. So if Detroit’s cumulative
State Equalized Value (SEV) for all residential properties is $14 billion, then its
cumulative market value for all residential properties cannot exceed $28 billion.
The county has several options for making corrections when a category’s
cumulative SEV exceeds 50 percent of the category’s cumulative market value.
It could direct the local assessor to make cuts until the cumulative SEV for all
residential properties falls below $14 billion. If the local assessor does not have
the required administrative capacity to complete this task, then the Michigan Tax
Act authorizes Wayne County to provide assistance.289 But, if the local assessor
is uncooperative, the county can take a more authoritative approach and apply a
factor that would categorically reduce or increase the assessed values of all
residential properties.290 Lastly, the county can report the offending city to the
State Tax Commission, which can assume jurisdiction of its assessment roll until
the local unit complies.291
Given the various options, Wayne County chose to work with Detroit’s
Assessment Division to make cuts in the cumulative SEV. The problem: accurate
data are required for this accountability mechanism to work effectively.292 The
county knew Detroit’s assessment data were faulty.293 They knew that the City
had not conducted a complete reappraisal in over fifty years.294 They also knew
286. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.27(d) (West 2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.34
(West 2019).
287. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.10 (West 2019).
288. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.34; see also Conroy v. Battle Creek, 22 N.W.2d 275, 280
(Mich. 1946) (“The constitutional requirement of a ‘uniform rule of taxation’ . . . can be satisfactorily
affected [sic] through the process of equalization.”).
289. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.23a (West 2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.34(3)
(West 2019).
290. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.34(2) (West 2019).
291. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.10f(1) (West 2019).
292. See PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 248, at 36 (“[A]nnual sales studies which are used
to determine assessment ratios and ultimately, assessed values would be adversely affected if data
relating to sales is missing or not accurate.”).
293. Interview with Willie C. Donwell, Administrator/Chairman,- City of Detroit Board of
Review (Oct. 22, 2018) (on file with the author) (“The county and state would have had to have known
because the BSNA software is used throughout state of Michigan. We transmit our BSNA data to the
county and they can see everything Detroit can see.”).
294. See DETROIT’S PROPERTY REAPPRAISAL, supra note 247.
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of the Equalizer debacle because it was reported in the Auditor General’s public
report.295 Yet, the county proceeded as if the data were accurate, knowing this
was not the case. Without an accurate record of the market value of each
property, the equalization process is nothing more than a game of smoke and
mirrors.296 Accountability remained elusive.
iv.

State Tax Commission

Many people inside and outside of Detroit are aware of Detroit’s
Emergency Manager, who had the power to temporarily override the decisions
of Detroit’s democratically elected officials. Most are not, however, aware that,
likewise, the State Tax Commission took control of Detroit’s Assessment
Division. In response to Detroit’s 2012 Auditor General report—examining the
Assessment Division’s performance from July 2008 to June 2011—and an
exposé about unrestrained assessment inaccuracies featured in The Detroit News,
the State Tax Commission assumed jurisdiction over the Division in 2014.297
Detroit then went through an Audit of the Minimum Assessing Requirements
(AMAR), which the Tax Commission created to more effectively monitor
compliance within local assessing units and to institute corrective action plans
when a unit’s affairs are not in order.298
When Detroit finally completed its citywide reappraisal in January 2017,
the Tax Commission suspended its mandatory oversight in August of the same
year because property assessments were finally based on market values, as
required by law.299 Post reappraisal, my research assistant and I conducted
another sales ratio study and found that the widespread illegality had greatly
abated, but not for the lowest-valued homes.300 In fact, we estimated that
Detroit’s Assessment Division is still unconstitutionally assessing 90 percent of
homes valued $18,500 or less.301

295. See PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 248, at 9.
296. See Atuahene, Our Taxes Are Too Damn High, supra note 39, at 1531.
297. See Christine Ferretti, State Lifts Oversight of Detroit Property Assessments, DETROIT
NEWS (Aug. 30, 2017), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2017/08/30/statelifts-oversight-detroit-property-assessments/105130886 [https://perma.cc/GK4G-VWER].
298. In 2015, all of Wayne County’s other local units went through the AMAR. To review all
AMAR reports for Wayne County, see State of Michigan, Dep’t of Treasury, Local Audit and Finance
Division, https://treas-secure.state.mi.us/LAFDocSearch [https://perma.cc/48RL-JPW9] (search county
field for “Wayne”).
299. See Ferretti, supra note 297; see also MacDonald, Tax Appeals Reveal Imbalance, supra
note 225 (quoting Alvin Horhn: “I am fairly confident that we have it mostly right . . ”).
300. See Atuahene, Our Taxes Are Too Damn High, supra note 39.
301. This is, in part, because nationally recognized assessment tools do not well accommodate
such low valued homes. See, e.g., John H. Bowman & John L. Mikesell, Uniform Assessment of
Property: Returns from Institutional Remedies, 31 NAT’L. TAX J. 137, 140 (1978) (writing that crowded
housing, as a proxy for low-quality housing, often suffers during assessments because “assessing such
properties is more difficult”). But see J. Wayne Moore, Property Tax Equity Implications of Assessment
Capping and Homestead Exemptions for Owner-Occupied Single-Family Housing, 5 J. PROP. TAX
ASSESSMENT & ADMIN. 37, 60 (2008) (“[T]ypically the low-value and high-value properties are the

158

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:107

The State Tax Commission was the only entity able to hold Detroit’s
Assessment Division accountable. There is, however, no public entity
accountable to the people who would not have lost their homes to tax foreclosure
but for the fact that unconstitutional assessments inflated their property tax bills,
making them unaffordable.302 If these taxpayers did not file an appeal, then they
were not just out of luck, but also out of their homes.
d. Legal Limitations
When oversight entities failed to hold Detroit’s Assessment Division
accountable for routine unconstitutional property tax assessments on the front
end, litigation proved a poor accountability mechanism on the back end. On July
13, 2016, the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, along with the
NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. and the law firm of Covington
& Burling filed Morningside Community v. Sabree, a class action lawsuit against
both the City of Detroit and Wayne County.303 The case against the City of
Detroit was for improper administration of the Poverty Tax Exemption (PTE),304
which relieves individuals and families from paying property taxes if their
income falls below the federal poverty line (see Figure 4).305
Figure 4: Poverty Tax Exemption Qualification Guidelines306
Number
in
Household
1
2

Maximum Income for Full
Exemption
(100% Reduction)
$16,660.00
$19,950.00

Maximum Income for
Partial Exemption
(50% Reduction)
$19,160.00
$22,450.00

most difficult to appraise.”). In addition, after trimming, the 2016 data only had 47 sales classified as
“Arm’s Length” so we included “Review Needed” number in the analysis. In prior studies, we included
only sales marked as “Arm’s length.”
302. See Bernadette Atuahene, Detroit’s Homeowners Deserve Better, DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 31,
2017),
http://www.detroitnews.com/story/opinion/2017/01/31/property-assessments/97304442
[https://perma.cc/79DK-PTA5] (discussing the need for the Mayor to come up with a plan to repair the
widespread damage that unconstitutional assessments caused prior to the city’s reassessment initiative).
303. Complaint, Morningside Cmty Org. v. Sabree, No. 16-008807-CH (Wayne Cir. Ct. July 13,
2016).
304. See Complaint, Morningside Cmty Org., supra note 303, at ¶ 2.
305. Michigan state law requires municipalities to provide a property tax exemption to
homeowners who, by reason of poverty, are unable to pay property taxes. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 211.7u (West 2019).
306. DETROIT CITIZENS BD. OF REVIEW, 2018 PROCESS FOR REVIEWING HOMEOWNERS
PROPERTY
TAX
ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM
APPLICATIONS
(2018),
https://detroitmi.gov/sites/detroitmi.localhost/files/2018-05/2018_hptap_application_guidelines.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LUC4-KCFE]. Add $4,180.00 to the income limit for each household member above
eight for a Full Exemption and add $1,500.00 to the proportioned Full Exemption for a Partial
Exemption.
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4
5
6
7
8

$22,100.00
$25,600.00
$28,780.00
$32,960.00
$37,140.00
$41,320.00
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$24,600.00
$28,100.00
$31,280.00
$35,460.00
$39,640.00
$43,820.00

Figure 5: Poverty Tax Exemption Yearly Comparison 307
Year

Full
Exemption

50%
Exemption

Total
Applications

Denials

Denial
Rate

2006

3,204

139

4,168

825

20%

General
Fund
Reduction
1,130,389

2007

3,483

264

4,829

1,082

22%

1,184,311

2008

3,483

331

5,780

1,966

34%

1,354,501

2009

4,528

219

5,633

886

16%

1,801,651

2010

4,388

295

5,795

1,112

19%

1,642,997

2011

3,652

265

4,891

974

20%

1,317,388

2012

3,617

196

4,536

723

16%

1,296,026

2013

3,712

148

4,313

453

11%

850,029

2014

3,678

127

4,214

409

10%

1,098,644

2015

3,840

138

4,164

186

4%

1,145,211

2016

4,459

74

4,645

112

2%

1,177,586

2017

5,206

68

5,684

410

7%

1,046,969

2018*

3,652

39

3,766

75

2%

737,133

*Excludes data from the December Board of Review and hence is incomplete.
Michigan law charges the Board of Review with administering PTE
applications and determinations.308 Given that 40 percent of Detroit residents fall
below the poverty line,309 the important questions are: why did so few
homeowners apply for the PTE; and why was the Board of Review’s denial rate
as high as 34 percent between 2006 and 2018 (see Figure 5)? The Morningside

307.
308.
309.

Private Document Provided by the Board of Review (on file with author).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.7u(5) (West 2019).
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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complaint alleges that “thousands of Detroit homeowners who qualify for a
poverty exemption excusing them from paying property taxes have been
unlawfully prevented from obtaining that exemption due to needlessly complex
and impenetrable application procedures.”310 The complaint includes among the
obstructive procedures: the Board’s failure to make the applications available
online, the requirement that applicants apply to receive an application, the denial
of applications without valid reasons, and the failure to process several submitted
applications.311 Plaintiffs claim that, through its improper administration of the
PTE, the City violated taxpayers’ constitutional right to due process.312
On July 3, 2018—when the City of Detroit agreed to revamp its PTE
application and review process—the parties settled the case.313 The settlement
requires the City to: Send a PTE application to all households with a Taxable
Value of $95,000 and below, all delinquent taxpayers, and all those who applied
in previous year; create a page on the City website that links to the application
and a list of organizations that can assist with its completion; make the
application available in the Assessor’s Office; provide PTE-related training to
staff in the Assessor’s Office; supply reasons for denying an application; reduce
the paperwork required to file the PTE; and raise funds to remove residences that
qualified for a PTE out of the tax foreclosure auction.314 The class action against
the City of Detroit spurred the City to improve its administration of the PTE and
hence was a success.
In contrast, plaintiffs’ suit against Wayne County was unsuccessful. The
suit alleged a violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) on the grounds that Wayne
County’s property tax foreclosure practices disparately impacted AfricanAmericans, causing them to “lose their homes through tax foreclosure at a higher
rate than non-African American homeowners in Wayne County.”315 The courts
never heard the plaintiffs’ substantive claims because both the Wayne County
Circuit Court and the Michigan Court of Appeals agreed plaintiffs should have
filed the case in the Michigan Tax Tribunal rather than in state court.316 Plaintiffs
tried to get the Michigan Supreme Court to overrule the lower courts’ assertion
of improper venue, but the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.317
Plaintiffs did not refile the case in the Michigan Tax Tribunal because of
three procedural disadvantages, which effectively killed their case. The first is

310. Complaint, Morningside Cmty Org., supra note 303, at ¶ 2.
311. Id. at ¶ 8.
312. Id. at ¶ 264.
313. See Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal, Morningside Cmty. Org. v. Sabree,
No. 16-008807-CH (Wayne Cir. Ct. July 3, 2018).
314. Id.
315. See Complaint, Morningside Cmty. Org., supra note 303, at ¶ 256.
316. Morningside Cmty. Org.v. Wayne Cty Treasurer, No. 336430, 2017 WL 4182985, at *3–4
(Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2017) (per curiam).
317. Wayne Cty. Treasurer v. Morningside Cmty Org., 905 N.W.2d 597 (Mich. 2018).
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the statute of limitations. The FHA gives aggrieved persons two years to file a
court claim.318 In contrast, before the Tax Tribunal gains jurisdiction,
homeowners must file an appeal during the Assessor’s Review’s 15-day
window.319 Plaintiffs had long since passed that window. The second
disadvantage is that—although the FHA includes injunctive relief as one of the
many remedies courts can impose320—the Tax Tribunal cannot issue injunctions
because it is not a court.321 The third and final drawback is that the Michigan Tax
Tribunal, unlike state courts, cannot hear class actions.322 The Tribunal is
equipped only to provide relief to individuals and thus cannot address the
systemic illegality that occurred in Detroit.
So, there was an impasse: state courts refused to hear the class action
lawsuit on its merits because they ruled that plaintiffs lacked proper venue, but
the proper venue—the Tax Tribunal—does not have the power to hear class
action suits. Usually, the Tax Injunction Act does not allow federal courts to
“enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under
State law.”323 But, there is an exception if there is no “plain, speedy and efficient
remedy” in state courts.324 The Morningside litigation has clarified that there is
no remedy for systematic property tax assessment errors in Michigan courts.
There may be a way forward in federal courts, but plaintiffs and their attorneys
did not have the resources and stamina to continue down this path.
Although the most obvious cure for systemic unconstitutional property tax
assessments is adjudication, procedural complexities effectively thwarted a legal
remedy. The Detroit case demonstrates that when plaintiffs successfully
overcome tremendous access to justice issues and secure lawyers to sue the
state,325 they still may not secure a win and attain justice.
e.

Financial Advantage

When investigating why predatory cities evolve, following the money will
reveal much. But, the City of Detroit did not stand to gain much from the
propagation of unconstitutional property tax assessments. Compared to other

318.
319.

42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (2012).
DETROIT, MICH., CITY CODE § 44-4-3 (2019) (previously codified as DETROIT, MICH.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 18-9-3 (2017)).
320. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c).
321. See Wikman v. Novi, 322 N.W.2d 103, 114; 413 (Mich. 1982).
322. The Michigan Supreme Court held that “the rules of the Tax Tribunal do not provide for the
maintenance of class actions.” Romulus City Treasurer v. Wayne Cty. Drain Comm’r, 322 N.W.2d 152,
168; (Mich. 1982). But see Sessa v. State Tax Comm’n., 351 N.W.2d 863, 865 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)
(“The Michigan Tax Tribunal has exclusive and original jurisdiction to review final decisions or
determinations concerning assessments or equalization under the property tax laws.”).
323. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
324. Id.
325. For more about access to justice challenges, see generally FELICE BATLAN, WOMEN AND
JUSTICE FOR THE POOR: A HISTORY OF LEGAL AID, 1863-1945 (2015); Rebecca L. Sandefur, What We
Know and Need to Know about the Legal Needs of the Public, 67 S.C. L. REV. 443, 448 (2016).
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cities, property tax revenues comprise a modest percentage of Detroit’s total
revenue. According to Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports produced by
Detroit’s Office of the Chief Financial Officer, between 2007 and 2016, property
tax accounted for, on average, 14 percent of Detroit’s city revenues.326 This is
low compared to other Michigan cities—Kalamazoo (45.9%), Ann Arbor (56%),
Sterling Heights (61.5%), and Warren (61.5%)—as well as other major cities
nationwide such as Los Angeles (25.6%), New York City (27%), Omaha
(27.9%) and Baltimore (39.6%).327 Detroit reliance on property taxes is limited
because it has three other major sources of tax revenue—state shared taxes
(14.2%), municipal income (16.3%), and wagering (11.5%)—whereas most
cities mentioned collect revenue only from income tax and/or property tax.328
Although it is not clear what portion of Detroit property tax revenues were
attributed to illegally inflated property tax assessments, any increase this illicit
act provided to city revenues pales in comparison to the long-term losses.
Unconstitutional property tax assessments are positively correlated with property
tax foreclosures, which have well-documented economic, social, and
psychological effects detrimental to Detroit and its residents.329 So, if you follow
the money, unconstitutional property tax assessments produce a net economic
and social loss for the City and everyone in it. The question becomes: who then
is financially benefitting? The clear and unequivocal answer is Wayne County—
the local governmental unit co-governing the metro Detroit area—and investors
participating in the tax foreclosure actions.
In 2015, Wayne County was nearing bankruptcy with a $52 million annual
deficit that projections estimated would increase to $171 million by 2019 if the
County did not undergo drastic restructuring.330 With only 45 percent of the
funds necessary to ensure full payment of its pension obligations and less than 1
percent of the monies required to fund its healthcare related obligations, the
County was in a financial emergency.331 Under the 2012 Local Financial
Stability and Choice Act, the state had the power to appoint an emergency
326. Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFR) are available at Financial Reports, CITY
DETROIT,
https://detroitmi.gov/departments/office-chief-financial-officer/financial-reports
[https://perma.cc/C6TF-6JWG].
327. Memo to Mary Sheffield, Detroit City Council Member Pro Tempere, from Coalition to
End Unconstitutional Foreclosure (Feb. 2, 2018) (on file with the author).
328. See id. (focusing especially on CAFR from FY2011-2016).
329. See Tsai, supra note 34 and accompanying text. See also Francis Wong, The Financial
Burden
of
Property
Taxes
(Job
Market
Paper,
Dec.
2019),
https://www.dropbox.com/s/cjetrfe94hofy0i/fwong_JMP.pdf?dl=0 (showing that increases in property
tax bills negatively impact consumption and generate spikes in mortgage delinquency).
330. See Wayne County to Operate Under State Oversight After Consent Agreement Approval,
CRAIN’S
DETROIT
BUS.
(Aug.
13,
2015),
https://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20150813/NEWS01/150819925/wayne-county-to-operateunder-state-oversight-after-consent [https://perma.cc/GGF6-KYNT].
331. See CONSENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN WAYNE CTY. AND THE STATE TREASURER (Aug.
10,
2015),
https://www.scribd.com/document/274186251/Consent-Agreement-Wayne-County
[https://perma.cc/VVF3-GHWS] [hereinafter CONSENT AGREEMENT].
OF
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manager to restructure the county’s economic affairs, bypassing the approval of
its democratically elected leaders, as it had done in 2013 in Detroit.332
To avoid this, in 2015, Wayne County entered into a consent agreement
with the state of Michigan.333 This gave the County Executive, Warren Evans,
certain extraordinary powers usually reserved for an Emergency Manager, such
as the ability to unilaterally cut employee pay and benefits.334 So long as Evans
satisfied certain obligations under the agreement, the County’s leadership could
retain much of its decision making power.335
In order to emerge from state oversight in 2016, Wayne County produced
a turnaround plan that balanced its books on the backs of cities with high property
tax delinquency and foreclosure rates.336 More specifically, the plan banked on
$286 million in revenue between 2015 and 2019 from delinquent taxes and
foreclosures.337 Robert Ficano—the Wayne County Executive from 2003 to
2014—admitted that the County’s reliance on tax delinquencies and foreclosures
to close budget gaps was bad policy.338 He remarked, “[f]rom a policy
perspective, you hope it dries up. You don’t want to have to keep foreclosing in
order to balance the budget.”339 Most detrimentally, the county’s reliance on
surpluses generated from tax delinquencies erased its incentive to halt the
property tax foreclosure crisis.
To fully understand how the County regained solvency using surpluses it
seized from delinquent taxes and tax foreclosures, an explanation of how
Michigan handles real property tax delinquency and forfeiture is required. Under
the prior system in place from 1977 until 1998, each locality performed its own
debt collection—even if it did not have the capacity—leading to debt collection
rates of less than 50 percent.340 Under the new system, established by the
Delinquent Property Tax Foreclosure Public Act (1999), when property owners
do not pay their property taxes, in the second year of delinquency, counties
purchase the debt and become the debt collector.341

332. See Mich. Local Financial Stability and Choice Act of 2012, Public Act 436 (2012); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 141.1541-141.1575 (West 2019).
333. See CONSENT AGREEMENT, supra note 331.
334. See id. at 3.
335. Wayne County to Operate Under State Oversight After Consent Agreement Approval, supra
note 330; see also CONSENT AGREEMENT, supra note 331.
336. See RECOVERY PLAN: WAYNE COUNTY, MICHIGAN [hereinafter RECOVERY PLAN],
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4337808/Wayne-County-RECOVERY-PLAN-FINAL522-15FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/RBW2-FAJW]; Wayne County Released From Consent Agreement,
DETROIT
FREE
PRESS
(Oct.
20,
2016),
https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/wayne/2016/10/20/wayne-county-released-consentagreement/92455932 [https://perma.cc/2RZ8-2UH4].
337. See RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 336, at 44.
338. Kurth et al., supra note 245.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. H.B. 4489, 90th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1999).

164

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:107

To purchase the debt, counties borrow money from banks at low rates.342
Counties then give cities monies to cover the unpaid taxes.343 Counties
recuperate their funds by collecting the unpaid property taxes and the sizable
fines, fees, and interest levied on the delinquent sums in addition to the revenues
from tax foreclosure sales.344 Counties deposit all funds collected from
delinquent property taxes and foreclosures into a facility called the Delinquent
Tax Revolving Fund (DTRF), which is used to make payments to cities and
banks.345
There are three distinct funding streams supplying the DTRF. The first
stream comes from the fees, fines, and interest charged on delinquent sums. In
addition to several specific fees,346 the Michigan Tax Act allows counties to levy
18 percent interest on delinquent amounts owed.347 Consequently, in the 20152016 fiscal year, Wayne County anticipated revenue of $8,175,328 from charges,
fees, and fines.348 In 2017, fees and interest constituted 9 percent of Wayne
County’s revenues, which was approximately equivalent to its state revenue
sharing payments.349
The second stream funding the DTRF is the property tax foreclosure
auctions. If delinquent taxes remain unpaid after three years, the Wayne County
Treasurer has the right to foreclose and sell the property at auction.350 Between
2011 and 2015, the Wayne County Treasurer completed the foreclosure process
for about 100,000 Detroit properties.351 Given the remarkable number of

342. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.87b (West 2019); CATHERINE COENEN, ET AL., UNIV.
OF MICH. URBAN & REG’L PLANNING PROGRAM, FROM REVENUE TO REFUSE: MANAGING TAXREVERTED
PROPERTIES
IN
DETROIT
12
(2011),
https://taubmancollege.umich.edu/pdfs/student_work/planning/revenue_to_reuse.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/N5LE-UUMQ]; Interview with Eric Sabree, Wayne County Treasurer (Apr. 19, 2017)
(“Four to five banks, including Chase and Bank of America, have purchased the bonds. The RFP goes
out in the Wall Street Journal. We had trouble getting people interested the last two years, so the interest
rate was higher: 5.75% (2015) and 4.25% (2016).”).
343. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.87b.
344. Any funds that counties do not recover, they charge back to the cities. See Atuahene &
Berry, supra note 17, at 869–70.
345. See MICH. ASS’N OF CTY. TREASURERS, THE DELINQUENT TAX REVOLVING FUND IN 2016
AND BEYOND 4 (2016) [hereinafter TAX REVOLVING FUND HANDBOOK], https://mactreasurers.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/07/Delinquent-Tax-Revolving-Fund-Handbook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MD9F5GK2].
346. Atuahene & Berry, supra note 20, at 870.
347. See WAYNE CTY. GOV’T, ADOPTED BUDGET FY 2015–2016 AND PROJECTED FY 20162017 22-2 [hereinafter FY 2015-2016], http://www.waynecounty.com/documents/mb/20152016_treasurer.pdf#toolbar=1&view=FitH [https://perma.cc/K9DP-LDY6] (explaining that, in fiscal
year 2014-2015, Wayne County collaborated with the city of Detroit and the state of Michigan to
propose legislation that would reduce the interest rate on property tax-delinquent owners from 18% to
6%); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.78g(3)(b) (West 2019).
348. See FY 2015–2016, supra note 347 (showing an increase of $426,928 from the 2014–2015
budget).
349. Kurth et al, supra note 245.
350. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.78(g) (West 2019).
351. For the authors’ calculations, see Atuahene & Hodge, supra note 7.
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property tax foreclosures, the auctions generate significant revenues. The 2014
tax auction netted approximately $24 million for the county, while in 2018 the
auction brought in between $23–25 million.352
A wide range of investors and speculators—from individuals and families
in the Detroit Metro area to real estate investment corporations from California
and Japan—purchase homes at the two tax foreclosure auctions that take place
each year. At the first auction, the minimum bid is all unpaid taxes, interest, and
fees.353 Properties that do not sell at the first auction go to the second one, where
the opening bid is $500.354 At these low prices, it is not uncommon for a
geographically distant investor to purchase a property sight unseen.
My interviews with people whom Wayne County foreclosed upon reveal
that there are two models investors use to flip occupied homes. The first model
is possible because the law prevents delinquent owners from repurchasing their
own properties at auction.355 Consequently, investors purchase the homes and
then sell them back to the original owner on a land contract. This works because,
while delinquent taxpayers do not have a large sum of money (i.e. $5000) to pay
off their past due bills, they can scrape together what a land contract requires (i.e.
$500 for a down payment and then $200 per month thereafter). Investors can
quickly recover the amount they paid at auction and the rest is profit because, in
a land contract, occupants are liable for repairs and upkeep on the property.
In the second model, investors purchase the home, evict the prior owner or
occupant, and then sell the home to a new buyer. If investors are unable to sell
the property to the current occupant or new buyer, then they commonly do not
pay the property taxes or maintain the home. As a result, Dewar finds that “a
high percent of auctioned property quickly went back into foreclosure.”356 Also,
these abandoned homes contribute to blight and crime.357 While the City of
Detroit suffers, investors and Wayne County together profit handsomely from
the property tax foreclosure crisis in Detroit.
The third stream of money funding the DTRF is tax auction overages. In a
mortgage foreclosure, after the debtor pays lenders their loan amount and any
additional accrued fees, the debtor is entitled to keep any remaining equity. In
contrast, once the county sells a home in the tax foreclosure auction and collects
352. Loveland Tech., A Year After the 2014 Tax Auction, LANDGRID,
https://makeloveland.com/reports/foreclosure [https://perma.cc/8NHS-D854]; Loveland Tech., About
What Happened at the 2018 Auction, PATREON (Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.patreon.com/posts/aboutwhat-at-22350862 [https://perma.cc/2XWT-DXZC].
353. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.78m(2) (West 2019).
354. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.78m(5) (allowing the county to establish a “reasonable
opening bid” to recover cost of sale); see Dewar et al., Disinvesting in the City, supra note 240, at 591
(noting that Wayne County has set $500 as cost recovery amount).
355. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.78m(2)(a)-(b).
356. Dewar, The Effects on Cities of “Best Practice”, supra note 36, at 22.
357. See Ellen Kirtner, Note, Interrupting the Blight Cycle: Managing the Future of Properties
in Tax Foreclosure Sales through Pre- and Post- Sale Initiatives, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1083, 1112
(2016).
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all property tax debts owed to it, Michigan law allows counties to retain any
overages. So, if a home sells for $50,000 at the tax auction, but the total tax debt
amounts to only $25,000, counties retain the overage of $25,000. While there are
several lawsuits challenging this practice as a violation of state and federal
takings clauses, none have yet been successful, so the practice endures.358
Figure 6: Wayne County Delinquent Tax Surplus359
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Loveland Technologies estimates that, between 2009 and 2016, all three
streams funding the DTRF resulted in significant revenues, ranging from
$399,923,489 in 2009 to $230,842,267 in 2016.360 More importantly, a
significant portion of these revenues is surplus because the county borrows

358. See, e.g., Hammoud v. Cty. of Wayne, No. 15-cv-14461, 2016 WL 8094373 (E.D. Mich.
Oct. 7, 2016) (dismissing plaintiffs’ ten causes of action for insufficient pleading and for lack of
jurisdiction); aff’d by Hammoud v. Cty. of Wayne, 697 Fed. Appx. 445 (6th Cir. 2017). See also Timbs
v. Indiana: Excessive Fines Clause Applies to All Governments, PAC. LEGAL FOUND.,
https://pacificlegal.org/case/timbs-v-indiana [https://perma.cc/4MAU-ZQ58] (Explaining the ongoing
case of Uri Rafaeli who “inadvertently underpaid his 2011 property taxes by $8.41 on a $60,000 home.
Though he paid all of his taxes on time each year thereafter, Oakland County, Michigan, foreclosed on
his property to collect the $8.41, sold the property at auction for $24,500, and kept every penny of the
proceeds rather than refund the difference to Uri”).
359. Loveland Tech., Wayne County Delinquent Tax Fund Graph, PATREON (June 11, 2018)
[hereinafter
Loveland
Tech.,
Wayne
County
Delinquent
Tax
Fund
Graph],
https://www.patreon.com/posts/wayne-county-tax-19383149 [https://perma.cc/S5VU-RPXD].
360. Id. (“The Total Collections of Taxes, Fees, and Interest measures all of the money that came
back to them in a given year through collections, fees, interest, and chargebacks from any properties
where taxes weren’t ultimately collected.”).
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money from banks for about 5 percent or less,361 but sometimes collects up to 35
percent in fees, fines, and interest in addition to auction sale revenues.362
According to Loveland Technologies, from 2009 through 2016 the surplus
ranged from $29,342,843 in 2015 to $60,457,170 in 2013.363
By statute, county treasurers must keep DTRF monies separate and cannot
comingle them with other funds in their custody.364 The stated purpose of the
DTRF is to obtain “funds to pay to all taxing units within the county the total
amount of delinquent real property taxes, which have not been collected by the
due date.”365 The statute envisions the DTRF as a lock box. Nevertheless, to
balance its books, Wayne County has been transferring ample sums from the
DTRF to its general fund, violating the DTRF’s statutorily established purpose.
As recently as 2018, the county transferred over $26 million from the DTRF
to the County General Fund with the authorization of the 15-member county
commission.366 The county authorized similar transfers in 2017 ($35,153,226),
2016 ($62,047,215), 2015 ($161,222,041), 2014 ($160,975,779), 2013
($23,109,101), 2012 ($15,000,000), 2011 ($4,000,000), 2008 ($5,000,000),
2007 ($14,500,000), 2006 ($8,000,000), 2005 ($21,000,000), 2004
($25,500,000), and 2003 ($10,00,000).367 Sources indicated that, from 2002 to

361. Kurth et al., supra note 245 (“Profit comes from borrowing at 5 percent or less and getting
up to a 22-percent return on delinquent taxes, creating the surplus controlled by the county treasurer.”).
Wayne County’s CAFR from FY2016 notes that the county is permitted to loan securities to banks for
collateral cash at a 2% interest rate. WARREN C. EVANS, CHARTER COUNTY OF WAYNE,
COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT: FOR THE YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2016, at 78
(2016).
362. See Atuahene & Berry, supra note 20, at 22.
363. See Loveland Tech., Wayne County Delinquent Tax Fund Graph, supra note 359.
364. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.87c (West 2019) (“Money and other property held in the
delinquent tax revolving fund shall be kept separate from and shall not be commingled with any other
money in the custody of the county treasurer.”).
365. See HANDBOOK, supra note 345, at 1; id. at 55 (“[T]he county has no right, title or interest
in the delinquent tax revolving fund and the county treasurer is only a collecting agent.”).
366. NO. 22 ANNUAL MEETING, FOURTH DAY, J. COMMISSION CHARTER COUNTY OF WAYNE
STATE PF MICH. 477 (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/commission/archivedjournals.aspx [https://perma.cc/2UUX-ZMHM] (Communication from Wayne County Executive
Warren C. Evans to Committee on Ways and Means, 10/30/2017: “requesting Commission approval of
a resolution authorizing the transfer of $35,153,226 to the County General Fund for fiscal year 20162017, which has been identified as available for transfer from the Delinquent Tax Revolving Fund”).
367. Id. at 488; NO. 25 ANNUAL MEETING, FIFTH DAY, J. COMMISSION CHARTER COUNTY OF
WAYNE
STATE
OF
MICH.
485
(Dec.
1,
2016),
https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/commission/archived-journals.aspx [https://perma.cc/2UUXZMHM]; NO. 12 EQUALIZATION MEETING, FIFTH DAY, J. COMMISSION CHARTER COUNTY OF
WAYNE
STATE
OF
MICH.
149
(June
4,
2015),
https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/commission/archived-journals.aspx [https://perma.cc/2UUXZMHM]; NO. 26 ANNUAL MEETING, SIXTH DAY, J. COMMISSION CHARTER COUNTY OF WAYNE
STATE OF MICH. 567 (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/commission/archivedjournals.aspx [https://perma.cc/2UUX-ZMHM]; NO. 12 EQUALIZATION MEETING, FIFTH DAY, J.
COMMISSION CHARTER COUNTY OF WAYNE STATE OF MICH. 291 (June 19, 2014),
https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/commission/archived-journals.aspx [https://perma.cc/2UUXZMHM]; NO. 24 ANNUAL MEETING, FIFTH DAY 588 J. COMMISSION CHARTER COUNTY OF WAYNE
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2017, the Wayne County Treasurer has transferred $571 million from the DTRF
to the county’s general fund.368 Through 2019, Wayne County plans to receive
$30 million per year from these transfers.369

STATE OF MICH. 291 (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/commission/archivedjournals.aspx [https://perma.cc/2UUX-ZMHM]; NO. 24 ANNUAL MEETING, SIXTH DAY, J.
COMMISSION CHARTER COUNTY OF WAYNE STATE OF MICH. 646 (Dec. 19, 2013),
https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/commission/archived-journals.aspx [https://perma.cc/2UUXZMHM]; NO. 2 ORGANIZATIONAL SESSION, SECOND DAY, J. COMMISSION CHARTER COUNTY OF
WAYNE
STATE
OF
MICH.
29
(Jan.
19,
2012),
https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/commission/archived-journals.aspx [https://perma.cc/2UUXZMHM]; NO. 6 ORGANIZATIONAL SESSION, SIXTH DAY, J. COMMISSION CHARTER COUNTY OF
WAYNE
STATE
OF
MICH.
111
(Mar.
17,
2011),
https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/commission/archived-journals.aspx [https://perma.cc/2UUXZMHM]; NO. 5 ORGANIZATIONAL SESSION, FIFTH DAY, J. COMMISSION CHARTER COUNTY OF
WAYNE
STATE
OF
MICH.
110
(Mar.
6,
2008)
https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/commission/archived-journals.aspx [https://perma.cc/2UUXZMHM]; NO. 8 EQUALIZATION SESSION, SECOND DAY, J. COMMISSION CHARTER COUNTY OF
WAYNE
STATE
OF
MICH.
186
(Apr.
19,
2007),
https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/commission/archived-journals.aspx [https://perma.cc/2UUXZMHM]; NO. 22 ANNUAL MEETING, FOURTH DAY, J. COMMISSION CHARTER COUNTY OF WAYNE
STATE OF MICH. 646 (Nov. 15, 2007), https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/commission/archivedjournals.aspx [https://perma.cc/2UUX-ZMHM]; NO. 19 ANNUAL MEETING, FIRST DAY, J.
COMMISSION CHARTER COUNTY OF WAYNE STATE OF MICH. 657 (Oct. 5, 2006),
https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/commission/archived-journals.aspx [https://perma.cc/2UUXZMHM]; NO. 19 ANNUAL MEETING, FIRST DAY, J. COMMISSION CHARTER COUNTY OF WAYNE
STATE OF MICH. 819 (Oct. 6, 2005), https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/commission/archivedjournals.aspx [https://perma.cc/2UUX-ZMHM]; NO. 19 ANNUAL MEETING, FIRST DAY, J.
COMMISSION CHARTER COUNTY OF WAYNE STATE OF MICH. 735 (Oct. 7, 2004),
https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/commission/archived-journals.aspx [https://perma.cc/2UUXZMHM]; NO. 21 ANNUAL MEETING, FIRST DAY, J. COMMISSION CHARTER COUNTY OF WAYNE
STATE OF MICH. 968 (Oct. 2, 2003), https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/commission/archivedjournals.aspx [https://perma.cc/2UUX-ZMHM].
368. Kurth et al., supra note 245; see NO. 23 ANNUAL MEETING, SIX DAY, J. COMMISSION
CHARTER
COUNTY
OF
WAYNE
STATE
OF
MICH.
579
(Dec.
6,
2018),
https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/commission/archived-journals.aspx [https://perma.cc/2UUXZMHM].
369. Violet Ikonomova, As Tax Foreclosures Give Wayne County a Short-term Financial Boost,
is There Incentive for an Overhaul?, DETROIT METRO TIMES (June 14, 2017),
https://www.metrotimes.com/detroit/as-the-system-gives-wayne-county-a-short-term-financial-boostis-there-incentive-for-an-overhaul/Content?oid=4179545 [https://perma.cc/2FRH-ECRD].
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Figure 7: Approved Transfers from the DTRF to the Wayne County
General Fund370
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The numbers are damning. They unequivocally show that, working with
investors, Wayne County is profiting from the tax foreclosure crisis in Detroit.
But, as the current Wayne County Treasurer, Eric Sabree, correctly asserted, “It
is our job to collect delinquent taxes. The City makes assessments. The City is
responsible for incorrect assessments, not the County.”371 Without the City of
Detroit’s failings, Wayne County could not and would not profit.
II.
BUILDING THE THEORY OF PREDATORY CITIES
Based on the Detroit case, I hypothesize that predatory cities evolve in
places where citizens do not have the economic and political resources to hold
accountable the street level bureaucrats who intentionally or unintentionally use
illicit means to fix budget shortfalls. Predatory cities have existed in the shadows
of legal scholarship because many assume that they are a product of
undemocratic regimes in the developing world and do not exist in advanced
liberal democracies committed to the rule of law. But the historic rates of
inequality experienced in America and abroad weaken the rule of law.372 Not
because poor people engage in more crime, but because inequality facilitates

370. See supra notes 366–368 and accompanying text.
371. Interview with Eric Sabree, supra note 342.
372. See generally Thomas Piketty, About Capital in the Twenty-First Century, 105 AM. ECON.
REV. 48 (2015) (showing trends in income inequality).
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government crimes against poor people. In this era of increasing fiscal
retrenchment, it is important to bring discussions of state predation from the
cobweb-festooned basement of development studies to the center stage of legal
discourse.
While many forms of coercive state extraction are, in fact, legal, the two
primary features of predatory cities are (1) that the routinized actions of public
officials are illegal and (2) that these illegal actions directly augment public
coffers. So in order to transition from a legitimate city into a predatory city, the
illegal takings must be systematic rather than a one-off occurrence. The illegality
does not necessarily make the extractive practices more destructive or morally
opprobrious. Instead, the illegality deconsecrates the state, removing its cloak of
legitimacy and allowing citizens to clearly perceive the state’s transition from
protector to predator. When revealed, the illegality can bolster social movements
by signaling the breach of a deliberated, concretized, and privileged moral
standard, rendering the state’s abuse of power more visible and opening
institutional avenues for resistance.
The predatory city is related to but distinct from four existing theoretical
constructs. The first is state crime, a term criminologists credit William
Chambliss with introducing.373 State crime is committed or tolerated by state
agents through their actions or inactions; performed by state agents in the course
of carrying out the state’s business; and involves the intentional or unintentional
violation of existing domestic or international laws.374 The second related
concept is stategraft, which is an important subcategory of state crime. Stategraft
is when state agents transfer property from persons to the state in violation of
domestic or international laws.375 While both state crime and stategraft focus on
public officials who violate the law in the course of achieving organizational
objectives, stategraft spotlights one crime in particular—illegal property
transfers that augment public coffers.
Stategraft can occur in rural and urban areas; in advanced capitalist nations
as well as developing nations; and at the national or local level. A predatory city
is an urban area where local government officials perpetrate stategraft at scale.376
This geographic dimension of stategraft is important because local governments
significantly impact people’s everyday lives by developing and implementing
373. Chambliss, State-Organized Crime, supra note 166, at 184 (“The most important type of
criminality organized by the state consists of acts defined by law as criminal and committed by state
officials in the pursuit of their job as representatives of the state.”).
374. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. CHAMBLISS, POWER, POLITICS, AND CRIME 142 (2000); Stuart Henry,
The Informal Economy: A Crime of Omission by the State, in CRIMES BY THE CAPITALIST STATE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO STATE CRIMINALITY 253, 266 (Gregg Barak ed., 1991); Jeffrey Ian Ross,
Controlling State Crime: Toward an Integrated Structural Model, in CONTROLLING STATE CRIME 3, 5
(2d ed. 2017) (“[S]tate crime is a broader and more inclusive concept than is the concept of human rights
violations.”).
375. Atuahene & Hodge, supra note 7, at 294–96.
376. The urban area involved can have one of several designations, including a town, village,
county, municipality, borough, district, or city.

2020]

PREDATORY CITIES

171

policies in diverse areas, such as housing, public health, education, social
services, policing, land use, and economic and environmental regulation.377 City
officials are “street-level bureaucrats” on the frontlines,378 so when they abuse
their discretion, entrench arbitrariness, and violate laws, this leaves citizens
particularly vulnerable.
The third related theoretical construct is the predatory state, which is
coercive resource extraction initiated or facilitated by state actors and
institutions—often in concert with market actors—that exploits vulnerable
populations and benefits elites.379 I am applying the well-recognized concept of
the predatory state to local governments. The primary difference is that the
predatory state is a concept that foregrounds elites who extract private gain from
public institutions while the concept of a predatory city focuses on state
predation that chiefly benefits the public purse.
The fourth is a pair of concepts, austerity urbanism and the minimal city,
which describe the evolution and consequences of the shrinking revenues,
mounting expenses, and escalating debt that many cities must endure.380 While
distinct, the predatory city framework builds upon these two concepts because it
moves beyond how and why cities become financially desperate to a deeper
understanding of the illicit actions that can occur in the shadow of austerity.

377. Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 591 (2017).
378. See MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN
PUBLIC SERVICES xi-xiii (1980) (“[T]he decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish,
and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the public
policies they carry out.”).
379. See JAMES K. GALBRAITH, THE PREDATOR STATE: HOW CONSERVATIVES ABANDONED
THE FREE MARKET AND WHY LIBERALS SHOULD TOO 126 (2008); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE
AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 21 (1981); see also Joshua Page & Joe Soss, Criminal Justice
Predation and Neoliberal Governance, in RETHINKING NEOLIBERALISM: RESISTING THE
DISCIPLINARY REGIME 139, 145 (Sanford F. Schram & Marianna Pavlovskaya eds., 2018) (arguing that
the predatory state subverts the political relationship between state and citizen, transforming this
fiduciary union into one predicated upon dominance and subordination); William Reno, Predatory
States and State Transformation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE STATE
(Stephan Leibfried et al. eds., 2015); James A. Robinson, When Is a State Predatory? (Ctr. for Econ.
Studies & Ifo Inst.Working Paper No. 178, 1999).
380. Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1120-6 (2014);
Jamie Peck, Austerity Urbanism, 16 CITY 626 (2012).
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Figure 8: Conceptual Matrix
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Figure 8 shows how the idea of predatory cities fits with other theoretical
concepts that also describe how public officials achieve organizational goals.
There is one question conspicuously missing from the chart: What are the
intentions of the public officials who commit the wrong? This absence is because
the intentions of public actors in each category vary wildly. Some are actively
trying to harm certain groups. Other public officials have a reckless disregard for
the consequences of their actions, even though they are not actively trying to
harm any segment of the population. Yet other public actors have the very best
of intentions but act in ways that nevertheless lead to illegal extraction. The
intentions of public actors can be a red herring. What really matters is that
citizens were actually adversely impacted, and not whether public officials
intended this harm.
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A. Understanding Why Cities Become Predatory
It is easy to attribute the genesis of a predatory city and its attendant
structural violence to political corruption. For instance, some commentators
blame Kwame Kilpatrick—Detroit’s disgraced former mayor who is now
serving twenty-eight years in a federal penitentiary—for the City’s woes.381
Although Hollywood narratives that identify an evil villain are attractive, they
are rarely true. The surge of unconstitutional tax assessments and the resulting
property tax foreclosure crisis in Detroit is due to evil systems. Not evil
individuals. A system, however, makes for an exceedingly poor villain because
you cannot place a black cape or horns on a system. Nevertheless, it is important
to resist simple explanations that pin the blame for the evolution of a predatory
city on a few scoundrels because doing so masks deeper truths.
While there are countless reasons why Detroit evolved into a predatory city,
my ethnographic research shows that a two-part explanation reveals a large part
of the puzzle. First, various factors plowed the City and its residents down,
creating vulnerability. Second, on this fertile ground, legal and governance
failures sowed seeds that eventually sprouted predation. By only highlighting
governance failures without a vulnerability analysis that underscores the
background factors at play, onlookers could wrongly assume that Detroit got into
this mess all by itself.
In the Detroit case, a vulnerability analysis identifies how structural
racism—including racial and exclusionary zoning, racially restrictive covenants,
urban renewal, predatory lending, and mortgage and insurance redlining—set the
stage for unconstitutional property tax assessments.382 In addition, water shutoffs, school closures, municipal bankruptcy, economic decline, political turmoil,
and drastically reduced funding from the state further weakened the City and its
residents, fortifying existing vulnerabilities. Although civil society organizations
normally serve as watchdogs and guard against malfeasance, they were busy
combating Detroit’s bevy of problems and so did not have the capacity to prevent
the Assessment Division from propagating unconstitutional property tax
assessments.
Against this backdrop of vulnerability, certain legal and governance
failures created the structural conditions necessary for predation to advance. One
source of tension was the two amendments to Article IX of the Michigan
Constitution, which were intended to protect taxpayers from ever increasing
property taxes, but actually forced assessment officials to choose between
maintaining a dependable revenue stream or breaking the law. Because
381. See, e.g., Tresa Baldas, How Corruption Deepened Detroit’s Crisis, USA TODAY (Oct. 6,
2013), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/06/how-corruption-deepened-detroitscrisis/2929137 [https://perma.cc/695K-GFZG].
382. Due to space constraints, there are also other major incidences of housing discrimination in
Detroit that I omit, most notably blockbusting, racial steering, and discriminatory placement of housing
projects.
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accountability was elusive, public officials in Detroit chose to break the law by
certifying tax assessment rolls where unconstitutional property tax assessments
abounded. Although the Assessment Division, Board of Review, Wayne County
Board of Commissioners, and the State Tax Commission all had varying levels
of oversight and authority to correct the prevalent unconstitutional property tax
assessments in Detroit, only the State Tax Commission successfully stopped the
illegal assessments by mandating a citywide reappraisal. Wayne County had no
incentive to intervene because it was profiting from the tax foreclosure crisis in
Detroit. Even worse, by generating assessments rolls that systematically violated
Michigan law, the City of Detroit enabled the County to balance its budget on
the backs of Detroit residents delinquent on their property taxes.
Appealing their property’s assessed value was taxpayers’ only remedy
against the rampant illegality. But many owners were unaware of the appeals
process while its complexity baffled those who were, in fact, aware. This Article
identifies six distinct hurdles that homeowners had to leap over to detect and
correct inaccurate property tax assessments. Taxpayers able to secure an
advocate were most likely to reach the finish line and obtain justice. Finding an
advocate, however, was difficult, especially for the indigent populations
occupying lower-valued homes most acutely affected by unconstitutional
assessments. If owners failed to appeal their property tax assessments and secure
individual justice, procedural complexities prevented taxpayers from bringing a
class action lawsuit in state courts for the systemic nature of the unconstitutional
assessments. So limited access to advocates and procedural complexities
infected the justice system and allowed the epidemic of unconstitutional tax
foreclosures to continue unabated.
Most importantly, Detroit officials illegally assessed residents, not because
they are evil people, but because they did not have the staff and budget to do
what was legally required. Resource deprivations brought an evil system into
existence. Dominant narratives about irresponsible homeowners who decided to
buy purses instead of paying their taxes masked this evil and drew attention away
from structural explanations for the crisis. That is, narratives that blamed the
poor kept the structural injustice (systemic illegal property tax assessments)
hidden in plain sight.
My data only allow me to hypothesize that heightened vulnerability
alongside legal and governance failures may be relevant to the genesis of other
predatory cities. Using quantitative and qualitative methods, other empirical
scholars should test whether these factors are, indeed, durable across cases.
B. Detroit is Not Sui Generis
Detroit earned the label “predatory city” because the proliferation of
unconstitutional property tax assessments fulfilled the following five elements:
1) occurred in an urban area; 2) perpetrated by public officials acting in their
official capacity; 3) involved the routine taking and transfer of property; 4)
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augmented the public purse; and 5) intentionally or unintentionally violated
domestic laws or basic human rights. But Detroit is not alone. These five
elements prevail in many other cities.
Ferguson, Missouri is likely another example of a predatory city. The 2014
police killing of an unarmed, 18-year-old African-American man, Michael
Brown Jr., put the spotlight on Ferguson and its suspect law enforcement
practices.383 In its 2015 report, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights
Division revealed that the Ferguson police department violated the US
Constitution’s First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments by adopting practices
intended to raise revenues rather than secure public safety.384 The report found
that Ferguson’s unconstitutional policing targeted African Americans, unfairly
subjecting them to excessive fines and fees.385
Instead of serving their intended role as neutral arbitrators who regulate
unlawful police conduct, courts merely enforced financial penalties, issuing
arrest warrants for unpaid fines and fees without consideration of an individual’s
ability to pay.386 The DOJ report finds that,
In 2013 alone, the court issued over 9,000 warrants on cases stemming
in large part from minor violations such as parking infractions, traffic
tickets, or housing code violations. Jail time would be considered far too
harsh a penalty for the great majority of these code violations, yet
Ferguson’s municipal court routinely issues warrants for people to be
arrested and incarcerated for failing to timely pay related fines and
fees.387
Washington, D.C. provides yet another potential entry point into the
conversation about predatory cities. Civil forfeiture allows law enforcement
officers to seize property that they suspect was involved in a crime without
charging owners for violating any laws.388 Civil forfeiture requires property
owners to prove the property was not involved in a crime, effectively reversing
the normal burden of proof and upending traditional due process protections.389

383. See
generally
Herstory,
BLACK
LIVES
MATTER,
https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/herstory [https://perma.cc/H8W7-2AZU].
384. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT
3,
15,
42
(2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CK9XK63E].
385. Id. at 4.
386. See id. at 3.
387. Id.
388. In contrast, criminal forfeiture requires a criminal conviction to deprive people of their
property. See DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL., INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE
ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 5 (2d. ed. 2015) [hereinafter POLICING FOR PROFIT]. In 2019, the
Supreme Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines clause was incorporated against the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and that civil forfeiture laws entailing severe fines can indeed
violate the Eighth Amendment. See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S.Ct. 682 (2019).
389. See CARPENTER II ET AL., POLICING FOR PROFIT, supra note 388, at 8; Timothy J. Ford,
Note, Due Process for Cash Civil Forfeitures in Structuring Cases 114 MICH. L. REV. 455, 466 (2015).
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Although the intent of forfeiture laws is to undercut profits derived from crime,
it is also a revenue generating mechanism for law enforcement departments—
giving cash-strapped police departments a structural incentive to abuse the law
in a contemporary perversion of Robin Hood.390
Without charging car owners with any crimes, D.C.’s police officers
routinely seized cars and other property that they suspected were involved in a
crime.391 “From 2010 to 2012, D.C. seized 339 vehicles, as well as money from
over 8,500 individuals, for a total profit of over 4.8 million dollars.”392 In order
to challenge these takings, car owners had to post bonds of up to $2500.393 If
poverty prevented owners from promptly rendering payment, D.C. officials
nevertheless took title to their cars, robbing indigent owners of their
constitutional right to due process.394
As a result, in Brown v. District of Columbia, the D.C. Public Defender
Office filed suit on behalf of 375 car owners, challenging the D.C. government’s
“unconstitutional scheme of seizing cars and retaining them indefinitely pending
potential civil forfeiture proceedings, without providing individual owners a
prompt, post-deprivation hearing before a neutral arbiter in which they can
challenge the self-interested police decision to seize, hold, and attempt to take
ownership of their private property.”395 The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs,
and local politicians agreed to reform D.C.’s wayward practices.396
Judicial practices in New Orleans may further illuminate the phenomenon
of predatory cities. Although debtor’s prisons (which incarcerate people for
being unable to pay their debts) violate the US Constitution,397 state criminal

390. See CARPENTER II ET AL., POLICING FOR PROFIT, supra note 388, at 8; Chuck DeVore,
Police-Collected Fines, Fees and Forfeitures: How Does Your City Rank? FORBES (Oct. 26, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/chuckdevore/2016/10/26/police-collected-fines-fees-and-forfeitureshow-does-your-city-rank/#4dfa44ca2520 [https://perma.cc/VHQ7-K5MJ].
391. See Robert O’Harrow Jr. & Steven Rich, D.C. Police Plan Future Seizure Proceeds Years
in
Advance
in
City
Budget
Documents,
WASH. POST
(Nov.
15,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/dc-police-plan-for-future-seizure-proceeds-years-inadvance-in-city-budget-documents/2014/11/15/7025edd2-6b76-11e4-b05365cea7903f2e_story.html?utm_term=.af57a5d0122c [https://perma.cc/XF6T-TYYC] (“Since 2009,
D.C. officers have made more than 12,000 seizures under city and federal laws . . . .”).
392. Pamela Huber, Policing for Profit: When Your Property Does the Time, AWOL (Dec. 12,
2013),
https://awolau.org/847/uncategorized/policing-for-profit-when-your-property-does-the-time
[https://perma.cc/EPG2-Q64R].
393. Id.
394. Complaint, Simms v. District of Columbia, No. 1.12-cv-00701, at 2 (D.D.C. May 1, 2012),
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/CJ-DC-0002-0001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DJ4KWVXU].
395. Class Action Complaint at 1–2, Brown v. District of Columbia, No. 1:13-cv-00686-ESH
(D.D.C. May 13, 2013), https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-DC-0011-0001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9BLR-4GYU]; see also Simms v. District of Columbia, 872 F. Supp. 2d 90, 92 (2012).
396. See O’Harrow & Rich, supra note 391.
397. The Supreme Court clarified that authorities can jail debtors only if they have the ability to
pay and are not willing to do so. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S.
395, 398 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1970).
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court judges in New Orleans revived this vile, anachronistic practice. Despite
endemic poverty, the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court routinely failed to
examine defendants’ ability to pay court debts prior to jailing them for nonpayment.398 In fact, the fines and fees that the court collected were its primary
source of funding, creating a structural incentive for judges to aggressively and
erroneously pursue payment from those with no ability to pay.399
In 2018, a U.S. federal district court issued a ruling in Cain v. City of New
Orleans, declaring the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court’s (OPCDC) debt
collection practices violated the Fourteenth Amendment.400 Specifically, the
court ruled that:
[W]ith respect to all persons who owe or will incur court debts arising
from cases adjudicated in OPCDC, the Judges’ policy or practice of not
inquiring into the ability to pay of such persons before they are
imprisoned for nonpayment of court debts is unconstitutional. The Court
further DECLARES that with respect to all persons who owe or will
incur court debts arising from cases adjudicated in OPCDC, and whose
debts are at least partly owed to the OPCDC Judicial Expense Fund, the
Judges’ failure to provide a neutral forum for determination of such
persons’ ability to pay is unconstitutional.401
In response to the litigation, Louisiana state legislators implemented substantial
reforms, ending the resurgence of debtor’s prisons in their state.402
While the unlawful practices occurring in Ferguson, Washington D.C., and
New Orleans seem to satisfy the five elements of a predatory city, further
empirical examination is required before we can definitively declare them such.
The preliminary evidence I provide, however, suggests that predatory cities may
be more common than we think.

398. Cain v. City of New Orleans, 327 F.R.D. 111, 117 (E.D. La. 2018); Judge Finds Louisiana’s
Debtors’ Prison Scheme Violates Core Constitutional Rights of New Orleans’ Poorest Citizens, LAW.
COMMITTEE FOR C.R. UNDER LAW (Dec. 14, 2017), https://lawyerscommittee.org/press-release/judgefinds-louisianas-debtors-prison-scheme-violates-core-constitutional-rights-new-orleans-poorestcitizens [https://perma.cc/XT3E-HMPJ].
399. Cain v. City of New Orleans, 327 F.R.D. 111, 111–12 (E.D. La. 2018); Cain v. City of New
Orleans, 281 F. Supp. 3d 624, 658 (E.D. La. 2017).
400. Declaratory Judgment, Cain v. City of New Orleans, Civil Action No. 15-4479, 1 (E.D. La.
Aug.
3,
2018),
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/CJ-LA-0011-0035.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3P54-6MES].
401. Id.
402. See H.B. 249, 2017 Reg. Sess. (La. 2017); Tanner Magee, Guest Column: An Unsustainable
Court
System
in
Louisiana,
ADVOC.
(Dec.
18,
2017),
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/opinion/article_8043f944-e1ec-11e7-8b8d1f3ff080a176.html [https://perma.cc/WNN2-HLM9].
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Figure 9: The Constitutive Elements of a Predatory City
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C. Directions for Future Research and Policy
Detroit, New Orleans, Ferguson, and Washington D.C. serve as mirrors,
and in their reflection, the larger phenomenon of predatory cities becomes visible
(Figure 9). Several arenas are particularly vulnerable to predation perpetrated by
public officials and thus require further examination by lawyers, anthropologists,
political scientists, economists, urban planners, geographers, sociologists, and
historians.
The first area for expanded research and policy making is property tax
administration. Although the case of unconstitutional property tax assessments
in Detroit is illuminating, some may assume that it is sui generis. This is wrong.
Christopher Berry and others have found that inequitable and racially
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discriminatory property tax assessments are also happening in Chicago.403 As a
consequence, Berry designed a study to understand if Chicago and Detroit are
part of a national trend. The national study is still ongoing, but his preliminary
results show that most local assessors in Chicago, Detroit, New York City,
Philadelphia, St. Louis, Phoenix, Miami, Los Angeles, Las Vegas, Boston, and
Seattle are systemically inflating the property tax assessments of poor and
minority homeowners in violation of existing laws.404
The second area is civil forfeiture laws, which is an area where the
government’s grasping hand has an especially high potential to victimize
innocent property owners. According to the DOJ, 88 percent of civil forfeitures
happened automatically because the property owner missed the deadline, could
not afford a lawyer, or otherwise failed to challenge the seizure.405 In fact, when
lawyer’s fees and other administrative costs surpass the value of the property
confiscated, owners are less likely to contest the seizure, even when it is blatantly
unjust.406 In addition to the problems in Washington D.C., there have been
comprehensive reports and lawsuits identifying and denouncing systemic abuses

403. See THE TAX DIVIDE, supra note 13; see also Berry, supra note 14. Berry also conducted a
regressivity analysis in Illinois and found that, in 2016, 91 out of 102 counties in Illinois were conducting
assessments using standards that produced widespread inequities in property tax assessments. See INT’L
ASS’N OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, supra note 27, at 14.; see also Complaint, Brighton Park Neighborhood
Council v. Berrios, No. 2017-CH-16453, at 1 (Cook Cty. Cir. 2017).
404. Berry, supra note 14. See also Carlos Avenancio-Leon & Troup Howard, The Assessment
Gap: Racial Inequalities in Property Taxation (Job Market Paper, Nov. 2019),
https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3465010
(showing that, in a study of 118 million homes in the United States, black and Hispanic homeowners
face a significantly higher tax burden).
405. POLICING FOR PROFIT, supra note 388, at 5.
406. See also Nick Sibilla, After Cops Seized and Kept Cash, Washington, D.C. Settles Almost
Million-Dollar
Forfeiture
Class
Action,
FORBES
(Sept.
12,
2014),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2014/09/12/after-cops-seized-and-kept-cashwashington-d-c-settles-almost-million-dollar-civil-forfeiture-class-action/#7d015f867a42
[https://perma.cc/X6QC-QQ9N] (“In Minnesota, the average value of forfeited property was $1,250,
while in Georgia half of the property seized by law enforcement in 2011 was worth less than $650. Since
the cost to litigate is often worth more than the property that was taken, many owners do not even contest
these seizures.”).
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of civil forfeiture laws in New York City,407 Albuquerque,408 Philadelphia,409
Nebraska,410 and Texas.411
The third area is citations issued by police and other city officials for code
violations. The unconstitutional policing and excessive fines in Ferguson are not
singular. The Institute for Justice is suing city officials in Doraville, Georgia,
where courts threaten residents with probation and jail time for failure to pay
innocuous code violations. The city “budgets between 17 and 30 percent of its
overall expected revenue to come from fines and fees issued by its police officers
and code inspectors.”412 The Institute for Justice is also suing Pagedale,
Missouri. Because Missouri limits the revenue municipalities can generate from
traffic tickets, Pagedale extracts money from poor residents by ticketing them
for “[h]aving mismatched curtains; [w]alking on the left-hand side of a
crosswalk; [w]earing pants below one’s waist; [h]aving holes in window screens,
and; [h]aving a barbeque in front of a house.”413
The fourth area for further research is court fines and fees. New Orleans is
not the only city violating the US Constitution by jailing defendants who cannot
afford to pay court fines and fees.414 The Brennan Center for Justice surveyed
407. Amended Complaint, Encarnacion v. City of New York, No. 1:16-cv-00156-DLC
(S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2016). Public defenders initiated a class action in 2016 alleging the City of New
York’s civil forfeiture practices are unconstitutional. The parties reached a settlement when the NYPD
and the Bronx DA agreed to stipulated reforms.
408. See Harjo v. City of Albuquerque, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 1151 (2018); J. Justin Wilson,
Federal Court Finds Albuquerque’s Civil Forfeiture Program Unconstitutional, INST. FOR JUST. (July
3,0, 2018) https://ij.org/press-release/federal-court-finds-abqs-civil-forfeiture-program-unconstitutional
[https://perma.cc/SHH4-WB4W].
409. See Andrew Wimer, Press Release: Institute for Justice Dismantles the Philadelphia
Forfeiture Machine, INST. FOR JUST. (Sept. 18, 2018), https://ij.org/press-release/institute-for-justicedismantles-philadelphia-forfeiture-machine [https://perma.cc/3JAW-MWFY] (“[C]ity officials agreed
to a set of reforms that will end the perverse financial incentives under which law enforcement keeps
and uses forfeiture revenue, fundamentally reform procedures for seizing and forfeiting property, and
establish a $3 million fund to compensate innocent people whose property was wrongly confiscated.”).
The consent decrees are available at the Institute for Justice’s website.
410. See Carimah Townes, How to End Civil Forfeiture, SLATE (July 27, 2017),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/07/how-nebraska-and-new-mexico-banned-civilforfeiture.html [https://perma.cc/8F3G-MNAU] (“Nebraska passed a similar law abolishing civil
forfeiture last year, after the state’s ACLU chapter released a damning report on the practice in 2015.”).
To read the report, see ACLU OF NEB., GUILTY MONEY: CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE IN NEBRASKA
(2015).
411. Eagle Pass Forfeiture, INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/case/eagle-pass-civil-forfeiture
[https://perma.cc/GEL9-HDWX]; Houston Forfeiture, INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/case/houstonforfeiture [https://perma.cc/D7PH-DRV2]; see, e.g., INST. FOR JUST. CIVIL FORFEITURE ARCHIVES,
https://ij.org/pillar/civil-forfeiture/?post_type=case [https://perma.cc/V3LP-H5TW] (cataloguing the
nonprofit law firm’s campaign to eradicate civil forfeiture and listing cases challenging abuses in twenty
states across the country).
412. See Police Must Serve and Protect, Not Ticket to Collect, INST. FOR JUST.,
https://ij.org/case/doraville-ticketing [https://perma.cc/5DLS-9CPH].
413. See Pagedale Municipal Fines, INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/case/pagedale-municipalfines/ [https://perma.cc/4NSE-K8DH].
414. ALICIA BANNON, ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
DEBT
20
(2010)
https://www.aclu-wa.org/sites/default/files/media-
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the fifteen states with the highest prison populations and found that all of them
have jurisdictions that arrest defendants for failure to pay a debt or attend debtrelated hearings.415 All fifteen states also have jurisdictions that impose court
fees without considering the defendant’s ability to pay.416
In addition to these four areas, scholars should aggressively search for other
domains where public officials have incentives to use illicit means to bolster
public coffers. When scholars and policy makers detect predation, they must
refrain from pointing fingers at specific local government officials and assuming
that removing these individuals will solve the problem. The problem is often
systemic. While a changing of the guard is easier, a system change is often
required. Future research should therefore resist the urge to cast all public
officials involved in the illicit extraction as unredeemable villains. Instead,
scholars and policy makers should take a balanced approach that acknowledges
these officials are often trying to maintain a constant water supply from a well
that is growing ever drier.
CONCLUSION
Predatory cities are precipitated by two emerging global trends: the rise of
inequality and the retrenchment of local government budgets. As a result, the
pressure for local officials to use illicit means to augment the public purse is
mounting. In addition to Detroit, several other cities seem to have been beguiled
by the siren song of illicit extraction, filling public coffers with dissonance. This
Article is the first attempt to identify the phenomenon of predatory cities and
explain why one local government could not resist the lure. I began this Article
with Mr. Jones’s story, so it is only fair that he gets the last word. Recall that the
City of Detroit inflated his property tax assessment in violation of the Michigan
Constitution, which led to illegally inflated property taxes that he could not
afford to pay. Consequently, the Wayne County Treasurer foreclosed upon his
home for failure to pay his property taxes. Adding insult to injury, he was not
legacy/attachments/Criminal_Justice_Debt_report_V8.pdf [https://perma.cc/GDJ3-PV5Z] (“Only
recently, an appellate court in Louisiana found that a trial court in Monroe Parish violated the
Constitution in sentencing an indigent person to an automatic jail term that was triggered if he failed to
pay fines and costs.”). In addition, a municipal judge in Bowdon, Georgia routinely threatened to jail
defendants for traffic violations if they did not provide payment immediately. Once the media surfaced
this illegal conduct, authorities temporarily closed the Bowdon Municipal Court while they implemented
reforms. See Shalia Dewan, A Surreptitious Courtroom Video Prompts Change in a Georgia Town,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/05/us/a-surreptitious-courtroom-videoprompts-changes-in-a-georgia-town.html [https://perma.cc/GF8V-C9K8]; Brittany Miller, Court
Closes After Judge Tells Defendant They Can’t Leave Until Traffic Fines Are Paid, CBS46 (Sept. 9,
2015),
https://www.cbs46.com/news/court-closes-after-judge-tells-defendant-they-can-tleave/article_73c18efe-9c54-5470-89dd-8b48d9d50f61.html [https://perma.cc/UGQ8-6NP9].
415. The fifteen states covered, listed in order of number of incarcerated persons, are: California,
Texas, Florida, New York, Georgia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Illinois, Arizona, North Carolina,
Louisiana, Virginia, Alabama, and Missouri. BANNON ET AL., supra note 414, at 1.
416. Id. (“All fifteen of the examined states charge a broad array of fees, which are often imposed
without taking into account ability to pay.”).

182

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:107

supposed to pay any taxes in the first place because his low income qualified him
for a poverty tax exemption. Mr. Jones succinctly described the structural
violence perpetrated by predatory cities when he said, “This whole mess makes
me feel like I was stuck up and robbed.”

